History of the Great War facts for kids

Quick facts for kids
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Committee of Imperial Defence

Illustrator	Archibald Frank Becke (maps)
Country	Britain
Language	English
Discipline	Military history Publishers HMSO Macmillan Longmans John Murray Heinemann Naval and Military Press Ray Westlake Books Clarendon Press
Published	1922–1949 1990s 2000s
Media type	Print (some online scans later)
No. of books	c.  108

The History of the Great War is a huge collection of books, about 109 volumes in total. It tells the story of how Britain fought during World War I. These books were created by a special group called the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, starting in 1915 and finishing in 1949. Sir James Edmonds was a key person in charge from 1919. He wrote many of the army books and helped choose who would write about the navy, air force, and other parts of the war.

The first books about naval operations and sea trade came out in 1920. The first "army" book, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914 Part I, was published in 1922. The very last book, The Occupation of Constantinople, was published much later, in 2010.

Originally, these history books were meant for military experts to learn from. There was also a plan to make simpler books for everyone to read. However, this didn't quite work out as planned. Edmonds preferred to hire retired officers to write, as they were less expensive than civilian writers.

Over the years, these official histories have been republished. In the 1990s, the Imperial War Museum and Battery Press re-released them with black and white maps. Later, in the 2000s, they were re-released in paperback with color maps and even on DVDs.

Why Write Official History?

Learning from the Past

Official military history started in the mid-1800s. These reports were detailed guides for future officers. They described events in great detail, but they weren't easy to read for everyone. They also left it up to the reader to decide what lessons to take away.

After World War I, some countries, like New Zealand, decided their official histories should be for the public. This was because so many ordinary people had fought or helped in the war. After World War II, people realized that military education needed to improve. So, they decided that trained historians should write official histories. These historians would explain why things happened, not just what happened.

Many of these historians had been in the war themselves. This meant they had personal experience and knowledge to help their writing. Today, people think official history should do three things:

• Give detailed descriptions for military training.
• Be easy enough for the general public to read.
• Show how people tried to solve problems, learning from their successes and failures.

Challenges in Writing History

Writing history can be tricky. Sometimes, a military historian might change facts for personal or political reasons. Popular histories can sometimes simplify the story too much, making it less valuable. Civilian historians might also pick facts that fit their own ideas.

However, military histories written as textbooks should be based on truth. This is important to teach useful lessons to students. For example, the British Report on the Lessons of the Great War (1931) used information from these official histories. Its conclusions were even added to new army rules.

Sometimes, official histories focus only on one country's actions. They might not talk much about allied or enemy armies. This can lead to a national bias. For instance, the Australian official history of World War I, edited by Charles Bean, sometimes made Australia's role seem bigger than it was. It also sometimes blamed British commanders for Australian failures, even when Australian officers could have been criticized.

After World War I, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was new and needed to prove its importance. So, The War in the Air (1922–1937) focused a lot on strategic bombing. This made the book a bit unbalanced. Embarrassing events could also be downplayed. For example, the French official history barely mentioned the French Army Mutinies of 1917, even though they affected many French soldiers.

Many writers and editors of the History of the Great War were senior officers during the war. This meant they had first-hand knowledge. But it also meant they might protect reputations, sometimes unfairly blaming others. For example, the Royal Navy's history of the Battle of Jutland (1916) was changed to remove criticism of some officers. Even when these officers were no longer serving, the critical parts were not put back.

The British Army's Military Operations books have also been criticized. Some say they didn't blame Douglas Haig, the commander of the British army, enough for the high number of British casualties. However, some argue that because the history just describes events without direct criticism, readers are free to form their own opinions.

British Official History Beginnings

Before World War I, Britain already had official histories being written by different government departments. In 1906, Lord Esher suggested creating a Historical Section. This group would collect army and navy records in one place. The idea was to learn lessons from past wars, like the Second Boer War (1899–1902). Lord Esher believed that to understand the Boer War, you needed to look at the navy, army, and political sides all together.

In 1907, the Historical Section was set up. One of its first jobs was to finish an official history of the Boer War. An earlier attempt by Colonel George Henderson was never published. A later version by Major-General Frederick Maurice was published, but it was expensive to make and didn't sell very well.

Starting the Great War Histories

When World War I began in August 1914, the Historical Section was working on a history of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). This work was stopped. The section then started collecting documents coming back from France. They realized that they needed to start collecting information right away. If they waited, it would be too hard to write the history later.

