Bazar Valley campaign facts for kids

Quick facts for kids Bazar Valley campaign
Part of Instability on the North-West Frontier
Punch Magazine cartoon - "Wilcock's Weekend War"
Date 12 February - 2 March 1908 (Official dates) Location Bazar Valley Result Jirga and peace
Belligerents
British Raj	Zakka Khel clan of the Afridi
Commanders and leaders
James Willcocks	Dadai  (WIA) Multan Gul Baz Muhammad Afzal Ziauddin Usman Khusrogi
Strength
Unknown	6,000 (British estimate)
Casualties and losses
Officers: 1 killed, 4 wounded Others: 2 killed, 33 wounded	70 or more killed, 70 or more wounded

The Bazar Valley campaign of 1908 was a military operation by the British against the Zakka Khel clan. The Zakka Khel were a Pakhtun tribe living in the mountains near Peshawar, in what was then the North West Frontier of British India.

This campaign was led by General Sir James Willcocks. It started on February 12, 1908, and ended with a peace agreement (called a jirga) in March 1908. The funny magazine Punch even called it "Willcocks’ Weekend War." Key British Army groups included the Seaforth Highlanders and the 37th Lancers. From the British Indian Army, parts of the 45th and 53rd Sikhs, the Madras Sappers, and 5 Gorkha Rifles took part. A famous officer named Archibald Percival, 1st Earl Wavell was a young officer in this campaign.

Why the Bazar Valley Campaign Happened

What Was Happening on the Frontier (1897–1907)

After the Tirah campaign in 1897-98, the British government had explored the Tirah region. The Afridi tribes learned that their hidden villages were no longer safe from a strong British force.

The peace agreement after those operations seemed good for both sides. The British offered fair terms, and the tribesmen, whose resources were low, appreciated it. Many joined the Indian Army and Frontier Militias.

However, some groups kept causing trouble. Religious leaders (mullahs) in the tribal areas and Afghanistan often encouraged fighting against the British. Also, some anti-British groups in Kabul (Afghanistan's capital) supported tribesmen who were unhappy with the British. In 1904, many Afridis visited Kabul. They received gifts and were allowed to buy weapons. This led to many rifles being brought into Tirah.

Because of this support from Kabul, the tribes, especially the Zakka Khel, became more defiant towards the British. On September 3, 1904, about 15 Afridis (Zakka Khel and Kambar Khel) raided Darshi Khel village. Tribal leaders tried to control the Zakka Khel but couldn't. They admitted that the tribesmen were beyond their control because of Kabul's support. The British then stopped payments (allowances) to all Afridis for 1904. This made other tribes try to control the Zakka Khel, but it didn't last. So, in early 1905, allowances were paid to everyone except the Zakka Khel.

From 1904 to 1907, the Zakka Khel openly defied the British. Their groups raided villages in the Kohat and Peshawar areas, making life and property unsafe. Other Afridi tribes didn't join these raids, but they couldn't stop the Zakka Khel. They even suggested that the British occupy the Bazar Valley as the only way to deal with the problem.

In June 1907, the Zakka Khel, realizing they weren't invited to receive allowances, sent their own jirga (council) to Landi Kotal. They said they wanted peace and to settle their cases. But when told about the claims against them, they refused them. They would only return stolen property if the accused admitted having it. They also wanted the system of deducting fines from allowances to stop. They said their oath should be accepted in all cases. They wouldn't be responsible for raiders passing through their land. They would never hand over offenders for punishment. And all rules about tribe members going to Kabul or getting money from the Amir (ruler of Afghanistan) must be removed. This showed they didn't really want to settle. They returned to Bazar without any progress. However, this tough meeting stopped their raids for a few months. But as time passed without punishment, their fear faded. In October, raids started again when leaders like Dadai, Usman, and Multan returned from Kabul.

Raids on British Indian Towns (1907)

The Zakka Khel who visited Kabul were welcomed by Sardar Nasrulla Khan. Those who received yearly payments from the Amir got them, and many payments were increased or new ones given. The tribesmen were also easily able to buy rifles, many of which came from the Persian Gulf. For an Afridi, getting money from the Afghan government meant they were expected to be against the British. So, when they returned, they naturally started raiding again. In early October, five different raiding groups were formed. They included outlaws from other tribes.

These groups immediately began their attacks. Reports of crimes came in constantly.

