History of Afghanistan (1978–1992) facts for kids

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was the government that ruled Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992. It was only officially recognized by eight countries, all allies of the Soviet Union. This government was very close to the Soviet Union in its ideas and relied heavily on them for money and military support. It was also a main participant in the long Afghan Civil War.

The 1978 Revolution: A New Government Takes Power

In 1978, a key member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Mohammed Akbar Khaibar, was killed by the government. The PDPA leaders worried that President Mohammed Daoud Khan planned to arrest them all. Many were indeed arrested, but Hafizullah Amin, another PDPA leader, managed to stay free. He organized military officers from the party.

On April 27, 1978, the PDPA, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal, and Amin, overthrew Daoud's government. Daoud and most of his family were killed the next day. This uprising was called the Great Saur Revolution. "Saur" means "April" in Dari, one of Afghanistan's languages.

On May 1, Taraki became the head of the new government. The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The PDPA's rule lasted until April 1992.

The PDPA had split into two main groups, Khalq and Parcham, in 1967. Ten years later, the Soviet Union helped bring them back together. However, the "Saur Revolution" was mostly carried out by the Khalq group. This gave them strong control over the army, which was a big advantage over the Parcham group.

The Khalq group was not involved in Daoud's government. Many of its members were teachers from the provinces, especially Pashtuns. They seemed unlikely to take over the government. However, Hafizullah Amin, a key Khalq leader, had secretly connected with Pashtun military officers who were unhappy with the government.

The coup was a bold and well-planned attack. It involved tanks and air strikes on the Argor palace, where Daoud's government was based. This quick action surprised and weakened the loyal forces. Capturing communication centers and the defense ministry quickly isolated Daoud's palace guards.

Many people wondered if the Soviet KGB helped plan the coup. But because the Khalq leaders soon had disagreements with Soviet officials, especially about removing Parcham members, it seems unlikely the Soviets fully controlled it. They probably knew about it beforehand, though.

After the military takeover, the PDPA quickly took political control. Taraki became the head of state and the party. Hafizullah Amin became deputy prime minister, and Babrak Karmal, the Parcham leader, also became a deputy prime minister. The cabinet was mostly Khalq members. Within weeks, the Khalq group began removing Parcham members from power.

New Rules and Challenges: 1978–1979

Once in power, the PDPA government started making big changes. They wanted to promote a non-religious society. Men were told to cut their beards, and women were not allowed to wear the burqa. Mosques were also restricted.

They also tried to change land ownership. They canceled farmers' debts and ended the practice of charging very high interest rates on loans. This was meant to help poorer farmers. The government also banned traditional practices like bride price and forced marriage. They also raised the minimum age for marriage. Education was made important for everyone, and programs were started to teach many people to read and write.

However, many Afghans, especially in rural areas, did not like these changes. They saw them as Western ideas that went against Afghan culture and Islamic beliefs. This, along with the government's harsh methods, led to protests and uprisings from tribal and religious leaders.

The PDPA asked the Soviet Union for help to improve Afghanistan's economy, especially in mining and natural gas. The Soviets also sent people to build roads, hospitals, and schools. They also trained and equipped the Afghan army. The Soviet Union promised a lot of money to the new government.

The old ruling class of Afghanistan was quickly removed. Many were executed, fled the country, or were killed later. This caused a huge loss of experienced leaders and damaged Afghanistan's institutions. Karmal, the Parcham leader, was sent away as an ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

The Khalq leaders struggled to fill the gap left by the old elite. Their harsh attempts to change farming, social customs, marriage, and education led to protests across the countryside. Taraki and Amin's actions created a lot of anger and made it hard for later leaders to gain public support.

Human rights abuses were widespread. Between April 1978 and the Soviet invasion in December 1979, about 27,000 political prisoners were executed at Pul-i-Charki prison near Kabul. Many victims were religious leaders who opposed the government's modernizing and secular plans. The government started a new, frightening practice of arresting people in the middle of the night, which was uncommon before.

The government was set up like a Leninist system. It had a Revolutionary Council as the highest power. A smaller group, the Presidium, made decisions when the council was not meeting. The president of the Democratic Republic led the Revolutionary Council.

Below the council, a cabinet worked under a Prime Minister, similar to the previous government. Two new ministries were added: Islamic Affairs and Tribes and Nationalities. Local governments also kept their existing structures.

The PDPA party was very closely linked to the government. The party's Central Committee and its Politburo made the main decisions. The party's secretary general led both. Party members working in the government were expected to carry out the party's policies.

On December 5, 1978, Afghanistan signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. This treaty was later used as a reason for the Soviet invasion. Many uprisings against the government happened regularly, led by traditional leaders who lost their power due to the land reforms. The government responded with strong military force, arresting, exiling, and executing many Mujahideen, who were "holy Muslim warriors." These Mujahideen groups had different leaders but shared similar conservative Islamic beliefs.