In May 1915, Captain C. T. Atkinson was sent to France to collect unit diaries. He found that many diaries were incomplete. It was hard to keep good records during intense events like the Great Retreat of 1914. Atkinson suggested that even incomplete diaries should be organized for later review.

A formal decision to write an official history of World War I was made on August 26, 1915. Maurice Hankey, a key government official, wanted a series of histories to:

• Be a helpful guide for the general public.
• Serve as a reference for military training.
• Correct inaccurate unofficial histories that blamed the government.

Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, wanted a short, popular history published soon after the war. This would keep the public interested and present the government's side. The Treasury (who managed money) worried about the cost. But Hankey argued that it was for education and reference, not for profit.

The Treasury eventually agreed to pay for the official history series and some popular single-volume books. Sir Julian Corbett was chosen to write the navy book, and Sir John Fortescue for the army book. However, work on the army history was very slow. By 1917, Fortescue's story had only reached November 1914.

In March 1919, Winston Churchill saw a draft of the navy history and disagreed with some parts. He wanted official records published alongside the book so readers could decide for themselves. Hankey worried that official histories would always criticize leaders, many of whom were still in public life.

Hankey even suggested not writing an official history at all. He thought it would face too much criticism and take too long to publish. He also felt that government departments would try to change the work too much, making it less interesting. However, the benefits of publishing were too great to cancel the project. The public had a right to know, and the histories would educate officers and correct unofficial accounts.

The Cabinet agreed to continue publishing, with checks by the War Office and Cabinet. The navy volume was published in 1920 and received excellent reviews. Work on the army histories was still difficult due to lack of resources. Then, on April 1, 1919, Brigadier-General James Edmonds was appointed Director. He found documents scattered everywhere and worked to organize them.

Fortescue was supposed to cover the whole war, but he wrote so slowly that his book was limited to May 1915 and only covered France. Edmonds also doubted the quality of Fortescue's work. He felt Fortescue didn't understand modern armies and used outdated language. Fortescue was eventually fired. After this, Edmonds decided that the history needed more than just official dispatches. He wanted to include private records and German information to make the story more engaging and accurate.

Funding and Challenges

Paying for History

The cost of producing the official history was discussed in the British Parliament in 1922. Some members of Parliament claimed they hadn't heard of the History...., even though five volumes had already been published. Daniel, from the Historical Section, explained that writing these histories wouldn't pay a living wage. He argued that the government had to pay for it because of its educational value.

He calculated that the cost of the History.... from 1916 to 1922 was about £42,000. The military histories cost £16,800, and the naval works £11,800. To put this in perspective, the annual cost of producing Hansard (parliamentary records) was £44,000. Daniel also pointed out that the war itself cost over £11 billion, or £3,500 per minute. Compared to that, the cost of making the war's experience available for education was tiny. The project was approved to continue.

Money continued to be a major factor in how the books were produced. In 1923, a permanent Cabinet Subcommittee was set up to oversee the official histories. This committee, which included representatives from the Treasury and military departments, met regularly to discuss costs, progress, and the size of the volumes. Edmonds submitted an annual report, and other historians added summaries of their work.

Money also affected how quickly books were published and who was hired. Edmonds preferred to employ officers who were on half-pay or retired. They were cheaper than civilian authors and often willing to work longer hours for less pay. For example, Lieutenant-General Launcelot Kiggell was removed from writing a volume because he was too slow and his work lacked "colour and atmosphere."

Selling the Books

The early volumes cost 21 shillings, plus another 21 shillings for map cases. This was too expensive for many officers. In 1923, the price was cut to 12 shillings and 6 pence. But this meant no money for advertising, and booksellers had no reason to display them. Publishers also set limits on the number of pages per volume. In 1924, the price was raised to 15 shillings.

The scope of the project was also limited by money. From 1922 to 1939, government departments often asked for histories beyond the Western Front. For example, in 1931, the War Office asked for a book on the East African Campaign. They felt it offered important lessons for fighting in hot climates far from Britain. The Treasury refused to pay, suggesting the Colonial Office should. East Africa Part I was eventually published in 1941 with money from the Colonial Office.

Some volumes were paid for by interested departments, but Edmonds still oversaw them. Money also affected the Historical Section itself. Their offices were small, and visits to battlefields were limited. In 1922, Edmonds even threatened to resign if he didn't get more help.

In 1922, the section had only three or four full-time officers, besides Daniel and Edmonds. They had to write books, prepare them for publishing, manage the library, study enemy records, and help other government departments. The section had about 2,000 visitors a year to its cramped offices. By 1924, Edmonds had five administrators and eight writers. In comparison, the French and German equivalents had about 130 staff each. The British staff were also underpaid. Edmonds himself worked incredibly hard, often seven days a week, for much of the 29 years of the project.