October 5, 1907

A group of about 30 Zakka Khel, led by Dadai, raided Sumari village in the Kohat district. They killed one person and took two Hindus and property worth about 600 rupees.

October 28

About 30 Afridis, mostly Zakka Khel, attacked Pabbi in the Peshawar district. They captured five Hindus. They shot at soldiers at the station, seriously wounding one soldier and a farmer. At Tarnab, they attacked and wounded a tax official and took his assistant and horses. Along the way, they robbed ten cart drivers. Near Peshawar, they met police and shot at them, wounding two officers. Here, they had to leave most of their heavy stolen goods and went back into tribal territory.

November 13

Lachi village in the Kohat district was attacked by 22 men, mostly Zakka Khel. The Post Office was robbed. One villager was killed and three were wounded. The raiders met Border Military Police and shot at them, killing two and wounding two others. They took four rifles, jewelry, and other property.

November 20

A similar group led by Dadai shot at a village near the Bara Fort. The Border Military Police came out and were immediately attacked. Two men were killed and two wounded in the first shots.

November 24

A large group of Zakka Khel attacked Marai village in Kohat. But soldiers and villagers drove them off. Two Zakka Khel were killed and three wounded. One of the killed was Rokhan, a well-known raider from Dadai's group.

November 25

Multan, with about 35 Zakka Khel, stole 400 goats from Matanni. They attacked a police post but were pushed back.

December 5

Masho Khel village in the Peshawar district was attacked. A shop was robbed, and its owner killed by a group of 16 people, mostly Zakka Khel. On the same day, 12 mules working on the Khaibar Road near Jamrud were taken to Bazar by the Zakka Khel.

Efforts to Avoid War (January 1908)

These were not just small border incidents. Many were organized raids by large, well-armed groups. They attacked peaceful villages deep inside British areas or directly attacked government posts. It was clear that military action against the Zakka Khel was now necessary.

On January 9, 1908, the British government suggested a final attempt to avoid war. Sir H. Deane, the Chief Commissioner, would call a jirga of Afridi clans. He would tell them that unless they stopped the Zakka Khel's actions, the British would punish them. This might prevent the need for British military action. If the Afridis said they couldn't or wouldn't control the Zakka Khel, it would show that the British had the right to act. It would also remove any reason for other tribes to join the Zakka Khel. At this time, other Afridi groups didn't seem to support the Zakka Khel. So, it was unlikely they would fight against a British advance into Bazar.

In the same message (January 9, 1908), it was explained that a traditional large expedition was not planned. Instead, the proposed actions included:

• Taking a fine and disarming the Zakka Khel.
• Capturing and trying the leaders and those involved in the raids.
• Building a road to control this group in the future. This road would prevent them from escaping into hard-to-reach areas.
• The actual offenders would be tried by local courts if captured.

It was important for the move into Bazar Valley to be sudden. Preparations were to be made so that the force could move quickly after Sir H. Deane met the jirga. Before a reply to this message was received, the Zakka Khel carried out two more bold raids.

On January 24, about 30 raiders attacked Kacha Garhi Railway Station. They wanted to lure out the Border Military Police and then attack them, but they failed.

On January 28, another raid happened. A group of 60 to 80 men raided Peshawar City. They killed one policeman and wounded two others and two guards. Property worth a lot of money was stolen. The Khaibar rifles tried to cut them off for 15 hours. But a broken telephone meant they were informed too late, and the raiders escaped. The situation was now so serious that immediate action was needed.

British Prepare for Conflict (January–February 1908)

On January 31, the Viceroy (British ruler in India) sent a telegram. He said it was important to show British authority right away. He felt it was no longer possible to solve the problem with the help of a jirga. He suggested that after explaining the reasons for the expedition to other Afridi leaders, the force should immediately go to the Bazar Valley. He proposed using two brigades (large military units) with one brigade in reserve.

On the same day, a reply to the January 9 message arrived. The British government didn't fully approve the proposed actions. They thought it sounded like a plan to take over the Bazar Valley permanently. But because of the constant raids, they approved an expedition. However, it had to be limited to punishment or a blockade. The British government also believed that expecting other Afridis to stay neutral was enough. Asking for their active help would be too much.

On February 1, the Indian Government still argued that to prevent future raids, the Zakka Khel's territory should be opened up. They explained that a blockade, like the one against the Mahsud in 1901, wouldn't work. This was because of the Zakka Khel territory's location. British troops would have to enter the land of other Afridi groups, whose friendship was important to keep.