In February 1979, the US ambassador in Kabul, Adolph Dubs, was taken hostage and later killed when police attacked the US embassy. The US did not send a new ambassador.

In March, soldiers in Herat rebelled to support Shi'ite Muslims. One hundred Soviet advisors and their families in the city were killed. The city was bombed, causing much destruction and many deaths. It was later recaptured by the Afghan army.

Nur Muhammad Taraki, the PDPA leader, asked Moscow for Soviet troops in March 1979. Soviet leader Alexei Kosygin warned him that sending ground troops would be a "fatal mistake" and make things worse. Despite this, Taraki got some military and humanitarian help, including helicopter gunships, military advisors, and food aid. Brezhnev, another Soviet leader, still warned Taraki that full Soviet intervention would only help their enemies.

The competition between Taraki and Amin within the Khalq group grew stronger. Amin became prime minister in March 1979, with Taraki remaining the party leader. In September 1979, Taraki's followers tried to kill Amin several times. However, it was Taraki who was overthrown and killed, and Amin took power. Some reports suggested Amin was supported by the US and met with CIA agents. Amin also tried to make the government seem less anti-Islam. He faced pressure from the ongoing rebellion and tried to get support from Pakistan or America, refusing Soviet advice. Many Afghans blamed Amin for the government's harshest actions. Soviet officials in Kabul worried that Amin's rule would be very harsh and strengthen the opposition.

Taraki's death was first reported as a serious illness. But after Amin's government was overthrown, Babrak Karmal's followers said Amin ordered Taraki to be suffocated with a pillow. Amin's rise to power worried the Soviets and led to the events that caused the Soviet invasion.

Amin tried to make the government seem more Islamic. He promised more religious freedom, repaired mosques, gave copies of the Quran to religious groups, and used the name of Allah in his speeches. He even said the Saur Revolution was based on Islamic principles. But many Afghans still held him responsible for the government's brutal actions.

The Soviets formed a special group to look into Afghanistan. They reported that Amin was removing his opponents, including those who liked the Soviets. They also believed he was not loyal to Moscow and was trying to make friends with Pakistan and possibly China.

Groups Against the Government

People outside Afghanistan often called the two main fighting groups "fundamentalists" (who wanted religious rule) and "traditionalists" (who wanted to keep old ways, sometimes including the monarchy). These groups continued to fight each other even after the Soviets left. Their struggles brought attention to Afghanistan's problems in the West, and they received military help from the United States and other countries.

Before the revolution, leaders like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, who would become important fundamentalist warlords, had already fled to Pakistan. They built support there with help from the Pakistani government. Pakistan also helped build many religious schools near refugee camps, with money from Saudi Arabia.

The fundamentalist groups focused on mass political movements. Rabbani started organizing in Kabul but had to flee to Pakistan in 1974. Hekmatyar broke away from Rabbani to form his own group, Hizb-e-Islami, which Pakistan favored for weapons. Another group, led by Yunus Khales, also used the name Hizb-e-Islami but was more moderate. A fourth group, Ittehad-i-Islami, led by Abdul Rabb Rasuul al-Sayyaf, later invited Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan. Rabbani's group got most of its support from northern Afghanistan, where Massoud, a Tajik, successfully fought the Soviets.

Traditionalist groups were different. They were made up of religious scholars (ulama) in Afghanistan. Unlike fundamentalists, they were not focused on redefining Islam in society. Instead, they focused on using Islamic law (sharia) as the source of law. One important group in Pakistan was the Jebh-e-Nejat-e-Milli, led by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi. Some traditionalists were open to bringing back the monarchy and looked to the former King Mohammed Zahir Shah, who was living in Italy.

These traditionalist groups actively tried to remove any non-religious opposition to fundamentalist ideas. They also eliminated intellectuals who opposed the Mujahideen groups.

Other connections, like those within Sufi religious orders, also helped some resistance groups. For example, the Mahaz-e-Milli Islami was a traditionalist group linked to the Gilani Sufi order. Another group, the Shia Muslims of Hazarajat, organized refugees in Iran.

The Soviet-Afghan War: December 1979

A Soviet Spetsnaz (special operations) group prepares for a mission in Afghanistan, 1988.

The Soviet-Afghan War began late on December 27, 1979. The Soviet Union sent a huge military airlift into Kabul, with about 280 transport planes and three divisions of nearly 8,500 soldiers each. Within two days, Soviet forces took control of Kabul. A special Soviet unit attacked Darul Aman Palace, where Afghan soldiers loyal to Hafizullah Amin fought fiercely but briefly. After Amin's death at the palace, Babrak Karmal, the exiled leader of the Parcham group, became Afghanistan's new head of government.

There are many ideas about why the Soviets invaded. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev said the decision was "no simple decision." Two main reasons likely played a big role. The Soviet Union wanted a group of friendly or neutral countries on its borders. They were increasingly worried about the unstable situation on their southern border with Afghanistan. Also, the Brezhnev Doctrine stated that the Soviet Union had a duty to help other socialist countries in danger. Afghanistan was seen as a friendly government that needed direct Soviet help against the growing pressure from the Pakistani-backed Islamist resistance.

