Broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II facts for kids
The broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II arose after General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, decided to advance into Germany on a broad front in 1944, against the suggestions of his principal subordinates, Lieutenant Generals Omar Bradley and George S. Patton and Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, who argued instead to stage competing advances on narrow fronts. The decision was controversial initially because the British government wanted to raise the profile of the minority British contingent in what was by then an overwhelmingly American army, and they perceived that a British-led thrust to Berlin would achieve this aim. Montgomery's strident advocacy raised political and nationalistic complications that strained the wartime alliance. During the subsequent Cold War, suggestions were made that the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe may have been reduced had Eisenhower sent a narrow-front thrust to race the USSR to Berlin in 1945.
Eisenhower's decision was based on both political and military factors. There were serious reservations in the autumn of 1944 about whether the Allied logistical system could support the narrow-front strategy, because at that time there were insufficient working ports to support large formations far from the coast, the road and rail transport network was already under severe strain, and there were concerns about being able to protect the narrow supply lines deep into enemy territory, through terrain that included crossing many rivers, in weather which hampered air support. In addition the Allied occupation zones in Germany had been agreed upon in February 1944, and a faster Allied advance in the autumn of 1944 would not have altered this. The Soviet Union would have also benefited from a rapid German collapse, and its participation in the war against Japan was greatly desired. The staff at Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) considered Montgomery's proposed advance on the Ruhr and Berlin and Bradley's proposed advance on Metz and the Saar, and assessed both to be feasible, but only on the assumptions that the port of Antwerp was brought rapidly into service, that considerable additional air, rail and road transportation became available, and that the other Allied armies were already poised on the German border. These assumptions were not met until very late in the year, by which time circumstances had changed. The consequences if the narrow front advance had failed, would have been severe.
The British historian A. J. P. Taylor credited Chester Wilmot's The Struggle For Europe (1952) as the work that "launched the myths that Eisenhower prevented Montgomery from winning the war in 1944". Few historians on either side of the Atlantic accept ending the war in 1944 was possible. "Wilmot's book", American historian Maurice Matloff wrote, "must be taken for what it represents—a suggestive, provocative work on the war written from a British point of view in a period of disenchantment." Montgomery's Chief of Staff, Major-General Freddie de Guingand, stated in his post-war account that he had opposed Montgomery's narrow front strategy on political and administrative grounds, but Montgomery's wartime Chief Administrative Officer, Major-General Miles Graham defended his contention that the narrow front advance was logistically feasible.
Background
On D-Day, 6 June 1944, the western Allies of World War II launched Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy. They achieved tactical and operational surprise, and established a lodgement. In the weeks that followed, the Germans made skillful use of the difficult and defensible terrain of the bocage country, and the initial Allied advance was slower and more costly than anticipated. A storm on 19 to 21 June wrecked the Mulberry harbour at Omaha Beach and gave a foretaste of the devastation that the autumn gales could bring. There was a genuine prospect of a World War I-style stalemate developing if the German defenders could hold out until then. However the German decision to hold on in Normandy also allowed the Allies to employ their superiority in firepower, subjecting the Germans to casualties and destruction of equipment on a scale that they could not replace, thereby making their ultimate defeat in Normandy inevitable.
On 25 July, the Allies launched Operation Cobra, and broke out from the lodgement in Normandy. By mid-August 1944 the Germans were in full retreat, and were also retreating on other fronts; including in Southern France, where the Allies had landed on the French Riviera; in Italy, where the Germans were falling back from Rome to the Gothic Line; and in Belarus, where a German army group had been broken by Soviet offensive Operation Bagration.
The US First Army completed the Liberation of Paris on 25 August 1944, assisted by the French Resistance and French General Philippe Leclerc's 2nd French Armored Division. Montgomery's offensive jumped off on 29 August. While the First Canadian Army under Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar invested the French Channel ports of Dieppe and Le Havre, Brussels was liberated on 4 September 1944 by the British 21st Army Group. Dempsey's British Second Army advanced 400 kilometres (250 mi) across France and Belgium to capture the port of Antwerp largely intact on 4 September, but the Germans still controlled the approaches to the port, so its opening was dependent on clearing the Scheldt estuary, and it was not expected to be operational before 1 November. In September 1944 the Western Allies had reached Germany's western border, which was protected by the extensive Siegfried Line.