Official Documents and Their Use

The British army in World War I was the largest Britain had ever raised. By 1924, it had created over 25 million documents. Edmonds thought it would take nine years just to sort them all. When he started, he found papers in piles on the floor. He complained that previous historians had taken documents and not put them back. It took until June 1923 to properly organize the records.

The first draft of a book was written by a "narrator" who sorted and analyzed the documents. Then, a "historian" revised it, adding comments and conclusions. The draft was then sent to people who had been involved, like battalion commanders, senior officers, politicians, and government departments. For example, the draft for 1916 Part I (which included the First Day on the Somme) was sent to 1,000 officers. By 1931, they had sent 1,470 replies. Comments on just the first chapter created a pile 5 feet high!

Edmonds complained that his staff was too small. They had to check every name, rank, and number, and then cross-check with French and German accounts. This small staff slowed down production. In 1922, Edmonds thought it would take 20 years to write ten volumes. The French had done that in three years. In the end, it took 21 years (not counting 1939–1945) to produce 14 Western Front volumes and 15 more on other battle areas.

What Was Included?

While money affected how fast the books were written, Edmonds, as the Director, had the most say in the quality and honesty of the work. In the first volume, published in 1922, Edmonds wrote that "no deviation from the truth nor misrepresentation will be found in the official histories on which my name appeared."

However, this claim has been questioned ever since. Some people think the work is boring at best, and dishonest at worst. They believe it's a biased account meant to protect the military establishment. In 1934, Liddell Hart called 1918 Part I "patriotic" and "parochial." In 1976, John Keegan wrote that the British Official History managed to describe a huge tragedy "without any display of emotion at all."

In 1985, David French claimed that Edmonds wanted to hide the truth about the high command in France from the public. He suggested Edmonds saw his subjects as heroes who couldn't be criticized. Tim Travers wrote that Edmonds avoided direct criticism of senior officers and protected Haig's reputation. He also claimed Edmonds sometimes changed facts and drew wrong conclusions in volumes about the Somme, Passchendaele, and 1918.

However, in 1996, Paddy Griffith called it an "encyclopaedic work." He praised it as well-organized, broad in scope, and "by far the best book on the Western Front." Griffith noted that despite Edmonds's personal quirks, he was careful, smart, and rarely let his opinions distort the official history.

Edmonds set rules for how information was presented. Authors had to avoid direct criticism and not use "hindsight" (knowing things after they happened). Facts about opponents were put in small footnotes. Conclusions could be for reflection, not for finding fault. Edmonds believed these rules were needed so that experts could read between the lines and find important details, while the general reader could still understand the story.

One author, Charles Hordern, who took over writing Military Operations: East Africa, Volume I, felt frustrated. He said he had to "gloss over mistakes and shortcomings" so much that it made the work less valuable as history. He tried to avoid offending anyone but also felt he needed to criticize when necessary for an "impartial record or military study."

Edmonds's approach to avoiding hindsight came from his military training. He believed that critics should only use the information a commander had at the time, not what they couldn't have known. Using later knowledge could seem arrogant. When Cecil Aspinall-Oglander ignored this rule in the first Gallipoli volume, Edmonds called his account biased.

Despite these rules, Andrew Green called Edmonds's accounts accurate and complete. Edmonds's letters with Basil Liddell Hart show that Hart valued the official history and offered helpful suggestions. Green noted that later scholars who accused Edmonds of bias often had to admit that his conclusions were mostly accurate.

Publishing Specific Volumes

Persia, 1914–1919

In 1920, the Government of India provided money for a book about India's role in the war. They chose Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly to write the official account of the Mesopotamian Campaign (1914–1918). Moberly published it in four volumes from 1923 to 1927. In 1926, the Government of India asked for another book on the Persian Campaign (1914–1918).

The book was almost finished by September 1927. But then, the Government of India worried about publishing it. They feared it would reveal secrets about their dealings with Iranian governments and people. They thought it might make helpful Iranian groups look bad. They also wanted to avoid mentioning Afghanistan too much.

Sir Denys Bray of the Indian Political Department liked the history but wanted it kept secret. Stephen Gaslee of the Foreign Office worried that the Soviet Union might publish their own information about Iran. He felt that if a censored British version came out first, it would put the British government at a disadvantage. He preferred a full history kept secret.

