John Searle facts for kids
Quick facts for kids
John Searle
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Searle at Christ Church, Oxford, 2005
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John Rogers Searle
July 31, 1932 Denver, Colorado, U.S.
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| Alma mater | University of Wisconsin–Madison Christ Church, Oxford |
| Spouse(s) | Dagmar Searle |
| Era | Contemporary philosophy |
| Region | Western philosophy |
| School | Analytic Direct realism |
| Institutions | Christ Church, Oxford UC Berkeley |
| Thesis | Problems arising in the theory of meaning out of the notions of sense and reference (1959) |
| Academic advisors | Peter Strawson J. L. Austin |
| Doctoral students | Bence Nanay |
| Other notable students | William Hirstein |
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Main interests
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Notable ideas
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Indirect speech acts Chinese room Biological naturalism Direction of fit |
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John Rogers Searle (
i/sɜːrl/; born July 31, 1932) is an American philosopher. He is well-known for his ideas in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy. He started teaching at UC Berkeley in 1959. He was a professor there until June 2019, when his status as a professor emeritus was changed.
As a student at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, Searle was involved in "Students against Joseph McCarthy". He earned all his university degrees from the University of Oxford. Later, at UC Berkeley, he was the first tenured professor to join the 1964–1965 Free Speech Movement. In the late 1980s, Searle questioned Berkeley's 1980 rent stabilization ordinance. After a court decision in 1990, Berkeley changed its rent control policy. This led to larger rent increases between 1991 and 1994.
Searle has received several important awards. In 2000, he won the Jean Nicod Prize. In 2004, he received the National Humanities Medal. In 2006, he was given the Mind & Brain Prize. In 2010, he became a member of the American Philosophical Society. His early work on speech acts, influenced by J. L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein, helped him become famous. One of his most well-known ideas is the "Chinese room" argument. This argument tries to show that "strong" artificial intelligence is not possible.
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About John Searle
John Searle's father, G. W. Searle, was an electrical engineer. His mother, Hester Beck Searle, was a physician.
Searle began his college studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. In his third year, he became a Rhodes Scholar. This allowed him to study at the University of Oxford. He earned all his university degrees from Oxford.
Searle was a professor at the University of California, Berkeley. He retired in 2014 but continued teaching until 2016. In June 2019, his emeritus title was changed.
His Involvement in Politics
While a student at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, Searle was the secretary of "Students against Joseph McCarthy". McCarthy was a senator from Wisconsin at that time. In 1959, Searle started teaching at Berkeley. He was the first tenured professor to join the 1964–65 Free Speech Movement. In 1969, he supported the university in a disagreement with students about People's Park.
In his book The Campus War: A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony (1971), Searle looked into why there were so many student protests back then. He said that both extreme groups attacked him. He felt their attacks were similar, using hints and suggestions instead of clear arguments.
In the late 1980s, Searle and other property owners asked Berkeley's rental board to allow higher rents. The board refused. Searle took legal action, saying his rights were violated. In 1990, the California Supreme Court agreed with part of Searle's argument. Berkeley then changed its rent-control policy. This led to larger rent increases between 1991 and 1994.
After the September 11 attacks, Searle wrote an article. He argued that these attacks were part of a long fight against groups that oppose the United States. He suggested that the U.S. might be in a long-term state of war with these groups. He also said that terrorists should not be allowed to use foreign land to plan attacks.
Awards and Honors
Searle has received five honorary doctorate degrees from four different countries. He is also an honorary visiting professor at Tsing Hua University and at East China Normal University.
In 2000, Searle received the Jean Nicod Prize. In 2004, he won the National Humanities Medal. In 2006, he was awarded the Mind & Brain Prize.
Searle's Philosophical Ideas
Speech Acts
Searle's early work focused on speech acts. These are actions we perform by speaking, like promising or asking a question. He combined ideas from other philosophers like J. L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Searle believed that speech acts are formed by the rules of language.
In his 1969 book Speech Acts, Searle explained his ideas about illocutionary acts. An illocutionary act is the speaker's intention in making an utterance. For example, when you say "I promise to help," the illocutionary act is promising. He looked at promising as a main example. He also showed how different sentences can have the same basic meaning but different intentions. For example, the sentences:
- Sam smokes habitually.
- Does Sam smoke habitually?
- Sam, smoke habitually!
- Would that Sam smoked habitually!
Each of these sentences is about "Sam smoking habitually." But they have different intentions: a statement, a question, a command, and a wish.