The Operation Overlord plan had been formulated in April 1944 by SHAEF planning staff, which consisted of three British officers: Captain P. N. Walker from the Royal Navy, Brigadier Kenneth McLean from the British Army, and Group Captain Harold Broad from the Royal Air Force. When addressing the eventual invasion of Germany itself, they considered but initially rejected the concept of an advance north of the Ardennes, as the rivers would restrict the advance to a narrow front as it approached the Rhine, and the many rivers would restrict the use of armour. On the other hand an advance on Metz would be over country suitable for armour, but thereafter would encounter increasingly rugged terrain, and would not threaten the Ruhr industrial area. In their 3 May report to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, they recommended a main advance on the Ruhr to the north of the Ardennes, coupled with a subsidiary advance to the south towards Metz.
The plan was based on the assumption that the Germans would successively defend each of the major rivers across France and Belgium. Furthermore, the original plans had assumed a steady rate of advance against resistance, rather than the rapid pursuit of a disorganized enemy, and this assumption formed the basis of logistic preparations. In addition, it was originally planned to pause for about a month at the River Seine, in order to develop an administrative base to support further offensives. In reality the advance was much slower than anticipated for the first seven weeks, as the Allied forces struggled to break out of the Normandy beachhead, and to gain the use of the port of Cherbourg. Thereafter the spectacular drive of early August greatly accelerated the advance to the enemy's border, but the lines of communications could not be developed fast enough to keep up. Railways and pipelines could not be extended quickly enough, and the motor transport facilities struggled to supply even the minimum needs of the advancing armies.
Eisenhower assumed personal command of all land forces on 1 September. Under his direct command fell the US 12th Army Group, which became active on 1 August. The 12th Army Group was commanded by Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, and it controlled the US First Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, and the US Third Army, under the command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. Also under Eisenhower's direct command fell the British 21st Army Group, commanded by General Sir Bernard Montgomery. The 21st Army Group controlled the British Second Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey, and the First Canadian Army under the command of Canadian Lieutenant General Harry Crerar.
At SHAEF optimism gave way to euphoria, and there was a conviction that the Siegfried Line (Westwall) would soon be overrun. In October and November 1918, Germany had sued for peace after it had suffered a series of battlefield defeats and its allies had defected. The situation in September 1944 looked very similar. On 5 September Eisenhower wrote in a memo that: "The defeat of the German armies is complete, and the only thing now needed to realize the whole conception is speed. Our rapidity of movement will depend on maintenance, in which we are now stretched to the limit."
On 4 September Eisenhower told Bradley to ensure that the main effort was made north of Ardennes, but it was not Eisenhower's habit to issue explicit directives to his army group commanders; he preferred to issue statements of his intent and allow the army commanders to implement them according to the situation on the ground. Eisenhower relented on 5 September, and agreed that Patton's advance could continue. Bradley continued to support Patton's advance to the extent of starving First Army units of fuel, and allocating Third Army two divisions released from the front in Brittany. This resulted in Eisenhower issuing a more explicit statement of his intent on 13 September. Patton crossed the Meuse on 14 September, but by the end of the month both First Army and Third Army had been halted short of their objectives.
Like his American counterparts, Montgomery's primary mission was to defeat Germany as quickly as possible, but as the senior British commander in north west Europe, he also operated under political pressure to achieve two other objectives. The first was that, given Britain's precarious economy and manpower situation, a victory in 1944 was preferable to one in 1945. He was therefore inclined to grasp at the most tenuous prospect of this, whereas Eisenhower was more ready to accept that it was unachievable. At a press conference on 15 August 1944, Eisenhower told reporters that anybody who thought the war would be over soon was "crazy". Eisenhower stated that Hitler knew he would be executed when the war ended, so he thus expected Hitler would fight to the bitter end, and that most of his troops would fight on with him.