General George Kirkpatrick also thought discussing the "Seistan Strategy" might upset Iranians. Sir Percy Cox, a political officer, told Moberly it was a great book, free from bias. Moberly told Cox that avoiding controversy would make the book useless. He felt it was important to explain Britain's involvement in Iran to the public.

Cox agreed that a censored account would be worthless. He told Moberly to write freely, even if it meant finding a commercial publisher. At a meeting in March 1928, it was decided the volume would be marked For Official Use Only. This would increase the cost, but His Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO) agreed to pay.

Moberly finished the work in May 1928. After the Foreign Office and Government of India approved it, Lord Peel, the Secretary of State for India, insisted that the politics of the military operations be removed. He wanted the last three chapters rewritten, even for a restricted book, because disclosing secrets was unacceptable.

Moberly argued that officers needed to understand the political factors in Iran to learn from the war. He said he had been careful and that experts had approved the chapters. At a meeting in March 1929, it was decided the book would be marked Confidential in Britain and Secret in India. Edmonds disagreed with the Confidential label, as it would keep the book from young officers, but he was overruled.

A limited edition of 500 uncensored copies was printed in late 1929. 150 were marked Secret and sent to India. In March 1930, copies of the Confidential volume were sent to libraries like the Imperial War Museum (IWM). In February 1933, HMSO destroyed the remaining 300 unbound copies. In 1987, the IWM published a copy of the volume.

Rhineland, 1918–1929

In 1930, Edmonds suggested a book about the British occupation of the Rhine Province (Rhineland) after the war. This was to counter a recent German book. The Treasury refused to pay. Edmonds hoped the War Office would find the money. He started collecting information and made sure records were stored.

By 1939, Edmonds complained that the official history was being neglected due to poor offices and lack of funding. When Daniel retired in late 1939, Edmonds took on both Director and Secretary duties. The Historical Section was moved away from London for safety during the war.

In February 1942, the committee decided to let Edmonds write the Rhineland volume. R. A. Butler, the President of the Board of Education, said the book would be useful for understanding the Armistice and disarmament terms for Germany. In 1987, Bayliss noted that the book also kept Edmonds busy, as he wasn't chosen to write the official histories of World War II. Edmonds was happy because he saw it as the final part of his Western Front history.

Edmonds felt he was qualified to write the book. He had visited the Rhineland during the occupation and knew many senior officers involved. However, a 1942 air raid in London destroyed many records. Also, Edmonds was isolated from libraries and researchers. He still managed to gather details and stories from senior officers.

General Charles Fergusson, a former military governor of Cologne, shared his dislike for Field Marshal William Robertson. Major-General Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd criticized Robertson for being too fussy and Fergusson for being too pro-German.

Because of the war, Edmonds couldn't talk to German researchers. He complained that speed and saving money were more important than respecting military history. Edmonds hoped the book would be useful for future occupations of foreign lands. He wanted to show how quickly the German attitude changed from humble to arrogant, and how strict economy affected the military situation.

Edmonds tried to write an unbiased history. But drafts sent to the War Office and Foreign Office received criticism. The War Office felt it was too detailed. The Foreign Office, on January 3, 1944, called the text misleading and incomplete. They wanted political references reduced to simple facts and dates. For example, they wanted to say Kurt von Schleicher was murdered "in the purge of 30 June 1934" instead of "by Hitler." They also didn't want unemployment pay called "dole," as it implied British soldiers joined the army to avoid starvation.

Edmonds dismissed most of the criticisms as "trifling or silly." He argued that the official history shouldn't be controlled by the War Office or Foreign Office. He stood by his work, which was based on official documents. The main critic was Charles Webster, who had analyzed the Armistice and occupation. Edmonds defended Haig against Webster's criticisms.

Obstacles were put in place to protect Edmonds's feelings. Another critic, Llewellyn Woodward, found the book "episodic" and "prejudiced." Woodward asked Webster to be kind to Edmonds, but Webster refused to spend more time on it. In July 1944, it was decided to print only 100 copies For Official Use Only, after many Foreign Office demands were met, including cuts to the preface.

Work on the volume started in 1930, resumed in 1942, and was drafted by July 1943. It was ready to print in May 1944, but only a limited edition was ordered. Edmonds later tried to make it public, but in November 1947, HMSO was ordered to destroy the printing plates. The book remained largely unseen until 1967, when a rule change allowed the public to view the surviving copies.

The problems with this volume raised questions about Edmonds continuing as Director. But since it was outside his usual area of expertise, he was allowed to carry on. He wrote a short account of the Occupation of Constantinople and oversaw the remaining Western Front volumes. He retired in July 1949, just before the final volume, Military Operations: Italy, 1915–1919, was published.

