Dehousing facts for kids
During World War II, the British government looked for the best ways to fight Germany. One idea was called the dehousing paper. This paper suggested that destroying people's homes would hurt their spirits more than anything else.
Professor Frederick Lindemann, a top science advisor to the British government, wrote this paper. He sent it to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on March 30, 1942. After the government leaders (the Cabinet) agreed, it became known as the dehousing paper.
The paper was part of a big discussion. The British government was deciding if the Royal Air Force (RAF) should be smaller. This would allow more money and resources to go to the British Army and Royal Navy. Or, should they focus on strategic bombing Germany from the air?
The dehousing paper argued for more bombing. It said that destroying about 30% of homes in Germany's 58 largest towns would break the German people's spirit. This was based on how British people reacted to the the Blitz, when German planes bombed British cities. The paper claimed that losing homes affected people more than losing friends or family. After a lot of debate, the Cabinet chose to focus on the strategic bombing campaign.
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The "Dehousing" Plan: Bombing Homes in WWII
The dehousing paper was written when the RAF Bomber Command was not bombing much. A report called the Butt Report had shown that earlier bombing raids were not very successful. Many planes were lost, and the effort didn't achieve much.
Since late 1941, the RAF had been saving its resources. They were waiting for many new heavy bomber planes. They also waited for a new radio navigation tool called GEE. This tool would help planes find their targets better. Before this, bombing policy had already moved away from trying to hit very specific targets.
Why Bomb Homes? The Idea Behind the Plan
Professor Cherwell created the dehousing paper. He used information from recent bombing raids on British cities. Researchers gave him details about how these raids affected people.
Here's a simple summary of what the paper suggested:
- One ton of bombs dropped on a city could destroy 20 to 40 homes.
- This would make 100 to 200 people homeless.
- The RAF expected to make about 10,000 heavy bombers by mid-1943.
- Each bomber could drop about 40 tons of bombs in its lifetime.
- This meant each bomber could make 4,000 to 8,000 people homeless.
- In 1938, over 22 million Germans lived in 58 large towns. These towns would be easy to find and hit.
- If half the bombs from 10,000 bombers hit these towns, most of their people would lose their homes. This was about one-third of all Germans.
- The paper stated that losing one's home was "most damaging to morale." People seemed to care more about this than losing friends or family.
- In the British city of Hull, people showed signs of stress even though only one-tenth of homes were destroyed.
- The paper believed that doing ten times more damage to German towns would "break the spirit of the people."
- The paper also mentioned that factories and transport would be damaged too.
Was the Bombing Working? Early Doubts
The dehousing paper came out when many people were criticizing the RAF's bombing efforts. These criticisms came from other parts of the military and even from the public.
One important report was the Butt Report, from August 1941. It looked at photos taken after bombing raids. It found that less than a third of the planes even got within 5 miles (8.0 km) of their target. If you included planes that couldn't bomb due to problems, only about 5% of bombers hit their target area.
Senior RAF leaders disagreed with the Butt Report. They ordered another report. This new report said that if Britain had 4,000 bombers, they could destroy 43 German towns. The head of the RAF, Sir Charles Portal, even thought they could win the war in six months with such a force.
Not everyone was convinced. Prime Minister Churchill had doubts. The RAF leaders then said that even if Germany wasn't knocked out, it would be weakened. This would allow British forces to return to Europe. With this agreement, Bomber Command kept its planned resources.
The Big Debate: What Was the Best Way to Fight?
Even with the agreement, some people still questioned the bombing strategy. A Member of Parliament, Professor A. V. Hill, gave a strong speech. He pointed out that British deaths from air raids were low. He also said that most bombs dropped by the RAF hit nothing important.
So, the Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair, and Sir Charles Portal were happy about the dehousing paper. It supported their argument to keep the strategic bombing campaign going. Others in the military thought that too many resources were going to Bomber Command without good results.
Professor Patrick Blackett, a new naval research director, thought the dehousing paper's estimates were too high. He believed they were 600% too optimistic.
Sir Henry Tizard was a main supporter of reducing Bomber Command. He argued that bombing only helped by making Germany use its resources to defend itself. He thought a much smaller bombing effort could do the same. He wrote to Cherwell, warning that the government might make the wrong decision based on the paper.
Tizard had several doubts:
- He thought Britain would only have 7,000 bombers, not the 10,000 expected.
- He believed new navigation tools wouldn't be ready until 1943.
- He felt it was unlikely that more than 25% of bombs would hit their target.
He argued that the strategy wouldn't work with the resources available. Cherwell replied that his calculations were for the Prime Minister, not for detailed statistics. He said that even with differences, the effects would be huge. Historian Max Hastings said the debate wasn't about whether bombing could destroy Germany. It was about the best way to use Britain's resources.
Mr. Justice Singleton, a judge, was asked to review these different views. In his report, he concluded: "If Russia can hold Germany on land I doubt whether Germany will stand 12 or 18 months' continuous, intensified and increased bombing..."
What Happened Next? The Decision to Bomb
In the end, the view that bombing could weaken Germany won. The dehousing paper helped this view succeed. Some people said the debate became very heated.
While this debate was happening, the area bombing directive was issued on February 14, 1942. This directive officially allowed bombing of entire areas, not just specific targets. Eight days later, Arthur "Bomber" Harris became the head of Bomber Command.
The "Hull and Birmingham Survey" was a study of bombing effects on those cities. It was published after Cherwell's paper. This study found that while people were worried, there was no widespread bad behavior. It also found "no measurable effect on the health of either town."
