Henry Clausen facts for kids

Henry Christian Clausen (born June 30, 1905 – died December 4, 1992) was an American lawyer and investigator. He is best known for writing the Clausen Report. This was an 800-page report about the Army's investigation into the Attack on Pearl Harbor.

In 1945, he traveled over 55,000 miles in seven months. He interviewed nearly a hundred people, including Army, Navy, British, and civilian staff. He worked as a Special Investigator for the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson. His job was to carry out an investigation ordered by the United States Congress.

Henry Clausen's Life Story

Clausen was a lawyer from San Francisco. He had also worked as an Assistant United States Attorney. He joined the military for the duration of World War II. He left the service in August 1945.

During the war, he was involved in a military trial. This trial was for Army inspectors who had problems with aircraft engine inspections. This happened at the Curtiss-Wright engine factory in Ohio.

Clausen was a Republican, like Secretary Stimson. He greatly admired Stimson. Later, Clausen wrote a book called Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement in 1991. It was published in 1992. He wrote it to correct what he called "inaccurate conspiracy theories" about the Pearl Harbor attack.

Understanding the Clausen Report

The Clausen Report was a very important document. It looked into why the attack on Pearl Harbor happened. Secretary of War Stimson received an earlier Army report on Pearl Harbor. This report criticized important leaders like George Marshall and Cordell Hull.

However, this first report had big problems. It was missing key evidence and some people did not tell the full truth. The investigators only learned about a secret code-breaking operation called Magic shortly before finishing.

Why Clausen Investigated

After reviewing the first report, Stimson asked Clausen to help. Clausen had been an Assistant Recorder for the Army Board. Stimson then appointed Clausen as his Special Investigator. His job was to gather more evidence and explore new clues.

Clausen and another officer, Colonel Hughes, wanted to find out:

• What did Pearl Harbor know about Japan's plans before the attack?
• What did Pearl Harbor do with this information?
• What did Washington know about Japan's plans before the attack?
• What did Washington do with this information?

Clausen had a special letter from Stimson. This letter told witnesses that Clausen had the authority to get their cooperation. Sometimes, people did not tell him everything at first. He had to show them copies of about 40 top-secret 'Magic' messages. This proved he had the right clearance. Before this, they had been told to keep 'Magic' a secret. Clausen carried these secret messages in a special self-destructing pouch for security.

Key Messages and Warnings

One important message was the "Fourteen-part Telegram." This message said that diplomatic relations would be broken. Colonel Dusenbury of the US Army SIS received the final part of this message around midnight. No immediate action was taken.

Both Dusenbury and Commander Kramer, the translator, went home. This caused a delay of several vital hours. The next morning, Colonel Bratton arrived later than he first said. Clausen believed Bratton made up a story about not being able to reach Marshall. This story almost ruined Marshall's reputation.

Marshall wanted to make sure the final warning on December 7 reached everyone before 1 PM Washington time. He sent Colonels Bratton and Bundy back to the message center twice to confirm this. But Colonel French, who ran the message center, found out the War Department's radio system could not reach Pearl Harbor. He decided to send the message by commercial radio. He did not tell Marshall about this delay.

Leaders at Pearl Harbor

Clausen also looked at the actions of the commanders at Pearl Harbor.

• Lt. Gen. W. C. Short was the Army commander. Clausen said he did not want the command in Hawaii. He also failed to understand his duties. He did not follow orders from Washington to work closely with the Navy. He also did not conduct reconnaissance (scouting for enemies). He failed to get his radar equipment out of training mode for months. Most importantly, he did not alert his forces against attack as ordered.
• Adm. H. E. Kimmel was the Navy commander. Clausen said he held back important information from General Short. For example, he did not share messages about Japan destroying its codes. He thought these were not "of vital importance." Kimmel was also very set in his ways. He would not work with the Army about their readiness.

Clausen also criticized other individuals. He mentioned President Roosevelt for making many phone calls after reading the Japanese message, but not one to Marshall. Clausen did not believe a "Winds Execute" message (a secret signal for war) was received, even though some people claimed it was.

Clausen's Final Thoughts

Clausen believed the main reason for being unprepared at Pearl Harbor was having two separate commands (Navy and Army). Also, there were two separate intelligence groups in Washington. He was happy when President Truman combined the Navy and Army efforts. This eventually led to the creation of the NSA.

General Douglas MacArthur told Clausen that he had to "barter like a rug merchant" to get intelligence from the Navy during the war. However, MacArthur also said he received "ample and complete information" from the War Department before December 7.

Before Pearl Harbor, the way things were organized in Washington was not efficient. For example, the Army and Navy shared code-breaking work on odd/even days. The Navy sent intercepts by teletype, while the Army used air mail before December 6. The Navy only had one officer, Commander Kramer, to distribute secret information. The Army had two officers, Colonels Bratton and Dusenbury. Clausen also noted that secret 'Magic' documents were found in President Roosevelt's military aide's desk, not in a wastebasket as often rumored.

Who Was Responsible?

Clausen did not approve of the policy where cryptographers and senior officers like Marshall kept secrets during investigations. However, he understood why they felt they had to do it to protect 'Magic'.

He listed people based on how much he thought they were responsible for the lack of readiness at Pearl Harbor. A score of 10 meant they were highly responsible, and 0 meant not responsible at all.

• 10: Walter Short
• 10: Husband Kimmel
• 9: Carlisle C. Dusenbury
• 8: Kendall Fielder
• 8: George Bicknell
• 8: Edwin Layton
• 8: Richmond Kelly Turner
• 8: Laurance Safford
• 7: Irving Mayfield
• 7: Rufus Bratton
• 6: Joseph Rochefort
• 6: Leonard Gerow
• 6: Alwin D. Kramer
• 5: President Franklin Roosevelt (especially for not calling Marshall that night)

Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury

Lieutenant Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury was an Army intelligence officer. He worked on the Japan desk in Washington on Saturday, December 6, 1941.

Alwin D. Kramer

Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer was a US Navy translator in Washington on Saturday, December 6, 1941. He was also in charge of sharing 'Magic' information with the President. Unlike the Army, he did not have another officer to help him with this important task.

Henry Clausen and Freemasonry

Henry Clausen achieved the 33rd degree in Freemasonry. This is the highest rank you can get in that organization. He was very important in Freemasonry. He served as the Grand Master of California. He was also the Grand Commander of the Supreme Council, Mother Supreme Council of the World, of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry. In these roles, he wrote several books about Freemasonry. These books were published by the Supreme Council.