France and Belgium 1917 Part II

James Edmonds's Account

In the second volume of Military Operations France and Belgium, 1917 (1917 Part II), Edmonds wrote about the Third Battle of Ypres (July–November 1917). He suggested that Haig and General Hubert Gough, the Fifth Army commander, had different ideas before and during the battle.

Edmonds described meetings where Gough and his corps commanders decided on deeper objectives than what Haig's headquarters had planned. An extra objective, the "red line," was added. This was beyond the range of most of the Fifth Army's artillery.

Brigadier-General John Humphrey Davidson from Haig's headquarters questioned the Fifth Army plan. He suggested less ambitious objectives. Gough replied that the main objective, the "green line," should be attempted. He also said that opportunities to take ground up to the "red line" should be taken if there wasn't much resistance.

On June 28, Haig discussed Davidson's concerns with Gough and General Herbert Plumer, who commanded the Second Army. Haig stressed the importance of the Gheluvelt plateau. Edmonds wrote that Gough's plan didn't match Haig's focus on this plateau. Gough had spread his divisions evenly, instead of concentrating them on the plateau.

In a footnote, Edmonds mentioned that Fifth Army intelligence reports in July highlighted the strength of German defenses on the plateau. They also noted that German counter-attack divisions were behind the plateau. This suggested the Germans would try to hold the plateau, even if pushed back elsewhere.

However, Edmonds's description of this misunderstanding is contradicted by an account on the following pages. This account describes Haig's visit to II Corps headquarters on June 27. Haig emphasized the importance of capturing the plateau. He arranged for II Corps to take command of the 24th Division from the Second Army to help with this.

Edmonds detailed the large amount of artillery the Fifth Army had: 2,174 artillery pieces in total. II Corps, which was attacking the Gheluvelt plateau, had 43 percent of the Fifth Army's artillery and five divisions. The "green line" objective for II Corps varied in depth. The "red line" was not a main goal, and divisional commanders could decide to attempt it based on German resistance.

Tim Travers's View

In his 1987 book, The Killing Ground...., Tim Travers discussed the planning of the Battle of Pilckem Ridge (July–August) and the Battle of Langemarck. He said that Gough believed Haig wanted a breakthrough offensive, but Haig later changed his mind to a step-by-step attack. Travers found it illogical to give a "bite and hold" attack (small, limited advances) to Gough, who was known for aggressive attacks.

Travers wrote that Haig emphasized the Gheluvelt plateau's importance. Haig even wrote "Capture the Passchendaele–Staden Ridge" on his copy of the Fifth Army plan. Travers argued that the Fifth Army didn't focus enough on this. He also noted that the southern edge of the plateau was awkwardly placed inside the Second Army's area. Travers concluded that Haig and his headquarters chose the time, place, and overall strategy, while Gough and the Fifth Army staff decided the tactics.

Travers described how the drafts of 1917 Part II changed over time. The first draft was "anti-Haig," the second "anti-Gough," and the third "anti-Haig and anti-Gough." Edmonds's final draft (published 1948) was "pro-Haig and anti-Gough." The original author, Wynne, refused to be named. Travers wrote that Edmonds became very protective of Haig's reputation.

Travers also said there was a "scandalous" lack of clear leadership in the British army. He felt Edmonds didn't stress this enough. Travers believed Gough was at fault for overlooking the Gheluvelt plateau's importance. He also noted that 1917 Part II left out Gough's request for a conference to discuss the lack of focus on the plateau. In the published version, most of the blame for the offensive's decisions was placed on Gough and the Fifth Army, rather than on Haig for choosing the Ypres Salient at all.

Andrew Green's Analysis

In 2003, Andrew Green described how Wynne wrote 1917 Part II and how the first draft was sent to those who had participated. Gough strongly objected to the draft. Since many others involved in the battle had died, Edmonds paid a lot of attention to Gough's views.

Gough felt the draft exaggerated his intention to break through German defenses. He pointed to the June 28 meeting with Haig and Plumer as proof that Haig understood and accepted his plan. Gough also noted that Haig had a road built for cavalry, suggesting he expected a deep advance. Gough stressed that his plan wasn't limited by specific objectives, which had caused problems in earlier battles.

Green wrote that Edmonds told Wynne to include Gough's points. But Wynne objected, claiming Gough misunderstood Haig's intentions. Edmonds initially supported Wynne but later changed his mind. Green stated that Haig had intended Gough to attempt a breakthrough. Edmonds included this in the draft, along with changes in Haig's thinking as French support varied. Gough had added the "red line" to meet Haig's demands but overlooked the Gheluvelt plateau's importance, spreading his forces too thinly.