On February 3, a telegram from the Secretary of State approved immediate action. But there must be no takeover or permanent occupation. The punitive operations must also have a strict time limit. They asked for details of the planned operations. They suggested that a small, fast-moving group might be enough for the actual punishment in Bazar.

The Indian Government replied that small groups of unsupported troops in Bazar Valley would be very risky. A disaster could happen, which would "set the whole frontier in a blaze" (cause widespread conflict). They then gave the following details for the proposed operations:

The Zakka Khel in the Bazar Valley can provide about 6,000 fighting men. We plan to move two brigades, about the same number of soldiers, with two artillery batteries, engineers (sappers), etc., into the valley near China. We will keep one brigade ready to support them if needed. After taking China, the force in the Bazar Valley would act as needed to capture the leaders and those involved in the recent raids. During this time, the passes around the valley would be blocked. We plan to use a force of selected Khaibar Rifles, who we are sure can be trusted for this purpose, to help.

The British Government approved these plans on February 6. At the same time, they added a rule for future actions in Bazar Valley:

It must be clearly understood that the goal is strictly limited to punishing the Zakka Khels. There must be no occupation or takeover of tribal territory, either now or later, directly or indirectly.

Sir H. Deane was told to gather the Afridi leaders (Maliks) and inform them of the British actions against the Zakka Khel. This information was also to be given to the Orakzai Maliks. As soon as the Afridi Maliks were dismissed, the expedition would start.

Meanwhile, the Zakka Khel continued their raids in the Peshawar district. On February 12, Sir H. Deane met the jirga of Afridi Maliks. He explained the situation fully. He advised them to go to their tribes and help the Zakka Khel reach a fair agreement. This would allow troops to leave the Bazar Valley quickly. He dismissed the jirga on the same day (February 12). He reported that the jirga seemed satisfied. They appeared relieved to hear that punishment would only be for the Zakka Khel. The Maliks returned to reassure their tribesmen. After that, they planned to gather a lashkar (tribal army) and take it to the Zakka Khel villages in Upper Bara to pressure them.

It was reported that the Zakka Khel were moving their families, animals, and movable property to Ningrahar and Bara. They had also buried their grain. A large number of people were leaving through the Thabai Pass. For political reasons, it was decided to inform the Amir of Afghanistan, Habibullah Khan, about the British plans. Immediately after the jirga was dismissed on February 12, a letter (kharita) was sent to him:

I write to inform you that the Zakka Khel section of the Afridis have broken their agreements with the Government of India. Despite the very kind and compassionate treatment I have given them, they have misunderstood my leniency. By constantly raiding and attacking my law-abiding people, they have committed many wrongs. I can no longer ignore these harmful actions. Therefore, I write to inform you that I intend to punish these people, who deserve severe treatment. I hope that, because of the friendship between us, Your Majesty will issue strict orders to prevent any of these people from entering your territories or receiving help from the tribes on your side of the frontier.

Meanwhile, Major-General Sir J. Willcocks was chosen to lead the Zakka Khel Field Force. The force had been secretly prepared. On February 12, Major Willcocks was told the expedition might start on February 13. On the same day, he moved out from Peshawar. The Indian Government gave the following instructions:

• The General in command has full political control.
• The Political Agent for Khaibar will go with him as Chief Political Officer. He will advise and help with political matters.
• The General's authority and responsibility must be complete. But he must send any opinions from the Chief Political Officer about tribal policy to the Government of India, if the Chief Political Officer asks him to.
• The goal is strictly limited to punishing the Zakka Khel. There will be no occupation or takeover of tribal land, now or later.
• Every possible step must be taken to prevent the conflict from spreading outside the Bazar Valley.
• No terms for fines or surrender of raiders can be made with the Zakka Khel tribe without first asking the Government of India.
• It is necessary to punish those involved in the many raids that led to murder and robbery in British India. For trials of captured persons, the Political Agent will act with full powers.
• All political communications will go directly from the General to the Foreign Secretary, Government of India. Copies will go to the Chief of Staff and Chief Commissioner, Peshawar. Telegrams about military operations will also be copied to the Foreign Secretary.

