Hezbe Wahdat facts for kids

Quick facts for kids Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan حزب وحدت اسلامی افغانستان Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan
Leader	Karim Khalili (alleged)
Founder	Abdul Ali Mazari
Founded	1989
Dissolved	2002
Preceded by	Tehran Eight
Headquarters	Kabul, Afghanistan
Ideology	Hazara nationalism Shia Islamism Anti-communism
Colors	Black, red and green
Party flag
Website
[1]

Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan (which means "the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan") is a political party for the Hazara people in Afghanistan. It was started in 1989. Like many other big political groups in Afghanistan, Hezb-e Wahdat grew out of the time when people were fighting against the Soviet forces in the 1980s. The party was formed to bring together nine different groups that often disagreed with each other.

During the Second Afghan Civil War, Hezb-e Wahdat became a major player in Kabul and other parts of the country. It had support from Iran. Many of its leaders believed in a political form of Shia Islam. However, the party slowly started to focus more on the needs of the Hazara people. It became the main group that spoke for the Hazara community's political hopes and demands. Its beliefs and its support from the Hazara people have always shaped what the party does. Through the fight against the Soviets and the civil war, Hezb-e Wahdat gained a lot of trust and support among the Hazaras.

By 2009, Hezb-e Wahdat had split into many smaller groups. Because of this, it no longer had the same strong influence in the country as it once did. It had broken into at least four different groups, each saying they were the real Hezb-e Wahdat.

How the Party Started

Abdul Karim Khalili with Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Igor Sechin, May 14, 2009, Moscow.

After the Soviet-backed government in Hazarajat (a region in Afghanistan) fell in 1979, the area was controlled by a group called Shura-ye Inqilab. Soon, new religious groups challenged and took over. These groups fought among themselves for power and different ideas. However, these early fights were not violent, and the groups still worked together against the Soviet forces. The wars were fought with strong religious passion against the Soviet forces. But none of these groups could fully control Hazarajat. By the late 1980s, things were stuck, with each group controlling only small areas. This made both villagers and leaders want to unite.

Several attempts to make peace failed. Alliances were made and then broken. One important alliance was the Shura-ye Etelaf, also known as the Tehran Eight. This was an alliance of eight major Shia Afghan groups, mostly Hazaras, formed in Tehran, Iran, in 1985. This alliance was the best attempt to get the leaders to work together. It became an important example for how Hezb-e Wahdat would later form. This alliance helped the Hazara fighters have a common voice when talking with the Sunni groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan. However, it could not stop the constant disagreements within the groups. A bigger change was needed to make the region stable.

When the Soviet Union announced it would leave Afghanistan in January 1988, people thought the government in Kabul would soon fall. This meant big changes were coming for political groups. At the same time, the Kabul government was having its own problems with different groups and ethnic rivalries. People lost faith in the government, which led to new alliances forming, often between people from the same ethnic groups. These new alliances crossed the old lines between the fighters and government officials. Meanwhile, talks about forming a new government, led by Sunni groups in Peshawar, did not include the Hazara alliance from Tehran. All these events made the Hazara groups realize they needed to work together more strongly. They needed to be taken seriously by the Sunni groups.

Because of this, there was a strong demand for all existing political and military groups to unite into one party. Many meetings were held across the region to discuss what this new party would be like. In August 1988, the city of Bamyan was taken by Hazara fighters. This helped and encouraged the formation of a regional organization. The operation to take Bamyan was planned by different fighter groups working together. Sazman-e Nasr (Victory Organization) played a key role in this attack. This event meant that the Kabul government no longer had any presence in the entire Hazarajat region.

After this, Bamyan became a center for important political events. It gave new energy to the ongoing unity process among the fighter groups in the region. The final meeting that led to the Misaq-e Wahdat, or unity treaty, happened in Bamyan in July 1989, less than a year after the city was freed. Bamyan became the political center for the new party, away from local disagreements. What made the talks for Wahdat different from earlier efforts was that they started from within the Hazarajat region. The process was shaped by the realities of war, disagreements, and leaders losing control over their military commanders in the region. Earlier attempts to form alliances were based in Iran and were often influenced by Iranian officials.

Once Hezb-e Wahdat was formed, its leaders had to convince their representatives in the Shuray-e Eatelaf and Iranian government officials. These officials were more comfortable dealing with a group of separate parties in Tehran. The fact that the Hazara fighters were divided had given Iran a way to control smaller groups, which were often linked to religious leaders and government agencies in Iran. The Iranians worried that a single party based inside Afghanistan would mean they would lose control over the movement. Also, the party's growing focus on ethnic identity was not liked by Iranian officials. For years, they had tried to promote a broader Shiite political Islam during the time of fighting. It is said that Husain Ibrahimi, who represented Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei in Afghan affairs, tried to stop Hezb-e Wahdat from forming to keep his influence. But eventually, once the party was formed, the Iranians decided to work with it and supported it at first. However, as events later showed, the party often followed its own political path, which sometimes went against Iran's policies and interests in Afghanistan.