Green noted that Edmonds changed the draft to favor Gough. He included details about unusually wet weather in August, contradicting an earlier book by Haig's intelligence officer. Edmonds vividly described the muddy conditions and their effect on British troops. Edmonds also cut much of Wynne's writing about the French Army's difficulties after the Nivelle Offensive and its impact on British strategy.

Green described a disagreement between Wynne and Edmonds. Edmonds sent Wynne to meet Gough, which significantly changed Wynne's perspective. Wynne revised the draft to remove much of the blame from Gough, putting principal responsibility on Haig in the third draft. Edmonds then found this draft unacceptable and argued with Wynne, who refused to be named as an author. Green wrote that both Edmonds and Wynne changed their views about Gough, making his role in 1917 more accurate and less defensive of Haig.

Green compared the volume with later studies. He noted that the book didn't fully explain why there was a delay from June 7 to July 31. Edmonds had attributed the delay to Haig's decision to give Gough main responsibility. Wynne had claimed Edmonds didn't show the superiority of German tactics. But in 1998, Prior and Wilson showed that British tactics had improved in 1917, though their use was inconsistent.

Edmonds had shown that the attack on Messines Ridge was a careful advance. It used new techniques like strong counter-battery fire and a controlled creeping barrage. The Second Army had a huge number of guns and ammunition, much more than for the First Day on the Somme. This helped destroy German strongpoints and cut wire. Infantry were trained in new fighting methods and followed by "mopping-up" parties. These methods worked because artillery was more accurate and had more ammunition. Objectives were limited to the artillery's range, leading to a great victory. Prior and Wilson wrote that these methods weren't used on July 31 because Haig overruled his commanders. Gough pushed too far, leaving British infantry vulnerable. Edmonds wrote that on July 31, the artillery's fire was spread too thin.

Green concluded that the 1948 publication of 1917 Part II sparked controversy. It highlighted the contrast between flawed tactics and successful methods used earlier in 1917. Green wrote that the volume largely matched modern historical accounts and showed little bias toward Haig. Edmonds had mentioned external factors like manpower shortages and the state of the French Army. Yet, his story still clearly showed the military errors. Haig's desire for a breakthrough led to a failure to connect strategy with tactics. Haig also failed to communicate well with Plumer and Gough and continued the offensive into bad weather. Green concluded that Edmonds created a work of lasting importance, a series with significant historical, military, and literary value.

Main Books in the Series

Military Operations

The books usually have a long title on the cover, like History of the Great War based on Official Documents by Direction of the Committee of Imperial Defence, followed by the location and description. On the spine, they are simply called Military Operations, with the location, year, and asterisks for part numbers (e.g., France and Belgium 1917 *).

Edmonds wrote most of the Military Operations: France and Belgium volumes. Other authors like Cecil Aspinall-Oglander, Archibald Becke (who drew maps), Cyril Falls, Charles Hordern, George Macmunn, Wilfrid Miles, Henry Stacke, and Graeme Wynne wrote most of the volumes about other battle areas, all edited by Edmonds. Frederick Moberly was chosen by the Indian Army to write The Campaign in Mesopotamia and Operations in Persia, where the Indian Army played a big role.

East Africa

• Only one volume was planned, but Stacke died while the draft was being reviewed. Hordern revised the work into two volumes, finished Volume I, and then also died. Volume I was republished in 1992. Volume II was never finished.

Egypt and Palestine

• These volumes cover the operations of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) and the start of the Arab Revolt. They include the capture of Mecca and Aqaba. Chapters on the revolt were drafted by T. E. Lawrence. These were republished in 1996.
• The EEF's advance through Palestine and Jordan, including the capture of Jerusalem and Damascus, is covered. It also continues the story of the Arab Revolt. Republished in 1996.

France and Belgium, 1914

• This volume had corrections issued with later books. It was reprinted in 1925 as a second edition and republished in 1933. This new edition included information from French and German official histories and more details about early air force operations. This was the only volume that was corrected and republished. The 3rd edition was republished in 1996 and again in 2009 with color maps and maps on CD-ROM.
• This volume summarizes the army's growth and discusses attacks on German colonies. It also had corrections issued with later books. Republished in 1995 and 2009.

France and Belgium, 1915

• This volume had corrections issued with later books. Republished in 1992 and 2009.
• This volume also had corrections issued with later books. Republished in 1995 and 2009.