About the Bazar Valley

The Bazar Valley is about 20 miles (32 km) long and 8 to 12 miles wide. It sits about 3,000 feet high. To the north, the Alachi mountains separate it from the Khaibar Pass. To the south, the Sur Ghar range separates it from the Bara Valley. The highest peaks in these ranges are 5,000–7,000 feet (1,500–2,100 meters) high. The Bazar stream flows through the valley, joining the Khaibar stream. The eastern end of the valley is narrow and becomes a very difficult passage before reaching the Peshawar plain. The western end is wide and open, leading up to the snow-capped Safed Koh mountains.

The Zakka Khel owned this upper part of the valley. It had two main branches, each about 2 miles (3 km) wide. Between them was an irregular hill spur that ended in a sharp peak above the main Zakka Khel stronghold, China. About 2.5 miles (4 km) east of China, the two branch valleys meet. At this meeting point, blocking the entrance to the China plain, is an isolated hill called Khar Ghundai.

Through the mountains to the southwest and west are four main passes. The Mangal Bagh and Bukar passes lead to the Bara Valley. The Thabai and Tsatsobi passes lead into Afghanistan. The Thabai and Tsatsobi passes were like "back-doors" or "escape routes" into Afghan territory. When their home was threatened, the tribesmen could retreat there with their families and belongings.

The main problem with dealing with the Zakka Khel was this "back-door" and the knowledge that they had a safe place to hide. The "front-door" to the valley was from the Khaibar Pass and over the Alachi range. There are four passes across this range: Chura, Alachi, Bori, and Bazar. The Chura Pass was the easiest. It also went through the territory of another clan, the Malikdin Khel. Their chief, Yar Muhammad Khan, claimed to be very friendly with the British.

British Plans

General Willcocks planned to gather his force at Lala China. The day after gathering, an advanced brigade (military unit) would go to China in Bazar through the Chura Pass. This group would not carry heavy supplies, only emergency food. The rear brigade, with all the supplies, would reach Chura the same day and stay there, ready to help. Meanwhile, a fast-moving group from Landi Kotal would block the passes at the west end of the Bazar Valley.

However, heavy snow on the higher hills changed the plan. It was impossible to reach the Thabai Pass from Landi Kotal. It was also impossible to reach the Tsatsobi Pass without entering the Bazar Valley through the Bazar Pass.

British Army Setup

On February 12, the expeditionary force was ready in Peshawar to move forward.

The Conflict Begins

First Moves (February 12–16)

Colonel Roos-Keppel was put in charge of the fast-moving group from Landi Kotal. A part of the 2nd 5th Gurkhas left Jamrud on the evening of February 12 for Landi Kotal. On the 13th, the 25th Punjabis took over the Khaibar Rifles' posts up to Ali Musjid. Two squadrons of the 19th Lancers also joined. Colonel S. Biddulph was in charge of the supply lines. The Khaibar Rifles, once relieved, marched to Landi Kotal. By the evening of the 14th, the fast-moving group was ready to enter the Bazar Valley. At 4:00 a.m. on the 15th, Colonel Roos-Keppel left Landi Kotal. By 9:15 a.m., they reached the top of the Bazar Pass without any fighting. From there, the force continued south and arrived at China that evening. China was empty. The village's towers and walls gave shelter from snipers who, as usual, started firing after dark. One person was reportedly killed and another wounded during the night.

The main column, led by General Willcocks, left Peshawar on the morning of February 13 and stopped at Jamrud that night. The next day, they reached Ali Musjid. On the 15th, the force left Lala China and entered the Bazar Valley through the Chura Pass. At dawn, the 2nd Brigade, with extra troops, advanced at the same time as the "flying column" moved through the Bazar Pass. General Willcocks went with this column. All soldiers carried three days' worth of food. Only a small part of the transport and hospital units were taken. The rest of the 2nd Brigade's baggage and supplies marched behind the 1st Brigade, which followed the 2nd Brigade. The 59th Rifles from the 1st Brigade stayed at Ali Musjid.