Babrak Karmal's government faced many problems. Its strong connection to the Soviets made it hard for people to accept it as legitimate. Even though the Parchamis had been persecuted by the Khalqis, people still saw them as linked to "anti-Islam" Marxism and Soviet "non-believers." The Soviets had to insist that the two groups reconcile. The Khalqis had so much control over the military that the Soviets had to rely on Khalqi officers to rebuild the army.

The Soviets also misjudged how much effort it would take to defeat the Afghan resistance. They expected the Afghan army to quickly suppress the opposition with Soviet support. But as the war dragged on for years, Karmal's government was weakened by its army's poor performance.

The international response to the invasion was strong and immediate. US President Jimmy Carter declared Pakistan a "front-line state" in the fight against communism. He offered Pakistan military and economic aid if it would help channel assistance to the Mujahideen. Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq initially refused but later accepted a larger aid offer from the Reagan administration. Questions about Pakistan's nuclear program were put aside for a while.

China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia also provided help. International aid also came to Pakistan to help with the more than 3 million Afghan refugees who fled the war. The foreign ministers of Islamic countries condemned the invasion and demanded Soviet withdrawal at a meeting in Pakistan in January 1980. The United Nations General Assembly regularly passed resolutions opposing the Soviet occupation.

In mid-January 1980, the Soviets moved their command center from Soviet territory to Kabul. For ten years, the Soviets and the Afghan government fought the Mujahideen for control of the country. The Soviets used helicopters, fighter-bombers, ground troops, and special forces. In some areas, they used a "scorched-earth" tactic, destroying villages, houses, crops, and livestock.

Seeking Public Support

Flag of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 1980–1987.

To gain more support, the PDPA created organizations and started political programs. The biggest one was the National Fatherland Front (NFF), started in June 1981. This group set up local branches in cities, towns, and tribal areas to recruit supporters. Village and tribal leaders were offered benefits to join public events. The party also gave groups for women, youth, and city workers a lot of attention on radio, TV, and in government newspapers.

Since the mid-1960s, the PDPA had been very interested in how information and propaganda worked. After their own publications were shut down by the previous government, they gained control of all official media. They used these media outlets strongly for their propaganda goals. Government newspapers like Anis and the Kabul New Times, along with new publications, showed the government's skill in propaganda. They also used television in Kabul in new ways.

Early efforts to get public support were followed by national meetings. They even used a version of the traditional loya jirga (a large assembly of leaders) to get rural leaders and religious authorities to cooperate. A large loya jirga was held in 1985 to approve the DRA's new constitution.

These attempts to gain cooperation were closely linked to efforts to influence Pashtun tribal politics. This included trying to divide tribes that supported the resistance or convincing important figures to raise local militias to serve the government.

A strong effort was made to win over the main minority groups: Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Tajiks, in northern Afghanistan. For the first time, their languages and literature were widely broadcast and published by government media. Minority writers and poets were celebrated, and attention was given to their folk art, music, dance, and stories.

People Flee to Cities

As the Afghan-Soviet war became more destructive, many Afghans fled to Kabul and other large cities. By the late 1980s, Kabul's population was estimated to be over 2 million. Often, villagers fled to cities to join family members already living there.

Between 3 and 4 million Afghans were under government control, making them targets for PDPA recruitment. The party claimed to have 160,000 members, up from 5,000-10,000 after the Soviet invasion. It was unclear how many members were active. Benefits like food and fuel at low prices made membership appealing. The NFF claimed millions of members, but its core activists were mostly party members. When the NFF ended in 1987, it disappeared without much impact.

Divisions Within the Party

The PDPA could never get rid of its internal rivalries. It was clear that the Soviets controlled its policies, dominated key parts of the government, and ran the war. Because of this, the PDPA could not truly become a strong political force until after the Soviets left. In the civil war that followed, it gained some respect, but its internal arguments got worse.

The PDPA was divided from the start and had constant conflict between its two main groups. The Soviets forced a public truce between Parcham and Khalq, but the rivalry continued with hostility often showing. Generally, Parcham had political power, while Khalq had influence over the army through its senior officers.

Social differences, language, regional origins, and different levels of Marxist ideas caused these divisions from the beginning. By the time Soviet forces invaded, there was already a fifteen-year history of disagreement, dislike, rivalry, violence, and murder. Each new event made the divisions worse. Hafizullah Amin's murder of Taraki further divided the Khalqis. Rival military groups also divided the Khalqis.

Mohammad Najibullah: 1986–1992

The Parcham group faced more divisions when the Soviets insisted on replacing Babrak Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah as the party leader on May 4, 1986. The PDPA was so divided that it struggled to carry out policies and keep its internal security. These weaknesses were somewhat hidden by the need to unite for survival after the Soviet withdrawal. But after military successes, the divisions reappeared.

