Abdi House raid facts for kids

The Abdi House raid or Operation Michigan, better known to Somalis as Bloody Monday (Somali: Isniinta Dhiigii), was an American surprise attack that took place in Mogadishu on July 12, 1993, as part of the United Nations intervention in the Somali Civil War. It marked a decisive turning point in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, as it inflamed anti-UN and anti-American sentiments among Somalis, which contributed immensely to the scale of resistance that the US military faced during the Battle of Mogadishu three months later.

As part of the campaign to capture General Mohammed Farah Aidid following the June 5, 1993, attack on the Pakistani Peacekeepers, and with the direct authorization of the Clinton White House, US forces conducted a deadly 17 minute raid on a villa belonging to Aidid's Interior Minister Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awale during a major gathering of Somalis. The meeting was being attended by high ranking elders of Aidid's clan, the Habr Gidr, and had been planned in order to discuss a diplomatic resolution to the growing conflict between the SNA and UNOSOM II.

The Meeting and UNOSOM II Justification for Strike

Rationale and Planning Phase

The day immediately following the attack on the Pakistanis, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, calling for the arrest of those responsible for the death of the peacekeepers.

Though General Mohammed Farah Aidid was not directly named in Resolution 837 on account of a lack of evidence, his political organization, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) was immediately blamed. This would mark the beginning of a new phase of escalating tit for tat violence that would begin with retaliatory AC-130 strikes on SNA sites and attempts to capture Aidid, which would be met in response from the SNA with ambushes, mortar attacks and assassinations of Somali UNOSOM II employees. But the UNOSOM effort to capture Aidid in the month following the passing of Resolution 837 would repeatedly end in failure.

The mounting frustration from these failures led US military commanders to propose to top UNOSOM II officials a strike on "The Abdi House" in order to deal a severe blow to the SNA command structure and weaken Aidid. Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awale's residence, a villa in the Hodan district of southern Mogadishu, was well known to have been holding regular clan meetings for the Habr Gidir and became a target, as Qeybdiid was a high ranking member of the SNA, and the organization was in large part comprised of members from the Habr Gidr. In the days and weeks following the commencement of military operations, UNOSOM had, via radio broadcast and propaganda leaflets dropped over Mogadishu, made the clear distinction that it was not the enemy of the Habir Gidir, but only wanted to capture Aidid.

Detailed planning for a strike on a future gathering at Abdi Qeybdiid Awale's villa would begin on July 7, 1993. Turkish commander of UNOSOM II forces, General Cevik Bir had declared on July 9, 1993, "I will kill Aidid within four days."

According to Mark Bowden, Gen. Cevik Bir and his deputy US Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery had wanted an attack without any warning. The head of the UNOSOM II operation in Mogadishu, retired US Admiral Johnathan Howe, had proposed issuing a warning or at the very least storming the villa with ground forces to prevent civilian casualties. This was rejected by UNOSOM commanders who explained that such an approach would expose American troops to an unacceptable risk of losses, as the 10th Mountain Division did not possess the capability to perform the kind of snatch-and-grab tactics used by Delta Force. UNOSOM command regarded the planned assault as, "a legitimate defensive action, one that would undermine Aidids support in the Habr Gidr clan" and feared that the Italian contingent of the force had been making a secret unilateral agreement with Aidid, which ran the risk of increasing his support if completed.

In an unprecedented decision that would break the mold of previous UNOSOM II raids in Mogadishu, no warning would be given, as eliminating the "SNA command center" and its inhabitants depended entirely on maintaining the element of total surprise. Dr. Sebastian Kaempf, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Queensland's Political Science department, argues that by not issuing a warning, UNOSOM II leadership had concluded that concerns for American casualties overruled concerns for Somali civilians. As Head of UNOSOM II, Howe could have overruled the military, but chose not to and effectively endorsed the departure from previous peacekeeping practices.

The White House would directly sign off on permission for the operation, but it is disputed if President Clinton knew if Somalis were being directly targeted when he did. The strike would be overseen first hand by the deputy commander of UNOSOM II, Thomas M. Montgomery, who would be seated in one of the Cobras participating in the strike. According to officials involved in the decision making, senior American and UN military personal were aware that the attack would mark a watershed moment for UNSOM II and agonized over whether to commit to it for more than two weeks.

The planned surprise attack would be unique and historic, in that it would the first attack where the target would be actual Somalis instead of weapon caches or other structures and is referred to by Washington Post reporter Keith B. Richburg as, "the UN's first ever officially authorized assassination".