Battle of Khar Gundai

Battle of Khar Gundai
Date 15–16 February 1908 Location East of the crest of Khar Gundai Result British victory
Belligerents
British Raj	Anai Zalcka Khel Sangu Khel
Commanders and leaders
James Willcocks	Dadai  (WIA)
Units involved
1st Brigade	N/A
Casualties and losses
1 killed 2 wounded	3 killed 7 wounded

The first part of the march was through Malikdin Khel territory, so no fighting was expected or happened. After passing Chura, the column turned west into the Bazar Valley. No shots were fired until they reached Tsarkhum, on the edge of Zakka Khel land. Tsarkhum is on a steep cliff overlooking the Bazar Tangi. As the advance guard reached this point, fire came from the high hill Tsapara. The left flank guards, protected by guns, fought all the way to Walai. The column stopped there for the night. A part of the 2-5th Gurkhas stayed to hold Tsapara. This secured the supply line to Chura, where the 1st Brigade and baggage were to stop for the night of the 18th-19th. South of Walai, at the meeting point of the Bazar and Walai streams, is a hill called Khar Gundai. It has a commanding view of the Bazar valley.

2-5th Gurkhas digging in at Walai

Surprisingly, the enemy did not occupy this hill. The force camped for the night in the stream bed, about 1,500 yards (1,370 meters) east of Khar Gundai's top. The Seaforth Highlanders guarded Khar Gundai. During the night, these guards and others around the camp were heavily fired upon. The enemy, mostly Anai Zakka Khel and Sangu Khel, were led by Dadai, a well-known raider who was badly wounded. It is said that three enemy soldiers were killed and seven wounded. General Willcocks’ column had one killed and two wounded. Early on the morning of the 16th, they made contact by signal with Colonel Roos-Keppel's column at China. General Willcocks chose a spot for his main camp closer to Walai, and the Landi Kotal column joined him there. During the day, the baggage and supply columns were brought up from Chura. The strong fort of Yar Mahomed Khan of the Malikdin Khel at Chura had been taken by the 1st Brigade under General Anderson the day before.

Battle of Sara Pial

A guard of the 45th Sikhs, protecting supplies, was attacked on the lower slopes of Sara Paial hill. The attackers were Anai Zakka Khel led by Multan. The 46th Sikhs, supported by the Seaforth Highlanders and mountain guns, captured the hill the enemy had occupied. They lost two men wounded. The chosen camp site was hidden in the Walai Stream bed. It was surrounded by Khar Gundai and other hills to the north, all of which were guarded. This spot had a secure supply line to the 1st Brigade at Chura. It also gave complete control of the whole valley. General Willcocks could now focus on punishing the Zakka Khel. Because the land was naturally barren, it was hard to cause serious damage to the Zakka Khel. China village, the most important settlement, was the first target. Its destruction began the next day.

British Advance, China Village Destroyed (February 16–22)

February 16–17

There was some scattered shooting into the camp on the night of the 16th. But the troops had enough cover, and no one was hurt. Telephone lines were set up between Headquarters and the main guard posts. This gave early information about enemy movements. In the morning, the enemy was seen moving around the hills near China and building small forts (sangars). The mountain guns fired from Zir Ghund, and about 200 men were seen retreating south towards Halwai. It was also reported that earlier, three or four hundred men had left Jabagai. About a hundred were in Halwai, and the towers along the Bazar stream were occupied. During the day, most of the 1st Brigade marched in from Chura. This meant enough troops were available for daily operations in the valley.

February 18

A mixed group led by General Barrett moved out before dawn to destroy the towers and walls at China. The Seaforth Highlanders and Gurkhas moved through Sarmundo and Khwar. Protected by mountain guns, they took the hills north of China. Lieutenant Macfadyen, with the Seaforth Highlanders, was fatally wounded during this advance. Meanwhile, the rest of the column reached China, destroyed the main towers, and gathered wood and animal feed. As they left to return to camp, the enemy followed them. The troops retreated steadily. The artillery unit and its guards in the open area south of China were especially targeted by the enemy. The 54th Sikhs, also on this side, were heavily engaged, with some tribesmen getting very close. By 4:30 p.m., the Gurkhas had left the hills above China, and the Seaforth Highlanders had also come down from the eastern slopes. The Zakka Khel tried to follow the retreat but lost many men. After this, they were more careful to avoid open ground.

As the troops returned inside the camp's guarded area, the enemy's firing slowly stopped. By 6 p.m., it had completely ceased. Not a single shot was fired at the guards during the night. The total British casualties were three officers, two British soldiers, and four local soldiers wounded. On this day, it was reported that many Bazar Zakka Khel and Sangu Khel Shinwari volunteers were gathered at the Thabai and Mangal Bagh passes. Also, ammunition traders had arrived from Afghanistan and were selling supplies cheaply. On the other hand, reports also said that jirgas of other Afridi tribes were gathering to arrange a peace settlement. Many tribes wanted peace.