Karmal remained president for a while, but power shifted to Najibullah. Najibullah had previously led KHAD, Afghanistan's secret service. He tried to reduce differences with the resistance and seemed willing to give Islam a bigger role and allow opposition groups. However, the Mujahideen rejected any of his offers.

Divisions greatly affected the PDPA's leadership. Najibullah was a skilled mediator between groups, a good diplomat, a clever opponent, a resourceful administrator, and a brilliant speaker. He handled constant turmoil during his six years as head of government, making him a strong leader among Afghans. His leadership style was a mix of being willing to compromise and being firm: he understood power, how to get it, and how to use it, but he was also willing to offer choices to his rivals. Most of his colleagues and rivals lacked this combination.

Najibullah faced a similar problem to Karmal when the Soviets put him in charge. Despite Soviet interference and his own frustration about not gaining much public support, Karmal had kept enough loyalty within the party to stay in office. This was clear from the strong resistance to Najibullah's appointment within the Parcham group. This division continued, forcing Najibullah to balance his politics between the Parcham support he could keep and any alliances he could gain from the Khalqis.

Najibullah was known as a secret police official who was especially good at getting Ghilzai and eastern Pashtuns to leave the resistance. Najibullah himself was a Ghilzai from the large Ahmedzai tribe. The Soviets chose him because he ran KHAD, the secret police, more effectively than the rest of the government. So, his appointment was not mainly due to internal party politics. It was linked to important changes in the Soviet-Afghan war that would lead to the Soviet military leaving.

The Soviet Decision to Leave: 1986–1988

The Soviets greatly underestimated the huge cost of the war in Afghanistan. It was later called the Soviet Union's "Vietnam."

Fighting was at its peak in 1985–86. Soviet forces launched their biggest attacks on Mujahideen supply lines near Pakistan. Major campaigns also pushed the Mujahideen onto the defensive near Herat and Kandahar. The Soviets had many unexpected problems, including poor training, low morale, and bad hygiene among their troops. The Soviet army was completely unprepared for the mine warfare used by the Afghan rebels. Muslim soldiers in the Soviet forces were treated poorly, had many desertions, and were unreliable. They were soon replaced by Slavic soldiers from Russia and Ukraine.

At the same time, a sharp increase in military support for the Mujahideen from the United States and Saudi Arabia allowed them to regain the upper hand in the guerrilla war. By late August 1986, the first Stinger ground-to-air missiles were used successfully. For almost a year, these missiles prevented the Soviets and the Kabul government from effectively using their air power.

These changes in momentum made the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, more inclined to see the war as a waste of Soviet political and military resources. Such doubts had developed even before the decision to install Mohammad Najibullah. In April 1985, one month after Gorbachev took power, the Soviet May Day greeting to Kabul did not mention "revolutionary solidarity" with the PDPA. This was a sign that their relationship had been downgraded. Several months later, Babrak Karmal suggested including non-party members in the Revolutionary Council and promoting a "mixed economy." These small concessions towards non-Marxists earned Soviet praise. But differences in policy became clear at a Communist Party meeting in February 1986. Gorbachev's speech, calling Afghanistan a "bleeding wound," hinted at a decision to withdraw "in the nearest future." Karmal's own speech made no mention of withdrawal. In early May, he was replaced by Najibullah.

Najibullah had to move carefully towards the changing Soviet position. Karmal's followers could use any concessions to non-Marxists or acceptance of a Soviet withdrawal against him. So, he moved in different directions. He insisted there was no room for non-Marxists in government. He only offered forgiveness to "bandits" who had been tricked by Mujahideen leaders into resisting the government. In addition to air strikes and shelling across the border, KHAD (the secret police) terrorist activity in Pakistan reached its peak under Najibullah.

Soviet soldiers returning from Afghanistan. 20 October 1986, Kushka, Turkmenia.

By late 1986, Najibullah had made his political position stable enough to start matching Moscow's moves towards withdrawal. In September, he set up the National Compromise Commission to contact those against the revolution. About 40,000 rebels were reportedly contacted. In November, Karmal was replaced as the ceremonial president by a non-party member, Haji Muhammad Samkanai. This signaled the PDPA's willingness to open the government to non-Marxists.

At the end of 1986, Najibullah announced a program called "National Reconciliation." It offered a six-month cease-fire and talks that could lead to a coalition government where the PDPA would give up its full control. Contact was to be made with "anti-state armed groups." It was suggested that resistance forces could keep control of the areas they held.

Much of this program was already happening on the ground. There were negotiations with unhappy Mujahideen commanders who agreed to work with the government as militias. The Mujahideen leaders publicly said the program had no chance of success. For his part, Najibullah assured his followers that there would be no compromise over the achievements of the Saur Revolution. It remained a stalemate. While a strong propaganda effort was aimed at Afghan refugees and Pakistanis, the program was mainly a way for Moscow to try and link a political settlement to its desire to pull out its forces.