The July 12, 1993, Gathering at Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awales Villa

A conference of high ranking elders, intellectuals, businessmen and clansmen of the Habr Gidr along with prominent members of other Somali clans such as the Ogadeni, Dir, Majerteen, Sheikhal and Murosade, was to take place in order to discuss how to respond to a peace initiative from Admiral Johnathan Howe.

A handful of prominent Somali elders, including the most senior of the Habr Gidr, Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, had met with Howe three days earlier and he had requested that they search for a peaceful resolution to the then four week long war between the Mohammed Farah Aidids SNA and UNOSOM II. Under the mounting pressure of the UNOSOM hunt, leaders of the different sub clans within the Somali National Alliance met and agreed to enter into a political dialogue with UNOSOM on July 11, 1993. Headed by a prominent member of the Habr Gidr, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan (later President of Somalia), during the meeting the clan decided to untangle itself from politics and leave national issues to Aidids SNA. It was agreed that a 25 member Supreme Council would be created in order to keep the clan united and an election for it was scheduled to take place on July 15, 1993.

Admiral Howes request for dialogue and the need to explain the developments of July 11, 1993 to the other members of the Habr Gidr, prompted the unusually high profile Monday July 12, 1993, gathering. Aidid disapproved of the meeting taking place, as his authority was now being held in question.

Abdi Qeybdiids villa was selected for the talks, as its possessed a large carpeted conference room on the second floor capable of holding a gathering of over a hundred people. The meeting had been publicized in Mogadishu's newspapers as a peace conference the day before and an American war correspondent in Mogadishu who was a witness of the raid, Scott Peterson, corroborates the Somali account that a group of elders had gathered to discuss to how to end the violence between the SNA and UN forces. In an interview with Scott Peterson, Abdi Qeybdiid would remark on the conference, "Everybody was interested in stopping the fighting, to open a dialogue. It was in the interest of all."

A CIA informant inside the clan passed intelligence that a meeting was to take place and present among the gathered would be some of those who had part taken in the June 5, 1993, attack. Aidid was allegedly tipped off that something would happen to the conference a few hours prior, by his own intelligence network or by the Italian element of UNOSOM II, who were allegedly sympathetic to him.

The Attack

On the morning of July 12, 1993, Operation Michigan was commenced by the 10th Mountain Division and Task Force Safari air units of the American Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in Mogadishu under the provisions of UN Resolution 837.

For at least a week before the raid, American special forces staked out the compound, surveilling Aidid and other members of the SNA come and go. The QRF had been on standby for the past few days, waiting for the attack order, and was prepared to launch the operation on just a five minutes notice.

Earlier that morning, the US State Department issued a warning that the CIA had received a memo revealing a plan by the SNA to launch a large scale attack on United Nations officials in Mogadishu, giving American commanders the excuse they needed to launch the assault. In the aftermath of the raid would it be discovered that the CIA report had been incorrect.

Air Strike Phase

Following confirmation of the codeword Michigan, an armada of 17 helicopters took off from Mogadishu International Airport and surrounded the villa within minutes.

Around 10:18 ^am a CIA informant named Omar Hassan Ganay walked out of the meeting to the main gate of the compound, in full view of the waiting attack helicopters that had just begun encircling the villa, wearing an arranged set of clothing as a strike signal.

1 of 6 AH-1 Cobras fires its 20 mm cannon at the "Abdi House" on July 12th, 1993

Seconds later, following visual confirmation of the signal and without any warning, six AH-1 Cobras and four OH-58 Kiowas launched a total of sixteen TOW missiles and 2,200 rounds of 20 mm caliber cannon fire into the gathering for a total of six to eight minutes.

The Cobras launched the TOWs into the second floor of the villa, where the conference was taking place, then specifically targeted the roof to prevent any escape.

"Our orders were to destroy the conference room on the second floor where everybody was supposed to be meeting, then we were to destroy the staircase in the back of the house so no one could get away...I was flying security for battle position one... <...> Then I was supposed to destroy the front gate of the compound so that the infantry could get it." Chief Warrant Officer Christopher Roben

Moments before the TOWs hit the villa, Abdi Qeybdiid had just begun addressing the crowd of approximately 80 to 100 Somalis that had gathered on the second story of the villa. Present among them were prominent sheikhs, former judges, famous poets, professors, and intellectuals who represented the most respected and best-educated of the Habr Gidr. The first TOW broke through the second story wall, flew past Qeybdiid's face and exploded. A survivor recounted that the first missile had torn a hole in the wall and revealed the mass of encircling helicopters that appeared to be almost at eye level over the city. Most notably, the Habr Gidr's most senior elder Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, over 90 years old, was instantly killed in the first TOW missile volley along with other elders, as they were all directly sitting against the walls of the conference room.

