Thomas Schelling facts for kids
Quick facts for kids
Thomas Schelling
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![]() Schelling in 2007
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Born |
Thomas Crombie Schelling
April 14, 1921 Oakland, California, U.S.
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Died | December 13, 2016 |
(aged 95)
Institution | Yale University Harvard University University of Maryland New England Complex Systems Institute |
Field | Game theory |
Alma mater | University of California, Berkeley Harvard University |
Doctoral advisor |
Arthur Smithies Wassily Leontief James Duesenberry |
Doctoral students |
A. Michael Spence Eli Noam Tyler Cowen |
Influences | Carl von Clausewitz, Niccolò Machiavelli |
Contributions | Focal point Egonomics |
Awards | The Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy (1977) Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (2005) |
Information at IDEAS / RePEc |
Thomas Crombie Schelling (April 14, 1921 – December 13, 2016) was an American economist. He was also a professor who taught about foreign policy, national security, and how countries deal with nuclear weapons.
Schelling was a professor at the University of Maryland. He also worked at the New England Complex Systems Institute. In 2005, he won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. He shared the award with Robert Aumann. They won for helping us understand how people and countries cooperate or conflict. They used something called game theory to do this.
Contents
About Thomas Schelling
His Early Life
Thomas Schelling was born in Oakland, California, on April 14, 1921. He went to San Diego High school. He earned his first degree in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1944. Later, he got his PhD (a higher degree) in economics from Harvard University in 1951.
His Career Journey
From 1948 to 1953, Schelling worked for the U.S. government. He helped with the Marshall Plan in Europe. This plan helped rebuild Europe after World War II. He also worked for the White House.
In 1956, Schelling joined the RAND Corporation. This is a place where experts study big problems. In 1958, he became a professor of economics at Harvard University. He also helped start the Center for International Affairs there.
In 1969, Schelling moved to Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He helped change what was taught there. He wanted students to learn more about leadership, not just how to manage things.
Later, in 1990, he joined the University of Maryland. He became the president of the American Economic Association in 1991. This is a big group for economists. He also led the Eastern Economic Association in 1995.
Schelling also took part in the Copenhagen Consensus. This group looks at the world's biggest problems and how to solve them.
Awards and Recognition
Schelling received many awards for his work. In 1977, he won The Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy.
In 1993, he got an award for his research on preventing nuclear war. This award came from the National Academy of Sciences.
He also received special honorary degrees from several universities. These included Erasmus University Rotterdam and Yale University.
His biggest award was the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. He won it for his ideas on conflict and cooperation.
His Personal Life
Thomas Schelling was married to Corinne Tigay Saposs from 1947 to 1991. They had four sons together. In 1991, he married Alice M. Coleman. She had two sons, who became his stepsons.
Schelling passed away on December 13, 2016, in Bethesda, Maryland. He was 95 years old.
After he died, his family sold his Nobel Prize medal. They gave the money to the Southern Poverty Law Center. This group works to protect civil rights. Schelling's wife, Alice, said he always remembered Smoky the Cowhorse as the most important book he ever read.
Schelling's Key Ideas
The Strategy of Conflict (1960)
In 1960, Schelling wrote a very important book called The Strategy of Conflict. This book was one of the first to study how people and groups bargain and act in conflicts. It was even named one of the most important books published after 1945.
In this book, Schelling introduced ideas like the "focal point" and "credible commitment." A focal point is a solution that people tend to choose by instinct when they can't talk to each other. A "credible commitment" means making a promise or threat that others believe you will follow through on.
Schelling believed that even in conflicts, there are chances to cooperate. He said that only in very rare cases, like a "war of complete extermination," are people's interests totally against each other.
He showed that cooperation can happen in many ways. This could be through preventing war, limiting fighting, or talking things out. He saw these actions as ways to turn a conflict into a "bargaining situation." What one person gains depends on the choices of the other person.
Schelling also talked about different ways to communicate. "Explicit" communication is when you talk or write, like offering a deal. But what if you can't talk? Then "tacit maneuvers" become important. This is when your actions send a message. For example, moving your army to a certain place can send a message without saying a word.
A former student of Schelling's, Michael Kinsley, once explained Schelling's ideas with a story. Imagine you are chained to someone at the edge of a cliff. You both want a prize, but only one can get it if the other gives up. If you threaten to push them off, you both lose. Schelling's idea is to start dancing closer and closer to the edge. You don't have to be crazy enough to jump. You just need to show you're willing to take a higher risk of accidentally falling. If you can do that, you might win.
Arms and Influence (1966)
Schelling continued his ideas about war in his 1966 book, Arms and Influence. He explored how military power can be used for bargaining. It's not just about fighting; it's about influencing the other side.
He looked at how the U.S. acted during the Cuban and Berlin crises. These actions were not just for war. They were also signals to the other side. For example, bombing a country might not just be to hurt their army. It can also be a way to make them come to the negotiating table. Schelling's interest in game theory and nuclear weapons greatly influenced this book.
Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978)
In 1978, Schelling wrote Micromotives and Macrobehavior. In this book, he explored how small individual choices can lead to big group patterns. He showed that even if people have a small preference, it can lead to large-scale separation.
He used a simple example with pennies and dimes on a board. He showed that if coins moved to be "happy" (surrounded by some of their own kind), it could lead to all pennies ending up in one area and all dimes in another. This showed how small preferences can lead to complete separation of groups.
His Views on Global Warming
Schelling was involved in discussions about global warming. He believed that climate change is a serious threat to poorer countries. However, he thought the threat to the United States was sometimes made to seem bigger than it was.
He used his experience with the Marshall Plan to explain his view. He said that dealing with global warming is a "bargaining problem." If the world reduces pollution, poor countries would get most of the benefits. But rich countries would have to pay most of the costs.
Impact on Popular Culture
Thomas Schelling's ideas even influenced movies! Stanley Kubrick read an article by Schelling. This led to conversations that helped create the famous 1964 movie Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.
Schelling is also known for using the phrase "collateral damage" for the first time in a published article in 1961. This term is now widely used to describe unintended harm.
In his book Choice and Consequence, he wrote about many topics. These included nuclear terrorism, blackmail, and even daydreaming. He looked at them from a behavioral economics point of view.
See also
In Spanish: Thomas Schelling para niños
- Brinkmanship
- Egonomics
- Focal point (game theory) (Schelling point)
- Hobbesian trap (Schelling's dilemma)
- Internality
- Precommitment
- Strategic realism
- Vicarious problem-solving