February 19

A column led by General Anderson marched out of Walai camp at 7:15 a.m. The goal was to finish destroying China and gather more animal feed. They met no resistance on the way there. But the enemy tried to bother them during the return. Two hundred and fifty mule loads of feed were collected. The column reached camp at 5:30 p.m. without any British casualties.

February 20

A column under General Anderson moved towards the Tsatsobi pass to explore that area. On the way, the towers at Khwar and Sarmando were destroyed. As the column neared the pass, the advance guard was fired on from hills on both sides. The left flank battalions were attacked on the hills west of China. Information about this route was gathered for mapping the valley, and the column returned to camp. No casualties.

February 21

For the past few days, the enemy had been seen gathering in large numbers near Halwai. This was in the southwestern part of the valley. Many Sangu Khel and other Shinwaris from the Thabai pass area had joined them. On the 21st, two columns led by Generals Barrett and Anderson moved out to attack this position together. Soon after daylight, the 28th Punjabis took the heights near China. They held them all day to cover the retreat. The rest of General Barrett's column took the route south of China. The Khaibar Rifles and No. 6 Company Sappers moved along the Bazar stream and destroyed the towers of Kago Kamar. The enemy kept firing at this place all day. The Seaforth Highlanders on the far left took the Saran Hills. They kept the enemy to the south and west of Halwai.

Meanwhile, General Anderson's column moved north of China, through Khwar and the Sarwakai pass. They came out onto the plain north of Halwai. During this movement, the enemy kept up scattered firing from the direction of Pastakai. The two columns now advanced at the same time. The steep cliffs overlooking Halwai were taken without stopping. The mountain guns made the enemy's small forts (sangars) impossible to hold. The right side of General Anderson's column was well protected from any attack from the Thabai or Mangal Eagh passes by the 59th Rifles. The towers and piles of timber in Halwai were destroyed. The force then began its march back to camp. As usual, this was a signal for many groups to come down from the Thabai direction. They opened fire from long distances, but the Mountain Battery kept them moving.

Both Brigades were now moving south of the China hills, which were held by the 28th Punjabis. As the last battalion reached China, the enemy's fire had almost stopped. But as the 28th Punjabis, covered by gun fire, began to leave the hills, many tribesmen appeared. They closely pressed the battalion. The Punjabis withdrew steadily but lost one man killed and eight wounded. On the left, the Seaforth Highlanders and Khaibar Rifles were also attacked. The enemy advanced to close range and suffered many casualties. While directing his rear companies during this fight, Major Hon’ble Forbes-Sempill, commanding the Seaforth Highlanders, was killed. The 53rd Sikhs, who were in the rear center, covered the retreat. When the rear guard reached east of China hills, the enemy pulled back and only fired from long distances. British casualties for the day were one officer and one soldier killed, and ten local soldiers wounded. Not a single shot was fired into camp that night.

February 22

The force stayed in camp. Only regular convoy duties were done. Sangu Khel and other Shinwaris kept arriving through the Thabai Pass. Although the most important leaders (Maliks) of the Afridi tribes were now gathering at Chura to arrange peace terms, it was feared that these new fighters would delay a settlement. On this night, the tribesmen tried sniping from several directions at once. Some even got close to the guard posts. A non-commissioned officer was wounded.

Steps Towards Peace (February 23–27)

February 23

A column under General Anderson moved out in the morning to China to collect fuel. Fuel was becoming scarce in camp. The enemy offered only weak resistance. Two hundred and fifty mule loads of fuel were collected. In the afternoon, nearly 400 men, representing the united Afridi jirga, came from Chura. They seemed very eager to arrange a settlement. The Maliks even said they were ready to use force to make the Zakka Khel agree to terms.

February 24

Colonel Roos-Keppel met with the jirga. They were confident they could reach a settlement with the Zakka Khel. Everyone, even the Pakkai Zakka Khel, agreed that any settlement must include punishment for the individual raiders. Operations were paused for two days (February 25 and 26). This allowed the jirga to meet the Zakka Khel and discuss terms at Halwai.