Those who escaped the air assault had to jump from the second story of the building onto the ground. Collateral damage occurred when a single TOW missile and multiple 20 mm rounds missed the villa and struck near the French Embassy. Also among those killed were civilians who were not directly participating in the conference.

Aidid was not present at the meeting.

Ground Assault Phase

Two UH-60 Blacks Hawks moments away from landing on the street outside the villa and deploying the Assault Platoon

At 10:23 ^am, one minute after the Cobras had stopped their assault on the villa, three of the waiting Black Hawk helicopters, consisting of 53 men, landed in the vicinity of the decimated building.

One of the Black Hawks, containing the support platoon tasked with covering the assault platoon, landed on the roof of the nearby French Embassy, which provided a vantage point over the villa. The two other Black Hawks, landed on the street in front of the meeting and troops from them quickly streamed out and set up a cordon around the house.

According to the 22nd Infantry Regiment, a primary participant in the raid, the assault platoon then made its way from the street into the compound and into the house to search for surviving "SNA leadership" and any valuable intelligence.

The UN account detailed in the Blue Book, claims that it took nine minutes for troops to clear the area, search the villa, and depart, all while leaving earlier than expected, marking the Abdi House raid as the fastest operation that had been conducted by UNOSOM II. The total time of the raid, from the first TOW hitting the villa to the last soldier departing on the Black Hawks, was about 17 minutes according to UN spokesman Lt. Col. David Haynes. Two of the survivors were taken prisoner.

Casualties

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, there were 54 Somalis killed and 161 wounded, but this was entirely based on a survey of the dead and injured at two large hospitals in Mogadishu. The actual casualty count is possibly higher as only two medical facilities in the entire city were canvassed, and since many Somalis follow the Islamic tradition of burying the dead immediately.

A portion of the destroyed villa, a few minutes after the raid

The Somalis claimed 73 people, who could be named, were killed and 200 were wounded, another charge which UNOSOM officials would deny. American war correspondent Scott Peterson who was present on the scene of the attack claims that the raid was far deadlier than US and UN officials acknowledged.

Along with notable figures like Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, a highly regarded poet Moallim Soyan, would also die in the strike. Doctors Without Borders claimed that one of their high ranking Somali administrators for the city of Merca had been participating in the meeting and was killed.

UNOSOM commanders initially only claimed that 7 Somalis had been killed, all men and all combatants, which would later be revised to 13 and then 20 as the body count rose at Bendair Hospital through the remainder of the day.

John Drysdale, serving as an advisor to UNOSOM II at the time of raid, noted that it would have been impossible for American troops to have been able to get a proper count of the dead and injured as they were incapable of reaching the second floor of the villa, where the meeting had been taking place, since the stairs had been totally destroyed in the minutes preceding the ground raid. UNOSOM II never produced evidence to substantiate its claim that the Abdi House was a legitimate military target with no civilians were present.

In the two and half years since the civil war had come to Mogadishu, Bloody Monday represented the deadliest loss from a single attack the city had seen. Many of those who would die in the strike were vocal supporters of reconciliation and negotiations with UNOSOM.

Former National Security Adviser to the Clinton Administration in July 1993, Anthony Lake, remarked in a 1998 interview with Black Hawk Down author Mark Bowden, that the raid "was not specifically designed to kill people."

Aftermath and Consequences

International Reaction

A multitude of relief and human rights organizations would publicly decry the attack, and in Mogadishu UNOSOM II command was delivered copies of the Geneva Convention, specifically in relation to attacks on civilians and proportional retaliation. Rony Brauman, then president of Doctors Without Borders would comment, "For the first time in Somalia there has been a killing under the flag of humanitarianism." Human Rights Watch would go as far as to claim that the attack "looked like mass murder."

Across the West, "Bloody Monday" caught the most press and attention in Italy:

• The surprise assault became front page news across the country and the newspaper representing Italian Catholic bishops, Avvenire, referred to it as a "vile American raid."
• Another paper, La Repubblica, would call it "...incomprehensible and unjustifiable"
• The Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano would comment on the raid saying, "...the original objective of the mission has been abandoned or momentarily forgotten."

In Rome, Somalis would take to the streets in protest. Achille Occheto, head of Italy's Democratic Party of the Left, would publicly decry it as a, "useless and irresponsible act of war" and said that Italian troops should withdraw if the mission was not exclusively humanitarian.

In the United States, Sen. Robert C. Byrd would break with his fellow Democrats and call for the U.S. troops in Somalia to, ‘‘pack up and go home.’’ The following week on July 27, 1993, Ohio Congressmen Sherrod Brown introduced Resolution 227, urging the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia as soon as possible.

