Metaethics facts for kids

Metaethics is a part of philosophy that looks at big questions about morality. It's like asking: "What is goodness?" or "How do we know what's right or wrong?"

Think of it this way:

• Normative ethics asks, "What should I do?" (Like, "Should I tell the truth?")
• Applied ethics looks at specific tough choices (Like, "Is it okay to use AI in certain ways?")
• Metaethics goes deeper, asking about the very idea of "right" or "wrong." It explores what moral words mean and where our ideas about good and bad come from.

Some thinkers believe understanding the deep nature of morality helps us make better choices. Others think that by studying how we make moral judgments, we can learn about morality itself.

What are the Big Questions in Metaethics?

Philosophers Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen say there are three main types of questions in metaethics:

• What do moral words mean? (This is called moral semantics.)
  • It asks about words like 'good', 'bad', 'right', and 'wrong'. What do we really mean when we use them?
• What is the nature of moral judgments? (This is called moral ontology.)
  • Are moral rules the same for everyone, everywhere (absolute)? Or do they change depending on the person or culture (relative)?
• How can we prove or defend moral judgments? (This is called moral epistemology.)
  • How can we know if something is truly right or wrong? Is it even possible to know?

These questions are connected. Answering one might help answer another. Metaethics doesn't tell you what specific choices are good or bad. Instead, it helps us understand the ideas behind all moral claims.

What Do Moral Words Mean? (Moral Semantics)

Moral semantics tries to figure out the meaning of moral words and sentences.

Do Moral Statements Have Truth? (Cognitivism)

Cognitivist theories believe that moral sentences can be true or false. They express ideas that can be checked against reality.

Are Moral Facts Real? (Moral Realism)

Moral realism says that moral facts are real and exist independently of what people think or feel. They are like facts about the world, not just opinions. There are two main types:

• Ethical naturalism suggests that moral properties are linked to natural properties. For example, being "good" might be like being "pleasant" or "beneficial." We can learn about these moral truths by observing the world.
• Ethical non-naturalism (like what G. E. Moore believed) says that moral properties, like "goodness," are real but can't be broken down into simpler, natural parts. We know them through a special kind of intuition or reason.

Are Moral Facts Just Opinions? (Ethical Subjectivism)

Ethical subjectivism is a type of anti-realism. It says that moral statements are true or false based on people's attitudes or agreements. This could be the attitudes of a whole society, an individual, or a specific group.

• Ideal observer theory suggests that what's right is what a perfect, rational, and fully informed person would approve of. Even though it's based on a "subject" (the ideal observer), it aims for universal answers.
• Divine command theory says that something is right if God approves of it. What's right for us is to obey God's will. This view also tries to give universal moral rules.

Are All Moral Statements False? (Error Theory)

Error theory is another anti-realism view. It says that even though moral claims try to express truths, they are all false. So, "Killing is wrong" and "Killing is permissible" are both false. J. L. Mackie was a famous supporter of this idea. If there are no moral truths, then error theory leads to moral nihilism (nothing has moral value).

Do Moral Statements Just Express Feelings? (Non-Cognitivism)

Non-cognitivist theories believe that moral sentences are not true or false because they don't express real ideas. They are more like expressions of feelings or commands.

• Emotivism (supported by A. J. Ayer) says that moral sentences just show our emotions. "Killing is wrong" means something like "Boo! Killing!"
• Quasi-realism (by Simon Blackburn) suggests that moral statements act like factual claims in language, so we can call them "true" or "false," even if there are no actual moral facts.
• Universal prescriptivism (by R. M. Hare) says moral statements are like universal commands. "Killing is wrong" means "Don't kill!" Hare believed these commands should apply to everyone.

What is the Nature of Moral Judgments? (Moral Ontology)

Moral ontology explores what moral judgments are like. For those who believe in some kind of morality, there are two main ideas:

• Universalists believe the same moral facts or rules apply to everyone, everywhere.
• Relativists believe different moral facts or rules apply to different people or societies.

Are Moral Rules the Same for Everyone? (Moral Universalism)

Moral universalism says that there are moral rules that apply to all people. These rules might come from human nature, shared experiences like suffering, or universal reason.

• Value monism is the common type of universalism. It says all good things can be measured on one single scale of value.
• Value pluralism argues that there are two or more real ways to measure value, and they can't always be compared directly. For example, a life as a scientist and a life as an artist might both be valuable, but you can't easily say which is "more" valuable.

Do Moral Rules Change? (Moral Relativism)

Moral relativism says that all moral judgments come from either society's rules or an individual's preferences. There's no single, objective way to decide if a moral statement is true. So, "good" or "bad" depend on what a society or person thinks. If two societies disagree on what's right, there's no higher, independent standard to settle the argument.

Does Nothing Have Moral Value? (Moral Nihilism)

Moral nihilism says that nothing has any true moral value. A moral nihilist would say that killing someone is neither right nor wrong in itself. This is different from moral relativism, which still allows for moral statements to be true or false within a specific group or person's view. If you're a moral nihilist, you're also a moral skeptic because you believe no one can have moral knowledge.

How Can We Know Moral Truths? (Moral Epistemology)

Moral epistemology is the study of how we gain moral knowledge. It asks, "How can we support or defend our moral judgments?" and "Is moral knowledge even possible?"

If we believe moral statements can be true or false, then knowing moral facts helps us justify our moral beliefs. Most theories in moral epistemology suggest that moral knowledge is possible.

Can We Learn Morality Through Experience or Reason?

Learning from Experience (Empiricism)

Empiricism is the idea that we gain knowledge mainly through observation and experience. Metaethical theories that use this idea include:

• Ethical naturalism: It says moral facts can be understood like other facts about the world, so we can learn them through observation.
• Most forms of ethical subjectivism: These say moral facts are about people's opinions or cultural rules, which we can learn by observing those opinions or rules.

One challenge for using experience to learn about ethics is the is-ought problem. This problem asks how we can go from knowing how the world is to knowing how we ought to act.

Learning from Reason (Moral Rationalism)

Moral rationalism says that we can know moral truths (or at least general moral principles) just by using our reason, without needing experience. Famous philosophers like Plato and Immanuel Kant believed this.

Can We Just Know Moral Truths? (Ethical Intuitionism)

Ethical intuitionism is the idea that we can know some moral truths directly, without having to figure them out from other things. It's like having a basic understanding of right and wrong. This view usually suggests that there are objective moral facts.

Can We Know Nothing About Morality? (Moral Skepticism)

Moral skepticism is a group of theories that all say no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also believe that moral knowledge is impossible. Error theory and most forms of non-cognitivism are types of moral skepticism.

See also

In Spanish: Metaética para niños