In addition, there was a grand strategy imperative that Britain be seen to be playing a vital part in the campaign if it was to have any say in the reconstruction of the post-war world. Montgomery's stature was an integral part of that. Britain may have entered the war as a great power, but by 1944 its status was greatly diminished. Suffering heavy losses in Normandy would diminish British leadership and prestige globally, and in post-war Europe in particular. The fewer the number of combat-experienced divisions the British Army had left at the end of the war, the smaller Britain's influence in the reconstruction of Europe was likely to be, compared to the emerging superpowers of the US and the USSR. Montgomery was thus caught in a dilemma—the British Army needed to be seen to be pulling at least half the weight in the liberation of Western Europe, but without incurring the heavy casualties that such a role would inevitably produce. The 21st Army Group scarcely possessed sufficient forces to achieve such a military prominence, and the remaining divisions had to be expended sparingly.
Montgomery's solution to the dilemma was to lobby to be reappointed as commander of Allied land forces until the end of the war, so that any victory attained on the Western front—although achieved primarily by American formations—would accrue in part to him and thus to Britain. He would also be able to ensure that British units were spared some of the high-attrition actions, but would be most prominent when the final blows were struck. When that strategy failed, he lobbied Eisenhower to put some American formations under the control of the 21st Army Group, so as to bolster his resources while still maintaining the outward appearance of successful British effort.
Logistical considerations
Ruppenthal wrote that the adherents to single-thrust theories underestimate the factor of logistics, which strongly influenced the initial strategic planning as well as the conduct of the battle. General Eisenhower's decision in mid-September 1944 to pursue a "broad-front strategy" was based largely on considerations of logistics. Initially it was logical to pursue the opportunities offered by the disintegration of enemy resistance, but the available transport was unable to deliver even daily needs, far less to stock advance supply depots. By 12 September (D-Day plus 98) the Allied armies had advanced to a point which they had not expected to reach until D-Day plus 350. Between 25 August and 12 September they had made 260 days of planned-progress in 19 days. Much larger forces were thus being maintained at much greater distances than was initially contemplated at that point of the war. In addition the city of Paris had been liberated 55 days ahead of schedule, and the needs to those civilians were added to the demand on supplies.
On 3 August Montgomery sent the US VIII Corps to take Brittany, saying "I feel that will be enough." The US 6th Armored Division reached Brest by 7 August. Brest was heavily armed and fortified, and was defended by approximately 30,000 German troops, including the elite 2nd Paratroop Division. Brest was finally captured on 20 September, at a cost of about 10,000 American casualties. The city of Brest was totally destroyed, and the Germans had thoroughly demolished the port. The river channel was blocked, the wharves and cranes and breakwaters had been ruined, and ships had been scuttled in the harbour. The smaller Breton port of St. Malo had been captured by 2 September 1944, but the Germans had also destroyed the port beyond hope of immediate repair.
Eisenhower decided on 7 September to cancel Operation Chastity, the development of an artificial port in Brittany, and on 9 September determined that none of the Brittany ports were needed. This left the Americans wholly dependent upon the increasingly distant port of Cherbourg and the Normandy beaches. With the rehabilitation of the railways and construction of pipelines unable to keep up with the pace of the advance, American logistics in the Northern France campaign depended on motor transport. Yet even before Operation Cobra began, there was a shortage of trucks, especially of the large semi-trailers that were especially suitable for long-distance haulage. Expedients like the Red Ball Express came at a high price. Tyres and other parts wore out, and vehicles were run without proper maintenance. Dry batteries, lack of oil, and loose nuts and bolts caused breakdowns. Driver fatigue was another important factor; round trips sometimes went for 48 to 65 hours. By the end of September, 5,750 vehicles required major repairs.
