1982 British Army Gazelle friendly fire incident facts for kids
Quick facts for kids Loss of Gazelle XX377 |
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| Part of the Falklands War | |||||||
 A British Army Gazelle helicopter, circa 1983 |
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On June 6, 1982, during the Falklands War, something sad and unexpected happened. A British Navy ship, HMS Cardiff, accidentally shot down a British Army helicopter. This helicopter, a Gazelle with the serial number XX377, was carrying four soldiers. All four were killed in what is called a friendly fire incident.
Cardiff was looking for enemy planes bringing supplies to Argentine forces. The ship mistakenly thought the helicopter was a large Argentine transport plane, a C-130 Hercules. At first, people thought enemy action caused the helicopter's loss. However, a later investigation found that Cardiff's missile was the cause.
On the night of June 5, HMS Cardiff was positioned east of the Falkland Islands. Its job was to help ground troops with gunfire and stop enemy aircraft. Around 2:00 AM, the ship's radar detected something. It was a British Army Gazelle helicopter on a routine flight. It was delivering people and equipment to a radio station on East Falkland.
Based on its speed and direction, Cardiff's crew thought it was an enemy aircraft. They fired one Sea Dart missile, which destroyed the helicopter. The helicopter's wreckage and the crew were found the next morning. The loss was first blamed on enemy fire. Even though Cardiff was suspected, early tests on the wreckage were not clear.
No official investigation happened until four years later. The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MoD) said they did not want to cause more sadness to the families. They were still trying to figure out how the Gazelle was shot down. The investigation finally confirmed that the soldiers died due to friendly fire. It said that no one person was to blame.
However, the investigation found several problems. There was a lack of communication between the army and the navy. The army had not told anyone about the helicopter's flight. The navy had not told the ground forces that Cardiff had moved to ambush Argentine planes. Also, the helicopter's identification friend or foe (IFF) system was turned off. This was because it interfered with the army's Rapier anti-aircraft missile system. The findings of the investigation led to criticism of how the MoD first handled the incident.
What Happened Before
On April 2, 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, which are a British territory. The United Kingdom, located far away, quickly sent a large naval force of 28,000 troops. Their mission was to take back the islands. The war ended that June when the Argentine forces surrendered. About 900 British and Argentine service members lost their lives in the battles.
In early May, British troops landed at San Carlos on the western side of East Falkland. From there, they moved towards Stanley, the capital. Helicopters helped by carrying supplies to the troops from San Carlos. The Argentine forces in Stanley received supplies throughout the war from C-130 Hercules planes. These supply flights worried the British Navy, who tried to stop them.
The Incident
On the night of June 5, the British ship HMS Cardiff took its position east of the islands. Cardiff had two main jobs. It was to provide fire support to the Royal Marines. It also had to stop any Argentine aircraft trying to fly into Stanley. The ship had tried a similar mission four nights before. It had tried to shoot down a supply plane but was not successful.
Meanwhile, pilots Staff Sergeant Christopher Griffin and Lance Corporal Simon Cockton were on a mission. They were from 656 Squadron Army Air Corps. They were ordered to fly equipment and people to a radio station on Pleasant Peak that was not working well. This station helped connect the 5th Infantry Brigade headquarters at Darwin with troops at Fitzroy.
The night was clear with a bright moon and a steady wind. The crew left Goose Green in their Gazelle helicopter, serial number XX377. They picked up the replacement equipment from Darwin. They also took two passengers: Major Michael Forge and Staff Sergeant John Baker. Griffin was an experienced pilot. The flight to the radio station was expected to take only ten minutes.
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At 2:00 AM local time, Cardiff's operations room detected XX377 on its radar. The helicopter was about 25 nautical miles away. The helicopter's identification friend or foe (IFF) system was turned off. This system helps identify friendly aircraft. Because there were no friendly signals and the contact seemed to be heading towards Stanley, the crew thought it was an enemy.
After calculating its speed, they believed it was an Argentine fixed-wing aircraft. They thought it was either a Hercules plane bringing supplies or a FMA IA 58 Pucará attack plane. Cardiff fired one of its Sea Dart missiles. The 5th Infantry Brigade lost radio contact with the Gazelle. At the same time, people at the radio station on Pleasant Peak saw and heard the missile explode. Cardiff's crew could see the fireball using night vision goggles.