Najibullah's real achievements were strengthening his armed forces, expanding the number of co-opted militia forces, and gaining acceptance from more urban people under his control. As a propaganda tactic, "National Reconciliation" was a way to gain time to prepare for civil war after the Soviets left.

Disease and poor hygiene were disastrous for the Soviets. Out of 620,000 Soviets who served in Afghanistan, 14,500 were killed or died from wounds, accidents, or disease. This was a low rate of 2.3%. Another 53,800 (11.4%) were wounded or injured. However, the hospitalization rate was very high, with 470,000 personnel hospitalized, almost 76% of the men. In total, 67% of those who served in Afghanistan needed to be hospitalized for a serious illness. These included many cases of infectious hepatitis and typhoid fever, as well as other diseases. Contributing factors were a lack of clean water, unhygienic practices, lice, and unbalanced food.

The Geneva Accords: 1987–1989

By early 1987, the most important fact in the Afghan war was the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw. They would not abandon their commitment to the Kabul government's survival. Mikhail Gorbachev's options were limited by the Soviet military's insistence that Kabul not be left alone. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership was convinced that solving Cold War issues with the West and making internal reforms were far more important than the fate of the Kabul government.

Other events outside Afghanistan, especially in the Soviet Union, helped lead to the final agreement. The high number of casualties, economic costs, and loss of support at home were causing criticism of the occupation policy in the Soviet Union. Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982, and after two short-lived successors, Mikhail Gorbachev became leader in March 1985. As Gorbachev opened up the country's system, it became clearer that the Soviet Union wanted to find a way to withdraw from Afghanistan without losing face.

The civil war in Afghanistan was a guerrilla war and a war of attrition between the government and the Mujahideen. It cost both sides a great deal. Up to five million Afghans, or one-quarter of the country's population, fled to Pakistan and Iran. There, they organized into guerrilla groups to attack Soviet and government forces inside Afghanistan. Others stayed in Afghanistan and also formed fighting groups. Ahmed Shah Massoud led one of these in northeastern Afghanistan. These various groups received money to buy weapons, mainly from the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, and Egypt. Despite high casualties on both sides, pressure continued to mount on the Soviet Union, especially after the United States brought in Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which greatly reduced the effectiveness of Soviet air power.

A way to make the withdrawal look less like a defeat was already available. In 1982, the UN had started negotiations to help the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Its basic plan was agreed upon by 1985. It involved indirect talks between the Afghan government and Pakistan (Pakistan did not recognize the Afghan government) with the UN's special representative, Diego Cordovez, as a mediator. The United States and the Soviet Union promised to ensure the agreement was carried out.

Both the structure and content of the agreement were designed to be acceptable to the Soviet Union and the Afghan government. Its clauses included confirming Afghanistan's independence and its right to choose its own government. It also stated its right to be free from foreign interference and the right of its refugees to return safely and honorably. But at its core was an agreement reached in May 1988 that allowed the withdrawal of "foreign troops" according to a timeline that would remove all Soviet forces by February 15, 1989.

The accords came from initiatives by Moscow and Kabul in 1981. They had claimed that Soviet forces entered Afghanistan to protect it from foreign forces helping rebels overthrow the government. The logic of the Geneva Accords was based on this accusation. It meant that once the foreign threat to Afghanistan was removed, the forces of its friend, the Soviet Union, would leave. For that reason, a two-sided agreement between Pakistan, which was actively supporting the resistance, and the Afghan government, stopping interference between them, was essential. In great detail, each party agreed to stop any action that could affect the other's independence or security. This agreement included preventing an expatriate or refugee from publishing a statement that their government could see as causing unrest. The agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan was signed on April 14, 1988.

The accords helped a superpower withdraw in a way that justified its invasion. They show how delicate UN diplomacy can be when a major power's interests are involved. Essentially, the accords were a political rescue for a government struggling with the consequences of a costly mistake. The UN could not insist that accusations of national guilt were relevant to the negotiations. In Afghanistan's case, the Soviet Union insisted on its own diplomatic terms, just as the United States did differently concerning Vietnam.

The agreement on withdrawal held, and on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan on schedule. However, their exit did not bring lasting peace or allow refugees to return home.

No Peace After Withdrawal

The Geneva accords did not bring peace to Afghanistan. Neither its enemies nor the Soviet Union expected the Kabul government to survive. Its refusal to collapse led to a three-year civil war. The Geneva process failed to prevent more bloodshed that a political solution among Afghans might have stopped or lessened. It failed partly because the Geneva process did not include the Afghan resistance. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan held Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations. Denied recognition, the resistance leaders resented the central role the Afghan government was allowed to play in Geneva. When the UN representative Diego Cordovez approached the Mujahideen groups in February 1988, more than five years after talks began, they were not interested. Their bitterness would affect later efforts to find a political solution.