France and Belgium, 1916

• This volume covers the preparations for and the First day on the Somme. It had corrections issued with a later book. Republished in 1993 and 2009.
• This volume also had corrections issued with later books. Republished in 1992 and 2009.

France and Belgium, 1917

• This volume had corrections issued with a later book. Republished in 1992 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued with a later book. Falls was hired for this volume in 1939 but resigned. Wynne took over. General Sir Hubert Gough strongly objected to the draft, feeling it blamed him unfairly. Wynne rewrote parts, and Edmonds also rewrote parts in 1948. Wynne refused to be named as the author. For cost reasons, there was no separate map case; maps were in a folder on the back cover. Republished in 1991 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued with a later book. Republished in 1991 and 2009.

France and Belgium, 1918

• This volume was written out of chronological order. British record-keeping was poor due to the speed of the German advance. Kiggell was hired in 1924 to interview participants but was fired in 1926 for being too slow. Edmonds completed it. Republished in 1995 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued with later books. Republished in 1995 and 2009.
• This volume had no separate map case; maps were in a folder on the back cover. Republished in 1994 and 2009.
• This volume also had no separate map case; maps were in a folder on the back cover. Republished in 1993 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued with a later book and no separate map case. Republished in 1993 and 2009.

Gallipoli

• This volume includes accompanying maps and appendices. Republished in 1992.
• This volume also includes accompanying maps and appendices. Republished in 1992.
• The Historical Section wanted this published quickly to counter unofficial histories. George Gordon started writing but resigned. In 1923, Lieutenant-General Gerald Ellison took over. He criticized inefficiencies and named people, including Winston Churchill. In 1924, the committee wanted changes to remove blame. Ellison refused and resigned. Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinall-Oglander took over in 1925. He kept much of the controversial material, moving passages around to satisfy the committee but not Edmonds. A shorter version was published in a newspaper in 1932. Republished in 1992.

Italy

• Republished in 1992.

Macedonia

• Republished in 1996.
• Republished in 1996.

Mesopotamia

• Covers August 1914 to April 1916. The Indian Office offered funds to the Historical Section to write this. Reprinted in 1927 and republished in 1997.
• Covers April 1916 to March 1917, including the siege and fall of Kut-al-Amara. Reprinted and republished in 1997.
• Covers April 1917, including the capture of Baghdad. Reprinted and republished in 1997.
• Covers May 1917 to November 1918, up to the Armistice. Republished in 1997.

Persia

• Written in 1928 for the Indian Office. The Foreign Office worried about exposing agreements with Tsarist Russia. A restricted issue was agreed to in 1929. Volumes sent to India were marked Secret, and others Confidential. Republished in 1987.

Togoland and the Cameroons

• Republished in 1995.

Occupations

• Planned and researched in 1943 but publication was canceled. Edmonds completed a draft in 1944, but it was not published. A copy is held at the National Archives.
• Two volumes were planned for the occupations of Germany and Turkey but were canceled. Research continued in the 1930s and revived in 1942. The Rhineland volume was commissioned and completed in 1943. It was published in 1944, marked Confidential, with only 100 copies printed. Republished in 1987 and 2009.

Order of Battle

• This volume had corrections issued with later parts. Republished in 1989 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued with later parts. Republished in 1989 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued with later parts. Republished in 1988 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued with later parts. Republished in 1989 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued. Republished in 1989 and 2009.
• This volume had corrections issued with itself and with Military Operations: Italy. Republished in 1989 and 2009.

Order of Battle (unofficial)

• Part 5 was planned but not written by Becke. F. W. Perry compiled parts 5A and 5B in the 1990s as unofficial additions.
• Westlake expanded Becke's index to include more detailed unit references.

Statistics

• Republished in 1987, 1995, and 2001.

Transport

• Republished in 1992 and 2009.

War in the Air

All volumes have the title page History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, with a second title page for War in the Air and the volume number.