Later, in his 1983 book Intentionality, Searle added new ideas. He said that illocutionary acts have "conditions of satisfaction" and a "direction of fit". For example, the statement "John bought two candy bars" is satisfied if it is true. The command "John, buy two candy bars!" is satisfied if John actually buys them. Searle called the first one "word-to-world" fit. This means the words should match the world. The second is "world-to-word" fit. This means the world should change to match the words.
Intentionality and the Background
In Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983), Searle explored intentionality. This is the ability of our minds to be "about" things in the world. For Searle, intentionality is a power of the mind to think about or represent objects, properties, and situations in the outside world.
Searle also introduced the idea of the Background. He said this is a set of skills, abilities, and ways of thinking that humans have. These are not conscious thoughts themselves. But they help us understand things and create appropriate thoughts when needed.
For example, if someone asks you to "cut the cake," you know to use a knife. If they ask you to "cut the grass," you know to use a lawnmower. The request didn't say which tool to use. The Background helps you know the right way to understand. Searle believes the Background is mostly unconscious. It's like the brain structures that help our minds work.
Searle also links his idea of the Background to the ideas of other thinkers. He sees it in Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of a "river-bed" of beliefs. He also connects it to Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus.
Consciousness
In his book The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), Searle talks about consciousness. He argues that many modern philosophies have tried to deny that consciousness exists. But he believes they haven't succeeded.
Searle says that consciousness is a real, personal experience. It is caused by the physical processes in the brain. He calls this idea biological naturalism.
Subjective vs. Objective
Searle argues that some critics say talking about consciousness is not scientific because science is objective. But Searle says they are making a mistake. Science aims for epistemically objective statements. This means their truth can be checked by anyone. But not all things are ontologically objective.
Searle explains that a value judgment like "McKinley is prettier than Everest" is "epistemically subjective." This means it's based on personal opinion. But "McKinley is higher than Everest" is "epistemically objective." This means it can be proven true or false.
Beyond this, Searle believes some things, like conscious experiences, are ontologically subjective. This means they can only exist as a personal experience. For example, a doctor's note saying a patient has back pain is an "epistemically objective" claim. But the pain itself is "ontologically subjective." Only the person feeling it can experience it.
Artificial Intelligence
Searle's idea of biological naturalism suggests that to create a conscious being, we would need to copy the brain's physical processes. This goes against what Searle calls "Strong AI." Strong AI believes that a computer, if programmed correctly, can truly "understand" and have thoughts.
In 1980, Searle introduced the "Chinese room" argument. This argument tries to show that Strong AI is false. Imagine a person in a room who doesn't know Chinese. They get Chinese characters through a slot. They use a book of rules to write down other Chinese characters and send them out. To people outside, it looks like the room understands Chinese. But the person inside doesn't understand anything. Searle says this shows that computers don't truly "understand" language. They just follow rules to move symbols around.
Searle argues that consciousness is a physical property, like digestion. A computer simulation of digestion won't actually digest anything. Similarly, a computer simulation of a mind won't actually be conscious. He believes that information processes are "observer-relative." This means they are patterns we see, not physical things that can cause consciousness.
Social Reality
Searle also explored how social things like "baseball" or "money" can exist in a world made of physical particles. He uses the idea of institutional facts. These are different from brute facts, like the height of a mountain. Institutional facts are created by human agreement and rules.
He argues that society works through institutional facts. These facts come from collective intentionality (when a group intends something together). They follow "constitutive rules" that have the form "X counts as Y in C." For example, filling out a ballot (X) counts as a vote (Y) in a polling place (C). Getting enough votes counts as a victory in an election. This helps explain how social things are built.
Some sociologists, however, think Searle's ideas about society are similar to those of Émile Durkheim. They argue that Searle's work faces the same criticisms as Durkheim's.
Rationality
In Rationality in Action (2001), Searle argues that common ideas about rationality are wrong. He says that rationality is not like a train track where you are forced to a conclusion.
Searle believes that reason doesn't force someone to do something. There's a "gap" between reasons and actions. For example, if you decide to vote for a candidate, you still have to make the effort to actually vote. This gap makes people feel like they have free will. Searle thinks that all rational activity needs free will.
Second, Searle believes people can do rational things even if they don't desire to. It's often said that you can't get an "ought" from an "is." This means facts about the world can't tell you what you should do. But Searle argues that if a fact is part of an institution (like a promise), then what you should do can come from that institutional fact. For example, if you promise to do something, you "should" do it because you are part of the system of promise-making.
Third, Searle argues that being rational often means adjusting your desires, which can be inconsistent. He believes that rationality is not a set of strict rules. Instead, it's more like a way of acting. Certain behaviors are seen as rational, and rules come from finding patterns in what is considered rational.
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See also
In Spanish: John Searle para niños