Much diplomatic effort was spent throughout 1987 to find a political compromise that would end the fighting before the Soviets left. While Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the Afghan government argued over a timeline for the Soviet withdrawal, Cordovez worked on a plan for an Afghan government that would bring the fighting groups together. The plan involved Mohammed Zahir Shah, the former king, and his former government members, most of whom were in exile. This approach also called for a meeting in the loya jirga tradition, representing all Afghan groups and communities. It was meant to reach an agreement on what a future government would look like. The jirgah was also to choose a small group of respected leaders to act as a temporary government instead of the Kabul government and the Mujahideen. During this transition, a new constitution would be created, and elections would be held to install a government accepted by the people. This plan kept reappearing in different forms throughout the civil war that followed. Suggested roles for the king and his followers came and went from these plans, despite strong opposition from most Mujahideen leaders.

The chance for peace failed because no believable agreement could be reached. By mid-1987, the resistance forces felt they were winning militarily. They had stopped what turned out to be the last major Soviet attacks. The Stinger missiles were still having a devastating effect, and they were receiving an unprecedented amount of outside help. Defeating the Kabul government was their solution for peace. This confidence, made stronger by their distrust of the UN, almost guaranteed their refusal of a political compromise.

Pakistan's Attempt at a Political Solution: 1987–1988

Pakistan was the only country in a position to convince the Mujahideen otherwise. Its close relationship with the groups it hosted had shaped their war and their politics. Their reliance on Pakistan for weapons, training, money, and safety had been almost complete. But by 1987, Pakistan's foreign policy was divided. The Foreign Ministry worked with Diego Cordovez to create a plan for a "neutral" government. President Zia-ul-Haq was strongly convinced that a political solution favoring the Mujahideen was essential. He worked hard to convince the United States and the Soviet Union. Some argue that disagreements within the military and with Zia's increasingly independent prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo, hindered Zia's efforts. When Mikhail Gorbachev announced a Soviet withdrawal without a peace settlement at his meeting with President Reagan on December 10, 1987, the chance for a political agreement was lost. All the main groups were then caught up in the rush to complete the Geneva process.

In the end, the Soviets were content to leave the possibilities of reconciliation to Najibullah. They supported him with massive material aid. He had made an expanded reconciliation offer to the resistance in July 1987. This included twenty seats in the State Council, twelve ministries, a possible prime ministership, and Afghanistan's status as an Islamic non-aligned state. Military, police, and security powers were not mentioned. The offer still fell far short of what even the moderate Mujahideen groups would accept. Najibullah then reorganized his government to face the Mujahideen alone. A new constitution took effect in November 1987. The country's name was changed back to the Republic of Afghanistan. The State Council was replaced by a National Assembly where "progressive parties" could freely compete. Mohammed Hassan Sharq, a non-party politician, was named prime minister. Najibullah's presidency was given new powers and assumed to be long-lasting. He was quickly elected to a seven-year term. On paper, the Afghan government appeared much more democratic than Mohammed Daoud Khan had left it, but its popular support remained questionable.

Stalemate: The Civil War, 1989–1992

The Soviet Union left Afghanistan in the middle of winter, causing some panic among officials in Kabul. Hard experience had convinced Soviet officials that the government was too divided to survive. Pakistani and United States officials expected a quick Mujahideen victory. The resistance was ready to attack provincial towns and cities, and eventually Kabul, if needed. The fall of one city might cause a chain reaction that would collapse the government.

Within three months, these hopes were crushed at Jalalabad. An initial attack broke through the city's defenses and reached its airport. A counterattack, supported by effective artillery and air power, pushed the Mujahideen back. Uncoordinated attacks on the city from other directions failed. The crucial supply road to the garrison from Kabul was reopened. By May 1989, it was clear that the Kabul forces in Jalalabad had held.

The Mujahideen were shocked by this failure. It showed their inability to coordinate attacks, logistics, or maintain political unity. Over the next three years, they could not overcome these weaknesses. Only one important provincial capital, Taloqan, was captured and held. Mujahideen positions expanded in the northeast and around Herat. However, their inability to gather enough forces to defeat a modern army fighting from strong positions was clear. A deadly exchange of medium-range rockets became the main form of combat. This angered the urban population and made it harder for millions of refugees to return.

The victory at Jalalabad greatly boosted the morale of the Kabul government. Its army proved able to fight effectively alongside the experienced Soviet-trained special security forces. Desertions decreased sharply when it became clear that the resistance was disorganized and could not win quickly. The change in atmosphere made it much easier to recruit militia forces. As many as 30,000 troops were assigned to defend Herat alone.

