Rice v. Cayetano facts for kids
Quick facts for kids Rice v. Cayetano |
|
|---|---|
|
|
| Argued October 6, 1999 Decided February 23, 2000 |
|
| Full case name | Harold F. Rice, Petitioner v. Benjamin J. Cayetano, Governor of Hawaii |
| Citations | 528 U.S. 495 (more)
120 S. Ct. 1044; 145 L. Ed. 2d 1007; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 1538; 68 U.S.L.W. 4138; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 1341; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 1881; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 898; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 105
|
| Prior history | Injunction denied, 941 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Haw. 1996); summary judgment granted for defendant, 963 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Haw. 1997); affirmed, 146 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1998); cert. granted, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999). |
| Subsequent history | Remanded, 208 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). |
| Holding | |
| Hawaii's denial of the right to vote in OHA trustee elections based on ancestry violates the Fifteenth Amendment. | |
| Court membership | |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas |
| Concurrence | Breyer (in result), joined by Souter |
| Dissent | Stevens, joined by Ginsburg (Part II) |
| Dissent | Ginsburg |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. XV | |
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), was a case filed in 1996 by Big Island rancher Harold "Freddy" Rice against the state of Hawaii and argued before the United States Supreme Court. In 2000, the Court ruled that the state could not restrict eligibility to vote in elections for the Board of Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to persons of Native Hawaiian descent.
Rice was represented by attorney John Goemans. John Roberts (who would later become the Chief Justice of the United States) argued for Ben Cayetano, the governor of Hawaii at the time.
The February 2000 court ruling in Rice v. Cayetano encouraged Hawaiian sovereignty opponents to file a similar lawsuit, Arakaki v. State of Hawai‘i, months later. As the Rice case resulted in non-Hawaiians being allowed to vote in OHA elections, the Arakaki case resulted in non-Hawaiians being allowed to stand as candidates in OHA elections.
Background
Beginning in 1978, Hawaii held statewide elections for the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), an agency charged with disbursing particular funds and benefits to those who may be classified as "Native Hawaiians" ("any descendant of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778"), or those who may be classified simply as "Hawaiian" ("any descendant[s] of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian islands ... in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to reside in Hawaii"). By law, only Native Hawaiians or Hawaiians could vote for, or be elected to, this Board of Trustees.
Harold F. Rice was a rancher of European descent whose family had resided in Hawaii since the mid-19th century. In March 1996, he attempted to register to vote for the OHA trustees. Where that application asked for confirmation that "I am also Hawaiian and desire to register to vote in OHA elections," Rice scratched out the words "am also Hawaiian and" and checked "Yes." Denied eligibility because he was not Hawaiian, Rice sued under the 14th and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The District Court for the State of Hawaii ruled against Rice, due to its conclusion (as summarized by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals) that "the method of electing OHA trustees meets constitutional standards for the essential reason that the restriction on the right to vote is not based on race, but upon recognition of the unique status of native Hawaiians that bears a rational connection to Hawaii's trust obligations." The District Court held that the OHA does not sufficiently resemble a typical government bureau, with governmental powers, and that it is "carefully constrained by its overall purpose to work for the betterment of Hawaiians."
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals also denied Rice's claim. For one thing, Rice contended that the legal status of an eligible voter is contingent solely upon race, and that Hawaii's contention that such status is a political designation, rather than a racial one, is an obvious effort to circumvent the Constitution with semantics. The Court of Appeals agreed that it might indeed be the case that the political designation is a racial designation under the state's statute, yet "the constitutionality of the racial classification that underlies the trusts and OHA is not challenged in this case. This means that we must accept the trust and their administrative structure as we find them, and assume that both are lawful." Because Rice had not challenged the OHA's very existence, which is predicated on a racial classification, the Court could assume that "the state may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be." Thus, despite an apparent racial classification for eligibility to vote, within the context of the OHA's creation and mandate, the classification is actually "not primarily racial, but legal or political."
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decided that the OHA trustee election was a "special purpose election" such as that upheld in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973). In that case, the election for directors of a certain "special purpose water district" was limited to landowners in that district. The weight of a landowners vote was proportional to the amount of land that was owned, and thus seemed to contradict the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection clause. The Court held that because these landowners were disproportionately affected by the policies of the water district directors, and that such directors existed for a "limited purpose" and exhibited a "lack of normal governmental authority," the districts did not violate the Constitution when they denied a vote to those who did not own land in the district, and granted votes proportionally to the amount of land owned. The elections for the OHA Board of Trustees is similar to that of the water district directors, in that "the vote is for the limited purpose of electing trustees who have no governmental powers and perform no governmental purposes." Also, because Hawaiians, as defined by statute, are those disproportionately affected by the OHA, the vote for its trustees may be limited to them. Thus this exception to the 14th Amendment was used to justify the Hawaiian voting scheme under objections based on the 15th Amendment.
Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the voting restriction for trustees is rooted in historical concern for the Hawaiian race ... carried through statehood when Hawaii acknowledged a trust obligation toward native Hawaiians ... and on to 1993, when Congress passed a Joint Resolution 'apologiz[ing] to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii ... and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination'." Thus the 9th circuit held that native Hawaiians were entitled to "special treatment" much like the special treatment accorded Native American Indians in Morton v. Mancari, where "preferential treatment that is grounded in the government's unique obligation toward Indians is a political rather than a racial classification, even though racial criteria may be used in defining eligibility."
Rice appealed to the Supreme Court. There, he would argue that in addition to being a naked violation of the Constitution on its face, the eligibility requirements subverted the original intended purpose of the public lands as written in the Annexation and Organic Acts, both of which granted subsequent benefits to all "inhabitants" of Hawaii, regardless of race. The elections do not qualify as "special purpose" under Salyer, nor does the eligibility requirement denote a political rather than racial classification. Finally, the protection under Morton v. Mancari is inappropriate. The Petitioner would deny that there is any "special relationship" at all, for there is no "former sovereign" or "historical relationship" clause in the Constitution, and the analogy with Indian tribes thus has no legal standing.