In the United Kingdom the American embassy in London saw protests and a group of people were arrested in the [[House of Commons].

In Germany, the Social Democrats would push against Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s offer to send a contingent of 1,600 German soldiers to Somalia, the first overseas deployment since the Second World War, and pushed for it to be withdrawn.

In Kenya, one of the countries largest papers, The Standard, would run a headline aimed at the UN titled, "Who Are the Warlords Now?" and Kenyan state-run TV and Radio broadcasting would announce that it was joining "...those calling for a review of the UN's armed policy...Despite repeated attacks on Mohamed Farah Aideed's strongholds and even offers of cash rewards for his capture by the UN, this objective appears as elusive as ever."

The Pakistani and French governments strongly backed the raid and Pakistan's Foreign Ministry would argue that without the American air strikes, there would be chaos in the country.

A significant amount of the international press on the incident was primarily focused on the deaths of four journalists—Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, Hansi Kraus, and Anthony Macharia—who were killed. Most western news organizations completely withdrew from Somalia which greatly contributed to the lack of any substantial press during the Battle of Mogadishu on 3–4 October 1993.

UNOSOM II and United Nations Reaction

The reason for the meeting, how many people were killed and even the very inhabitants of the house at the time is disputed by UNOSOM officials who claimed that the conference was in reality a gathering of an SNA war council at a major command and control center, and that operation was a successful strike. Among the claims UNOSOM officials put forward were:

• No warning had been given to the occupants because the Abdi House was a purely military facility.
• ‘‘...no innocent civilians were injured in the attack" and ‘‘All were adult males. All were armed.’’
• Johnathan Howe would claim, “There was no evidence of non-combatant casualties from the raid itself” and that the raid had been conducted on a "very key terrorist planning cell". He would also go on to claim that the footage recorded by the Somali cameraman was "suspect".
• Maj. Leann Swieczkowski, an army spokeswoman, said that the photographs taken inside the villa proved that it was an SNA "forward command center,"
• An after action report on Somalia prepared by Montgomery and others, claimed that among those killed were a number of top financiers and military planners, including the overall planner of the June 5th ambush of Pakistani soldiers. Montgomery would later concede that elders were in fact killed, but that they had been combatants.

According to the UN, "The raid was carried out on the basis of information that meetings would be held at the center, and that the militia leaders would likely attend." The exact target of the operation is disputed, as UN officials later claimed Aidid rarely attended the meetings and was not the target. Some of the American helicopter pilots involved in the raid claimed that Aidid had actually been the informant.

Disintegration of UNOSOM II cohesion

The attack exposed deep rifts and dissension among states contributing troops to UNOSOM II, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe, but primarily the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation a few days later citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led campaign against Mohammed Farah Aidid.

The Italians, who had ruled Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack against the Habr Gidr threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN peacekeeping force. Fabio Fabbri, then Italian defence minister, would remark, "A choice of this nature, with its extremely high risk, indeed certainty, that human lives will be lost is shared neither by public opinion nor by parliament in our country."

A Pakistani officer in Mogadishu noted that the clash between the Americans and Italians was destroying the cohesion of UNOSOM II, and that a review of strategy was desperately needed. According to American envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley, following the raid, "...Italy, France, Zimbabwe and other contingents of UNOSOM, on orders from home, stopped participating in anti-Aidid operations, thus further weakening an already lame U.N. command authority. Much of the humanitarian activity stopped and various NGOs voiced their criticisms of both the United Nations and the United States."

The strike also caused an outcry among UN civilian staffers and disenchantment over the direction of UNOSOM II for employees of the humanitarian section. At least nine UN civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or walked away from their posts in protest, including the top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia, Ann Wright. Many of those who stayed would comment to reporters that the United Nations had relinquished its moral authority in its war against Aidid.

Ann Wright, top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia in a memo to head of UNOSOM Johnathan Howe Wright, tasked with helping rebuild the decimated police force and judicial system, would further go on to state that it “...undercuts U.N. credibility when we can not with accuracy state how many persons were killed or injured, who they were and why they were in the facility.” The dissension in the U.N. ranks with the Italians and others over what had occurred on July 12, 1993 led to a significant lull in UNOSOM operations in Mogadishu until the August 8, 1993 killings of American soldiers.