Immediately after the Soviet departure, Najibullah removed the appearance of shared government. He declared an emergency and removed Sharq and other non-party ministers from the cabinet. The Soviet Union responded with a flood of military and economic supplies. Enough food and fuel were provided for the next two difficult winters. Much of the military equipment belonging to Soviet units leaving Eastern Europe was shipped to Afghanistan. With adequate supplies, Kabul's air force, which had developed tactics to minimize the threat from Stinger missiles, now prevented large attacks against the cities. Medium-range missiles, especially the Scud, were successfully launched from Kabul to defend Jalalabad, 145 kilometers away. One even reached the suburbs of Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, more than 400 kilometers away. Soviet support reached $3 billion a year in 1990. Kabul had achieved a stalemate, which exposed the Mujahideen's political and military weaknesses.

Reagan's Policy Against Communism: 1981–1988

When Ronald Reagan became President of the United States in early 1981, he started a strategy to push back against communism. He supported rebel groups in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, and especially in Afghanistan.

Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. He quickly realized the huge cost of trying to keep his Communist empire together. The US was increasing military spending, threatening to build "Star Wars" defenses, and the Soviet economy was failing badly as oil export revenues dropped. It took him several years to get enough support from the Politburo. All this time, the poor performance and long presence of the Soviet military in Afghanistan created financial and political problems at home. In 1986, he replaced Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah, the head of the secret police (KHAD). Finally, in 1988, to save the core of the Communist system in Russia, he admitted defeat and cut his losses in Afghanistan.

Boris Yeltsin Takes Power in Moscow: 1991

When communist hardliners failed to take over the Soviet government in August 1991, Mohammad Najibullah's supporters in the Soviet Army lost their power to control Afghan policy. The effect was immediate. On September 13, the Russian government, now led by Boris Yeltsin, agreed with the United States to stop military aid to both sides in the Afghan civil war. This was set to begin on January 1, 1992.

The new Soviet government then tried to build political relationships with the Afghan resistance. In mid-November, they invited a delegation from the resistance's Afghanistan Interim Government (AIG) to Moscow. There, the Soviets agreed that a temporary government should prepare Afghanistan for national elections. The Soviets did not insist that Najibullah or his colleagues participate in this process. Having lost both material and political support, Najibullah's divided government began to fall apart.

During the nearly three years that the Kabul government had successfully defended itself against Mujahideen attacks, groups within the government had also developed secret connections with their opponents. Even during the Soviet war, Kabul officials had arranged ceasefires, neutral zones, and passes allowing unarmed Mujahideen to enter towns. As the civil war became a stalemate in 1989, such arrangements grew into political understandings. Fighting generally stopped around Kandahar because most Mujahideen commanders had an agreement with its provincial governor. Ahmed Shah Massoud made an agreement with Kabul to keep the important north-south highway open after the Soviet withdrawal. The biggest Mujahideen victory during the civil war, the capture of Khost, happened because its garrison cooperated. In March 1990, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar worked with an attempted coup by the Khalqi Defense minister Shah Nawaz Tanai. Hekmatyar's forces were supposed to attack Kabul at the same time. The plan failed due to bad communication. Tanai escaped by helicopter to Pakistan, where Hekmatyar publicly welcomed him as an ally.

Working with opponents became a major part of Najibullah's defense strategy. Many Mujahideen groups were literally bought off with weapons, supplies, and money to become militias defending towns, roads, and installations. Such arrangements carried the risk of backfiring. When Najibullah's political support ended and the money ran out, these loyalties crumbled.

The Fall of Kabul: April 1992

Kabul finally fell to the Mujahideen because the groups within its government tore it apart. Until its senior officers became disheartened and defected, the army had performed better than it ever had under direct Soviet guidance. It was a classic case of losing morale. The government collapsed even though it still had more weapons and supplies. Its stockpiles of ammunition and planes would provide the victorious Mujahideen with the means to wage years of very destructive war. Kabul was short of fuel and food at the end of winter in 1992, but its military units were well-supplied enough to fight indefinitely. They did not fight because their leaders were scrambling for survival. Their aid had not only been cut off, but the Marxist-Leninist ideas that had given the government its reason for existing had been rejected by its source.

A few days after it was clear that Najibullah had lost control, his army commanders and governors arranged to hand over authority to resistance commanders and local leaders across the country. Joint councils, or shuras, were immediately set up for local government. Civil and military officials from the former government were usually included. Reports indicate the process was generally friendly. In many cases, arrangements for transferring regional and local authority had been made between enemies beforehand.

These local arrangements generally stayed in place in most of Afghanistan until at least 1995. Disruptions happened where local political arrangements were linked to the struggle that developed between the Mujahideen parties. At the national level, a political power vacuum was created. The exiled parties rushed in to take control. The rivalries, ambitions, arrogance, and strict beliefs that had paralyzed their shadow government proved to be even more disastrous in their struggle for power. The traits they brought with them had become stronger during their competition for favor in Peshawar.