Goals of Hezbe Wahdat

Roundel of Hezbe Wahdat's air force during the Civil War.

The name Wahdat means "Unity." This shows that the party's main goal was to bring all Shiite fighter groups together under one political leadership. It was created because both Hazara leaders and common people strongly wanted unity.

The party had important parts in its organization:

• Shuray-e Aali Nezarat (Supreme Supervisory Council): This council was made up of important religious leaders and experts. Its job was to watch over all parts of the party and make sure all activities and policies were followed.
• Central Council: This was the most important group in the party for making decisions. It was meant to have 36 members at first, but it grew much larger to include more people and groups. By its peak, it had over 80 members, representing almost all religious and political groups and important people in the region, as well as Hazaras from cities. By having members from different groups and sharing power, the party managed to keep the previously divided Hazara political groups together.
• The Wahdat Manifesto also planned for councils at the provincial and district levels. These would report to committees at the main office in Bamyan.

The desire for change and unity was especially pushed by the leaders of two main groups, Pasdaran and Nasr. These groups were at risk of losing their power because they were losing control over their military commanders. The path to unity was long and difficult, with many problems. Each group wanted to have the biggest role in the new party. Smaller groups wanted equal representation, while the more powerful ones demanded more power and positions. In the end, the more powerful groups won. Nasr and Pasdaran convinced others to agree to proportional representation, meaning groups would get power based on their size.

Smaller groups were pressured to join. Many had no other choice, as staying out would have been too difficult. For example, Harakat Islami, led by Shaikh Asif Mohsini, was the main Shiite party that refused to join Wahdat. This party was mostly made up of non-Hazara Shiites. Mohsini presented conditions that were seen as an unwillingness to join a party focused on Hazara issues. However, parts of his party did join Hezb-e Wahdat. This was either because the new party seemed more promising for the Hazaras' future, or because the pressure to join was too strong. Harakat's main group could resist joining because it was located outside the region. But it did lose many of its Hazara followers to Hezb-e Wahdat, showing how ethnic identities became more important after the fighting.

Military commanders who had gained power during the civil war were a big problem for unity. Nahzat-e Islami is an example of military commanders refusing to unite even when their leaders agreed. Its senior leaders took part in the unity process and even hosted a meeting in their stronghold in the Jaghori district. However, Wasiq, Nahzat's main military commander there, refused to break up his military group. This led to a fight with former Nasr commanders who were fighting for Hezb-e Wahdat. This conflict ended with Nahzat and other smaller groups being defeated in that district in 1993. So, Wahdat became strong in Jaghori and most other parts of Ghazni through the military victory of the former Nasr forces.

One by one, smaller parties were pressured or convinced to join. In November 1989, the remaining part of Behisthi's Shuray-e Ittefaq also joined. His decision was a turning point for religious leadership in Hazarajat. It showed that important non-Khomeinist religious leaders accepted the dominance of Khomeini's ideas. Beheshti's Shura was different from other groups. He represented a more traditional and non-revolutionary group of religious scholars. He followed the Khoei school of thought, which was a moderate, non-political way of thinking that was against Khomeini’s revolutionary Islamism. This was common among Afghanistani Shiites until the early 1980s. By the time Hezb-e Wahdat was forming, Beheshti was only leading a small part of the Shura in Nawur district.

The goal of bringing together previously opposing groups into one party was largely successful. Officially, all previous groups except Harakat were dissolved, and their military groups were broken up. A fairly stable political order was brought back to the areas Hezb-e Wahdat controlled. However, the party still had serious problems with its structure and different ideas among its members.

Beliefs and Hazara Identity

Most Hezb-e Wahdat leaders believed in political Islam. In a way, forming the party was the peak of making the Hazara groups fighting against the Soviets more Islamic. This process also saw religious leaders slowly gain more power in the region's political leadership. It marked the final victory for religious Islamists. By uniting under the new name, they made their political power even stronger. The Wahdat manifesto stressed continuing efforts to create an Islamic government based on the Quran and Sunnah (teachings of Prophet Muhammad). It called for more efforts to include all other true Shiite groups into the party and to work together with all Islamic Sunni groups. The language of the manifesto clearly showed that Wahdat was mainly a Shiite organization, even with mentions of working with Sunni groups. It demanded equal status for Shiite religious law alongside the Hanafi school, which was common among Sunnis in the country.