The loss of the helicopter made the British think Argentine forces were still in the area. So, Gurkha soldiers were sent on patrols. When the Gurkhas met the people at the Pleasant Peak station, there was a risk of another friendly fire incident. At dawn, a proper search was done. The Gazelle's wreckage was found along with the dead crew and passengers. These were the 5th Infantry Brigade's first casualties of the war.
Immediately, there were suspicions that Cardiff was responsible. Later that evening, Rear Admiral "Sandy" Woodward gave a "Weapons Tight" order. This order meant that no aircraft could be attacked unless it was clearly identified as hostile. This applied to all aircraft flying over East Falkland that were slower than 200 knots and lower than 610 meters.
The Investigations
A senior medical officer, Surgeon-Captain Richard "Rick" Jolly, first examined the bodies of the crew. The helicopter's wreckage was checked at the site. However, the British could not tell if it was destroyed by Cardiff's missiles or by Argentine fire. Because of this uncertainty, they decided not to hold an official investigation. XX377 was declared "lost in action." They thought that telling the families it might have been friendly fire would cause them more sadness.
After the war, missile pieces found in the wreckage were sent for analysis. They went to a British government aviation research center. The tests concluded that the pieces were not from a British Sea Dart missile. This was despite a Sea Dart casing being found "several hundred yards" away from the wreckage.
In December 1982, an inquest was held in Southampton for Lance Corporal Cockton after his body was returned to the UK. Based on the test results, the Army Air Corps said that the analysis of the missile pieces showed the helicopter was destroyed by an anti-aircraft missile "known to have been in the possession of the enemy." The test results were reviewed again in November 1985. They then said there could be "no definitive conclusion" about where the missile pieces came from. In June 1986, John Stanley, a government minister, announced this change.
In October 1986, partly due to pressure from Cockton's mother and a politician named Tam Dalyell, an official investigation finally began. The investigation took a month to conclude that XX377 was shot down by Cardiff. Historian Hugh Bicheno noted that it took the Ministry of Defence four years and two investigations to admit the friendly fire incident. The findings of this investigation were made public in July 2008. However, some parts of the report were kept secret. This was because they contained operational details that could still be useful to potential enemies.
The investigation found that army commanders did not have to tell anyone else about the helicopter's mission. This was because the flight was within their area and for their task. Gazelle XX377 had an IFF transmitter, but it was turned off. The investigation believed that if IFF had been used, Cardiff would not have attacked the aircraft. At that time, less than half of the army's helicopters had IFF transmitters. Those that did were told not to use them. This was because they interfered with the British ground-based Rapier anti-aircraft missile systems.
There was a misunderstanding about the Navy's ability to attack air targets over land. This led to the Navy not being told that the army's helicopters were not using IFF. The investigation concluded that this failure to communicate, along with the Navy's assumption that all helicopters would use IFF, caused the accident. However, the investigation recommended that no one person should be blamed.
Lessons Learned
Helicopters were becoming more important in land operations. Also, guided missile destroyers were being used more for coastal defense. Because of this, the investigation recommended changes to NATO procedures. These changes would help other armed forces understand the danger of underestimating a ship's missile range over land.
In the late 1980s, the British government focused more on joint warfare training. Exercises like Purple Warrior took place in Oman and Scotland. The investigation noted the creation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters. This was designed to stop operations from being done in a disorganized way.
IFF transmitters were then fitted to all Army Air Corps and Royal Marine Gazelle and Lynx helicopters. The problem of IFF interfering with Rapier batteries was also fixed. The investigation also suggested that naval gunfire-support officers could help with air defense problems during joint operations near the coast.
A memorial cross was placed on Pleasant Peak. Soldiers from 205 Signal Squadron painted the number "205" at the crash site. The number is about 40 meters wide and can be seen from the air at (51°47′01″S 58°28′04″W / 51.78361°S 58.46778°W).
See also
- List of accidents and incidents involving military aircraft (1980–1989)