By the middle of August it was no longer possible to maintain in combat all the available divisions, and by early September three divisions had been immobilized so that their transport could be reallocated to form provisional truck companies. It was estimated that no more than twenty divisions could be maintained in combat as far forward as the Rhine by 1 October. Bad weather would soon reduce the capacity of the beach landing zones even further. It was thus accepted that the Saar and Ruhr areas were at the absolute maximum distance at which Allied forces could be supported for the time being, and that "a power thrust deep into Germany" could not be attempted without additional logistic capacity.
By mid-September the US First Army was fighting at Aachen inside the German border, more than 200 miles beyond Paris. The original planning had not anticipated reaching that area until May 1945, so it had become necessary to support a huge force at this substantial distance approximately 230 days earlier than originally planned.
The decision to continue the pursuit beyond the Seine stretched the American logistical system to breaking point, and had long-term and far-reaching effects in the form of the attrition of equipment, failure to establish a proper supply depot system, neglect of the development of ports, and inadequate stockpiles in forward areas. That the American advance came to a halt in early September was not due to a shortage of fuel; the problem was one of delivering it to where it was needed. By September, with the weather starting to deteriorate, the Communications Zone was warning that it could not provide enough resources to maintain more than one army, and then only at the expense of deferring the construction of advance airfields, the winterisation of clothing and equipment, and the replacement of damaged and worn-out materiel. Since the Ruhr was the most important objective, this entailed halting Patton's Third Army.
Eisenhower had initially been willing to defer the capture of the Brittany ports in favor of advancing rapidly to encircle and destroy the German Seventh Army, which would otherwise have subsequently been able to delay the Allied advance, and again when he decided to cross the Seine immediately and continue to drive the disintegrating German formations eastward to the German border. However such deferments were no longer permissible, in view of the impending bad weather with its anticipated impact on the landing of supplies over the beaches, as well as the hardening of German resistance in prepared defensive positions.
By 9 September the Brittany ports were 400 to 500 miles behind the front lines, and Eisenhower had decided that the Brittany ports (apart from Brest) were no longer essential to support the US armies. Logistics planners had suggested in early September that US port development resources should rather be used in developing the ports north of the Seine.
At the end of September the Communications Zone clearly confirmed the impossibility of supporting large-scale operations east of the Rhine. The Communications Zone did not expect its port and transportation situation to improve sufficiently until mid-November, and that large-scale operations would not be possible until the port of Antwerp and adequate railway infrastructure became available.
Montgomery's proposal
On 17 August Montgomery flew from his headquarters at Le Bény-Bocage to see Bradley at 12th Army Group headquarters at Fougères. Montgomery outlined a concept to Bradley whereby the Overlord plan would be set aside, and the 12th and 21st Army Groups kept together to advance north of the Ardennes. Montgomery later described this as the Schlieffen Plan in reverse. At the time Montgomery thought that Bradley agreed with his proposal. The following day Montgomery cabled the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke:
Have been thinking about future plans but have not (repeat not) discussed the subject with Ike [Eisenhower]. My views are as follows. After crossing the Seine 12 and 21 Army groups should keep together as a solid mass of some 40 divisions which would be so strong that it need fear nothing. This force should move northwards, 21 Army Group should be on the western flank, and should clear the Channel coast and the Pas de Calais and Western Flanders and secure Antwerp. The American armies should move on Ardennes, directed on Brussels, Aachen and Cologne. The movement of the American armies would cut the communications of enemy forces on the Channel coast and thus facilitate the task of British Army Group. The initial objects of the movement would be to destroy German forces on the coast and to establish a powerful air force in Belgium. A further object would be to get enemy out of V-1 or V-2 range of England. Bradley agrees with above conception. Would be glad to know if you agree generally. When I have your reply will discuss matter with Ike.