February 25

The Afridi jirga left in the morning to meet the Zakka Khel at Halwai. They had a difficult task. It was made even harder by the presence of Sangu Khel volunteers. These volunteers stood around the jirga, shouting insults and trying to convince the Zakka Khel to keep fighting. The Maliks had argued that the troops needed to stay in the valley to give weight to their talks with the Zakka Khel. If the troops left before their discussions were finished, they couldn't guarantee success. General Willcocks had been told that there was no strict limit on his stay in the valley. This was as long as a settlement was reached quickly and troops were withdrawn soon after. Despite the interference from these outside groups at the jirga, the advice of the Maliks won out. The important elders of the Zakka Khel took an oath on the Koran (their holy book) to follow their decisions.

February 26–27

A water guard of the 45th Sikhs on Tsapara Hill was attacked in thick bushes. They lost one soldier killed and two wounded. Early on the morning of this day, after terms were agreed, the Afridi jirga started back to report the result to General Willcocks. However, they were delayed by a mixed group (lashkar). This group included Sangu Khel Shinwaris, about a thousand Ningraharis, and a few Mohmands. They advanced from the Thabai Pass. The Zakka Khel convinced these groups to go back to the western end of the valley. They pointed out that they had come too late to be useful and would only ruin the settlement that all Afridis wanted. After some hesitation, this lashkar agreed to wait until the jirga's negotiations were known. Because of these delays, the jirga arrived too late to be received at Walai that day. On the 27th, the Chief Political Officer met them and brought them into camp after they left their rifles for safekeeping.

Peace, British Withdrawal (February 28–March 1)

February 27–28

The night of the 27th was spent discussing the details of the settlement. By the afternoon of the 28th, a document written in Persian by General Willcocks, outlining the full terms, was presented to him in a public jirga. This document was signed by all the Maliks and important elders. It assigned responsibility to different clans for the good behavior of the various Zakka Khel groups. They promised to help each other punish bad individuals. They also agreed that the Government could punish them for the wrongdoings of those they guaranteed. General Willcocks saw that these terms more than met the Government's demands and formally accepted them. Meanwhile, secret orders had been given for the troops to withdraw the next day. The Zakka Khel and other jirga members who wished were allowed to go to China at once. Work to strengthen the camp continued as usual. During this night, before the agreement terms were known at Chura, the camp there was heavily sniped. Four local soldiers were wounded.

February 29

Early in the morning, General Barrett's brigade began their march back to Ali Musjid through the Chura Pass. By 9 a.m., the baggage and transport of both brigades had left Walai Camp. By 10 a.m., the last guard posts began to withdraw. General Anderson's brigade covered the withdrawal and stayed at Chura for the night. General Barrett's brigade marched straight through to Ali Musjid.

March 1

All troops, except the 59th Rifles and 2 Squadrons of the 19th Lancers (who stayed to guard supplies at Ali Musjid), arrived at Jamrud. The next day, they reached Peshawar. During the entire operation, not a single helper, public or private, was killed or wounded. Only one rifle was lost, belonging to a man killed while fighting in thick bushes. From the time the force left Walai Camp until it arrived back in British India, not a single shot was fired.

What Happened Next

The expedition seemed very successful. The Afridi jirga had agreed to punish the raiders and take responsibility for their future good behavior. After the troops returned, the entire jirga came to Peshawar. They discussed with the Political Agent how to punish the raiders. They organized a jirga of about 600 men, representing each Afridi clan. This group visited the Zakka Khel settlements one by one. This jirga spent about a month in Zakka Khel country, living off the inhabitants as per tribal custom. This act itself was a form of punishment. They managed to catch all the raiders except Multan, who had escaped to Afghan territory. They beat the captured raiders and took away their stolen goods. These goods were later given to the Political Agent at Jamrud to be returned to their owners. They left some rifles as a promise that they would not allow Multan to settle in Tirah until he had been properly punished. They also asked the Government to request the Amir either to hand over Multan and other refugees or to expel them. While at Jamrud, the jirgas were bothered by many messengers from the Mohmands and Afghanistan. These messengers urged them to join a rebellion and threaten Peshawar. Although this caused some unrest, no trouble resulted. The Maliks and elders of the Afridis had fully kept their promises, and the Government rewarded them.

Casualties

James Willocks estimated that the rebel forces had at least 70 killed and even more wounded. The rebels did not want to give details about their losses. This was partly due to their pride and partly from fear of the "evil eye," which wounded men were thought to be especially open to. The British recorded their own casualties: among officers, 1 killed and 4 wounded. Among other ranks, 2 killed and 33 wounded.