• Raleigh died after finishing Volume I. This covers events of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) before 1914 to winter 1914 in France, and Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) anti-Zeppelin raids. Republished in 1969, 1998, and 2002.
• Covers air operations of the RFC, Dardanelles, Western Front (Spring 1915 – Autumn 1916), and RNAS operations in 1915. Republished in 1969, 1999, and 2002.
• Covers air operations of the RFC in East Africa, the SMS Königsberg, South-West Africa, German bombing of Britain (1914–1916), and the Western Front (winter 1916 – spring 1917, Arras). Republished in 1998 and 2002.
• Covers air operations of the RFC on the Western Front (Summer 1917 – Summer 1918), including Messines. Republished in 1998 and 2002.
• Covers German bombing of Britain (1917–1918), RFC in Egypt, Darfur, Palestine (1914–1917), Mesopotamia (1916 – March 1918), and RNAS in the Mediterranean (1916 – March 1918). Republished in 1998 and 2002.
• Covers RAF strategic bombing, Mesopotamia, Iran, India, Macedonia, Italy (1914–1917), RNAS in the Mediterranean (Summer and Autumn 1918), RNAS in Home Waters, and RFC on the Western Front (Amiens, Bapaume). Republished in 2002 and 2003.
• Republished in 2002 and 2003.

War at Sea

Naval Operations

• Covers the escape of SMS Goeben and SMS Breslau, Heligoland Bight, British ship losses, searches for German cruisers, Antwerp, Coronel and Falkland Islands, and the occupation of German colonies in Africa and the Far East. A revised 2nd edition was published in 1938. Republished in 1997 and 2003.
• Covers January to May 1915, East Coast raids, Dogger Bank, sinking of SMS Dresden, the Dardanelles failure, and the loss of RMS Lusitania. A revised 2nd edition was published in 1929. Republished in 1997 and 2003.
• Covers May 1915 to June 1916, including the Dardanelles, evacuation, destruction of SMS Königsberg, the SS Arabic and HMS Baralong incidents, the Irish Easter Rising, an air raid, and the Battle of Jutland. Drafts were changed due to controversy about failures at Jutland. Republished in 1940 and 1995, and 2003.
• Corbett died and was replaced by Sir Henry John Newbolt. Covers June 1916 to April 1917, German U-boat and surface raider campaigns, loss of HMS Hampshire (with Lord Kitchener on board), operations in African, Middle East, and Mediterranean waters, and the evacuation of the Serbian Army. Republished in 1996 and 2003.
• Covers April 1917 to November 1918, including the continuation of the anti-U-boat campaign, the Convoy System, the Northern Barrage, and the Zeebrugge and Ostend raids. Republished in 1996 and 2003.

Seaborne Trade

• Republished in 1997.
• Covers pre-war events and the start of hostilities, maritime law, control of the Atlantic, North Sea mining, trade in the Far East and Pacific, cruises of SMS Emden and SMS Karlsruhe, the battles of Coronel and Falklands, and U-boat warfare.
• Republished in 1998.
• Covers U-boat operations from February 1915 to December 1916.
• Republished in 1998.
• Covers U-boat operations from December 1916 to November 1918.

Blockades

• Completed in 1921 but not published at the Foreign Office's request due to legal issues. Published by HMSO in 1937, marked Confidential. It was republished and offered to the public in 1961 and 2013. A German translation was published in 1943.

Merchant Navy

• Republished in 2003.
• Covers cruises of SMS Emden, defense against commerce raiders, Auxiliary patrols, the U-boat campaign, and the sinking of RMS Lusitania.
• Republished in 2003.
• Covers U-boats in UK Home Waters, Auxiliary Craft, fishermen in war service, Troop Transports, the Blockade of Germany, Mediterranean shipping, the SS Persia, and the execution of Captain Charles Fryatt.
• Republished in 2003.
• Covers patrolling from February 1917 to November 1918, the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the U-boat campaign, Dazzle camouflage, Auxiliary patrols, attacks on hospital ships, and merchant sailor prisoners. Republished in 2003.

Ministry of Munitions

• Published as paperback booklets, usually bound in twelve volumes. Volume II Part I was published in three sections from 1920 to 1922 for unknown reasons. Republished in microfiche in 1976 and bound in 13 volumes in 2009.

Medical

Casualties

• Republished in 1997.

General

• Republished in 2009.
• Republished in 2009.
• Republished in 2009.
• Republished in 2009.

Hygiene

• The Marmite Food Extraction Co. reprinted parts of this volume in 1923 for advertising.

Images for kids

• 

  Winston Churchill by William Orpen, 1916

• 

  Map of Iran (Persia)

• 

  The occupation zones (Rhineland and Ruhr) 1919–1930. green (Saar): League of Nations (France), blue: France, brown: United Kingdom, yellow: Belgium, blue/yellow (Ruhr): France/Belgium

• 

  Map showing advances on the Ypres front, 31 July –10 November 1917.

• 

  Herbert Kitchener, circa 1915

• 

  Douglas Haig

• 

  Charles Bean with files

• 

  Maurice Hankey

• 

  Arthur Conan Doyle

• 

  John Buchan

See also

• Official history