Eisenhower agreed to meet with Montgomery for lunch on 23 August at the latter's headquarters, which was now at Condé-sur-Noireau. Montgomery pitched his proposal to Eisenhower, warning that—in his opinion—failure to take advantage of the favourable operational situation would result in the war in Europe continuing well into 1945. Montgomery contended that the 21st Army Group needed the assistance of at least twelve American divisions, and to provide the logistical support for them, he recommended that Patton's Third Army be halted. In August and September 1944, the US First Army consisted of nine divisions, so giving up twelve would have meant handing over the entire army to Montgomery.
Bradley's proposal
When Montgomery saw Bradley again on 19 August, Bradley informed him that he was considering a concept of Patton's, whereby the main effort of the 12th Army Group would be south of the Ardennes, towards Metz and the Saar. While Bradley acknowledged the value of the Ruhr, he contended that instead of First Army encircling it from the south with a crossing of the Rhine near Cologne like Montgomery recommended, it would be preferable to undertake a wider envelopment of the Ruhr with Third Army crossing in the vicinity of Frankfurt. Even more so than Eisenhower, Bradley was a proponent of the broad front doctrine taught at Fort Leavenworth. Since he considered that the German Army in the West had been completely defeated, he saw no reason to halt Patton's drive on the Saar, which he saw as providing a tactical windfall.
Outcome
On 17 September, Eisenhower emphasized that an additional major deep-water port on the north flank was an indispensable prerequisite for the final drive into Germany, and that a large-scale drive into the "enemy's heart" was unthinkable without the opening of Antwerp. He resolved to thereafter advance on a broad front once adequate logistic support was available.
Eisenhower gave Montgomery permission to proceed with Operation Market Garden, in which airborne troops would seize a series of bridges up to the Rhine at Arnhem, which Eisenhower saw as having the limited objective of securing a bridgehead over the Rhine. Operation Market Garden was fought from 17 to 25 September 1944, and ended with a British defeat at the Battle of Arnhem when the ground forces were held up by German defenders on the narrow road, and could not reach the airborne troops in time.
On 18 and 21 September, with the Battle of Arnhem was still raging, Montgomery tried one last time to get his narrow front strategy adopted in cables to Smith. Once again, Eisenhower rejected the narrow front concept. "So far as the debate between proponents of the single thrust to the north or south of the Ardennes was concerned," Pogue wrote, "the result at Arnhem settled nothing." For his part, Bradley still insisted on advances in both the north and the south, but by 21 September he had accepted that opening the port of Antwerp was necessary to support future operations. As the planners had feared, the available resources were insufficient to support the broad front strategy.
Eisenhower held a conference at Versailles the following day that was attended by 23 generals and admirals, including most of his senior commanders. The only notable absence was Montgomery, who sent his chief of staff, Major-General Francis de Guingand in his stead owing to the critical situation at Arnhem. Eisenhower attempted to make his intentions clear. He declared that operations in the immediate future would be limited to breaching the Siegfried Line and advancing on the Ruhr. He ordered Bradley to convey the decisions reached at the conference to Montgomery in person.
The subsequent defeat at Arnhem made it clear that the war would not end soon, and that much hard fighting lay ahead. Bradley was drawn into costly battles at Aachen, the Hürtgen Forest and Metz. In making his decision in favour of a broad front advance, Eisenhower took both political and strategic factors into account, as well as tactical and logistical factors. He considered the political consequence in an American election year, and damage that might be done to inter-Allied cooperation if one nation was seen as being favoured over the other. He was aware of the glittering prospect of an early victory that Montgomery offered, but rightly judged it beyond reach.
Operations to clear the Schelt were initiated by the First Canadian Army in October, but it became apparent that it did not have sufficient resources to complete the operations alone. On 15 October, Eisenhower sent Montgomery a direct order to focus all his resources on the opening of Antwerp, which Eisenhower frankly explained was absolutely necessary for the support of the American forces. The following day Montgomery issued a new directive to the 21st Army Group prioritising the opening of Antwerp over the advance to the Rhine, and committing the British Second Army as well as the Canadian First Army to the battle. The battle ended on 8 November, and minesweeping operations concluded on 26 November. Two days later, the first Liberty ship entered the port.