Secret agreements between military leaders quickly brought down the Kabul government. In mid-January 1992, within three weeks of the Soviet Union's collapse, Ahmed Shah Massoud knew about conflict within the government's northern command. General Abdul Momim, in charge of the Hairatan border crossing at the northern end of Kabul's supply highway, and other non-Pashtun generals based in Mazari Sharif feared being removed by Najibullah and replaced by Pashtun officers. The generals rebelled, and the situation was taken over by Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was a general and head of the Jozjani militia, also based in Mazari Sharif. He and Massoud reached a political agreement, along with another major militia leader, Sayyid Mansor, from the Ismaili community based in Baghlan province. These northern allies strengthened their position in Mazari Sharif on March 21. Their alliance covered nine provinces in the north and northeast. As chaos grew within the government in Kabul, there was no government force standing between the northern allies and the major air force base at Bagram, about seventy kilometers north of Kabul. By mid-April, the air force command at Bagram had surrendered to Massoud. Kabul was defenseless; its army was no longer reliable.

Najibullah had lost internal control immediately after he announced on March 18 that he was willing to resign to make way for a neutral interim government. As the government broke into several groups, the issue became how to transfer power. Najibullah tried to fly out of Kabul on April 17 but was stopped by Dostam's troops, who controlled Kabul Airport under the command of Babrak Karmal's brother, Mahmud Baryalai. Revenge between Parchami factions was taken. Najibullah took refuge at the UN mission, where he remained until he was hanged by the Taliban in 1996. A group of Parchami generals and officials declared themselves an interim government to hand over power to the Mujahideen.

For more than a week, Massoud waited to move his forces into the capital. He was waiting for political leaders from Peshawar to arrive. The parties suddenly had sovereign power within their grasp, but no plan for how to use it. With his main commander ready to occupy Kabul, Burhanuddin Rabbani was in a position to win by default. Meanwhile, UN mediators tried to find a political solution that would ensure a transfer of power acceptable to all sides.

The United Nations Plan for Peace

UN official Benan Sevan was Cordovez's successor as the special representative of the UN secretary general. He tried to use a political plan that had been announced by UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar on May 21, 1991. Called a five-point plan, it included: recognizing Afghanistan's independent status as a politically non-aligned Islamic state; accepting the right of Afghans to choose their own government and social and economic systems; the need for a transition period allowing talks between Afghans to establish a government with wide support; stopping all foreign arms deliveries into Afghanistan; and enough international funding to help Afghan refugees return and rebuild the country after the war.

These principles were supported by the Soviet Union, the United States, and Afghanistan's neighboring governments. However, there was no military way to enforce them. The three moderate Peshawar parties accepted it, but it was opposed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Rasool Sayyaf, and Mawlawi Yunis Khalis, who wanted a total victory over the Kabul government.

Nevertheless, these four "fundamentalists" found it politically smart to participate in the effort to carry out the UN initiative. Pressure from their foreign supporters and the opportunities that participation offered to change or block the plan encouraged them to be reluctant players. Pakistan and Iran worked together to get Mujahideen acceptance at a conference in July 1991. Showing its official acceptance of the plan, Pakistan officially announced the end of its own military assistance to the resistance in late January 1992. Najibullah also declared his acceptance, but until March 18, 1992, he avoided giving a clear answer about whether or when he would resign during negotiations.

Sevan made a strong effort to create the way for talks that would lead to the transitional process mentioned in point three of the plan. The planned arrangement was a simpler version of earlier plans that had involved the possible participation of Mohammed Zahir Shah and a loya jirga meeting. By March 1992, the plan had changed to holding a meeting in Europe of about 150 respected Afghans representing all communities in late spring. Most of Sevan's effort was directed at getting all Afghan groups, including the Shia parties in control of the Hazarajat, to cooperate. In early February, he seemed to have gained active support from commanders among the Pashtuns in eastern Afghanistan and agreement from Rabbani and Hekmatyar to submit lists of participants acceptable to them for the proposed meeting. At the same time, Sevan worked to persuade Najibullah to step down, believing that his removal would bring full Mujahideen participation. Instead, Najibullah's March 18 announcement sped up the collapse of his government. This collapse, in turn, triggered events that moved faster than Sevan's plan could be put into effect.

In the midst of busy efforts to organize the European meeting, Sevan declared on April 4 that most of the parties (including Hekmatyar's) and the Kabul government had agreed to transfer power to a proposed temporary authority. He also announced the creation of a "pre-transition council" to take control of the government "perhaps within the next two weeks." He was struggling to keep up with events that threatened to dissolve the government before he had a replacement for it.

In the end, some of the Shia parties and the Islamists in Peshawar blocked his plan. They held back their choices or submitted candidates for the European meeting whom they knew would be unacceptable to others. The hope for a neutral, complete approach to a political settlement among Afghans was dashed. Sevan then worked to ensure a peaceful transfer of power from the temporary Kabul government, which replaced Najibullah on April 18, to the forces of Ahmed Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostam. In effect, the transfer was peaceful, but without an overall political settlement in place. Within a week, a new civil war would begin among the victors as the era of the Islamic State of Afghanistan began.