Somali Reaction

The unprecedented strike invoked outrage in Somalia. The atmosphere in Mogadishu became very tense and humanitarian work in the city more or less came to a halt as the risk towards foreigners, especially Americans, had become the worst it had ever been since the start of the intervention. The Americans had begun to be viewed as a rouge entity within UNOSOM by many Somalis and local cooperation in Mogadishu, necessary for UNOSOM to carry out its mandate, evaporated. On the afternoon of July 12, 1993, the SNA announced that it would continue to fight "...until the last colonial soldier of the United Nations leaves." In the following days and weeks parts of the city would turn into near anarchy as UNOSOM positions all over Mogadishu would repeatedly be directly assaulted.

"It's absolutely incomprehensible...This attack was excessive and unjust. You can't explain it to the Somali people or international community. Now people are very, very angry. There is a total divorce between the U.N. and Somali people. The Somali people feel now that it is an occupation force with a hidden agenda to take over the country. They don't feel U.N. troops have come to protect the humanitarian assistance."

Mohamed Sahnoun, a former Algerian U.N. envoy to Somalia, commenting on the change in Somali attitudes towards UNOSOM:

"Until Bloody Monday, members of the SNA/USC believed that the UN, in particular its Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, had been manipulating the naïve Americans into supporting an imperialist Egyptian agenda under cover of a humanitarianism, but the ambush wiped away any residual sympathy for American misunderstandings. A few years earlier, Ghali had been an Egyptian diplomat that had supported former President Siad Barre against the SNA/USC when the civil war had broken out.

According to the Associated Press an SNA spokesman by the name of Hussein Dimdil was quoted saying, "We only want peace and reconciliation, and all we get is bombs."

Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, president of the future internationally recognized Transitional National Government during the early 2000's, had used his influence in the Habr Gidr to argue for diplomatic resolution to the war with UNOSOM, but acquiesced following the raid.

The outrage was so significant that even Somali opponents of Aidid could not publicly approve of the raid, and after Bloody Monday UNOSOM had, "...no chance in counting on the support of other politico-military groups, even those opposed to Aydid’s." Aidid was now better able to count on the neutrality or even support of groups that had previously been unfavorable to him, as many Somalis from all walks of life felt that the peacekeepers had crossed a significant line. Leaflets calling for reprisals against American soldiers and warning of a coming battle against international troops were spread across Mogadishu. In some parts of the city armed gangs had formed going from agency to agency inquiring about the location of American citizens. The SNA would put out a bounty for any American soldier or UN personnel killed, and attacks against UNOSOM II forces would double in July and August 1993.

According to Robert Oakley the raid, "affected the Somali attitudes as much as the attack on Pakistanis had influenced attitudes with UNOSOM". In the notes for Black Hawk Down, Mark Bowden would find while researching the book that, "The attack still stirs up deep anger and bitterness among the Somalis from all walks of life I interviewed in Mogadishu."

Prelude to the Battle of Mogadishu

The raid was the first time the UNOSOM II forces in Somalia had deliberately targeted people, instead of buildings or armaments caches, marking a decisive turning point in what had until then been a low-level intensity conflict. To the Habr Gidr, including the former moderates and even other clans that had formerly opposed them, the attack marked a declaration of outright war from the United States and signified the point where a diplomatic solution to the "Somalia problem" had become inconceivable. In the view US special envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley the incident caused many non–Habr Gidr Somalis to sympathize, and even join forces with the Somali National Alliance and furthermore increased Aidid’s support among those Habr Gidr who had not previously been with him. He would also remark, "Before July 12th, the US would have been attacked only because of association with the UN, but the US was never singled out until after July 12th"

Many Somalis, UN personnel and humanitarian organizations believed that the strike had marked an unnecessary escalation that had devolved the Americans and UN peacekeepers into yet just another belligerent faction involved in the Somali Civil War, fears that were exacerbated by comments from UN officials who publicly warned that UNOSOM had a list of ten more alleged command and control centers to be raided in a similar fashion. A 2004 US military sanctioned case study on military operations in Somalia would comment on the raid, saying that the, "...liberalization of the rules of engagement mirrored the shift to combat operations."

To thousands of cities residents, Aidid's anti-UNOSOM rhetoric warning of an ever growing neocolonialist and imperialist international intervention had been validated, which greatly enabled him to consolidate and expand power across the divisive clan lines of war torn Mogadishu, making the city far more dangerous for international troops to operate in. The attack was designed to destroy Aidid’s power base, but instead it counterproductively resulted in an increased support for Aidid and intensified opposition to UNOSOM across Mogadishu. The raid massively undercut the growing internal opposition in the Habr Gidr to Aidid and solidified his political leadership. The SNA would seize on to assault to and successfully portray a David and Goliath like struggle between patriots and foreign invaders to the residents of Mogadishu.