As a religious party, Hezb-e Wahdat was open and inclusive, which was unusual in a traditional society like Afghanistan. In a rare move among Afghan fighters, the party included ten women members in its central council. It also had a whole committee for women's affairs, led by a Hazara woman who had gone to university.

However, the party slowly started to focus more on its ethnic support base. Later political events in Kabul showed how hard it was to create an Islamic government in the country. When the communist government in Kabul fell, and an Islamic government could not be formed, the fighting groups turned to their ethnic and regional supporters. While Islamism was still the official belief of most groups, ethnic demands and power struggles became the main reasons for political action. Wahdat's leaders tried to balance ethnic identity and religion. The result was an Islamic belief system used to express and promote the rights of a community that had been treated unfairly for a long time. A strong desire for Hazara unity was its main driving force. In fact, Nasr's mix of ethnic nationalism and radical Islam increasingly became Wahdat's main belief. This was an ethnic message expressed through Islamic language.

Abdul Ali Mazari, a former member of Nasr and the first leader of Wahdat, was key in making the party a clear platform for the rights and political demands of the Hazaras. When he arrived in Kabul in 1992, he opened the party to Hazaras from all social and ideological backgrounds. A group of former leftists and government workers joined the party's inner circle, causing more disagreements. This was a real test for the more traditional religious leaders. While the party was created to unite mostly Islamist and religious groups, in Kabul it met much larger groups of educated Hazaras than in the provinces. These were also mostly left-leaning and well-organized. The question of whether the party should accept these people divided the party leadership. The ulema (religious scholars) needed the knowledge and experience of these educated Hazaras to help the party adapt to city politics. The party lacked members who had received a modern education. Also, most of the religious leaders were not familiar with Kabul's politics. Most of them were educated in religious centers in Iran and Iraq and had mainly been involved in politics in rural Hazarajat. Finally, Wahdat fighters lacked military skills suitable for a city environment. Despite this, many key figures in the central council opposed including the educated Kabulis in the party, seeing them as godless communists. While none of the former leftists were given official positions of power, their growing relationship with, and perceived influence on, Abdul Ali Mazari angered the more traditional parts of the party. Most notably, Muhammad Akbari consistently opposed Wahdat's alliances with non-jihadi groups like General Dostum’s Junbish Milli and the Hazara leftists. On the other hand, the leftists did not seek official positions. They were mostly concerned with their personal safety and avoiding being punished by the fighters.

Political Actions

The idea of building an Islamic government and promoting religious brotherhood quickly ran into problems. Hezb-e Wahdat's position as the representative of the Hazara fighters was not welcomed by its Sunni counterparts in Peshawar. Instead, it was left out of the talks about forming a fighter government in Kabul, which were controlled by the Sunnis. A Hezb-e Wahdat group sent to Peshawar to negotiate being included returned to Bamyan very disappointed. In a central council meeting in Bamyan, the group, led by Abdul Ali Mazari, brought up the idea of discussing a new political plan. Some of the Sunni fundamentalist parties had basically ignored the Shiite demands for any real representation in a future government. Hezb-e Wahdat wanted a quarter share in future power-sharing agreements. But some Sunni parties said that the Shiites were not a big enough community to be included in the talks.

Three days of discussions in the party's central council in Bamyan led to a new plan: forming an alliance of the country's historically disadvantaged ethnic communities. This new plan would involve working with military commanders from various communities in the provinces, rather than with the leaders in Peshawar. Government officials from different ethnic communities were also contacted to join or support the new alliance. The new plan was shared with various political and military players in the country through groups and representatives. Fifty groups were sent to several parts of the country, including the Panjshir valley and the northern province of Balkh. Members of these groups were tasked with finding a common political plan to collectively bargain for the rights of minorities in future political arrangements. The groups sent to Panjshir and the north reached important agreements with Massoud and the future leaders of the emerging Junbish-e Milli Islami. These agreements formed a new political deal known as Paiman-e Jabalu-Seraj, or the Jabalu-seraj agreement, named after the area in Parwan province where one of the final negotiations took place in April 1992. Massoud was chosen as the head of the new council, Mohammad Mohaqiq from Hezb-e Wahdat as his deputy, and General Dostum as commander of its military affairs.

The alliance of Wahdat, Junbesh, and Massoud's Shuray-e Nezar (Supervisory Council) fell apart when they tried to take control of Kabul. Similarly, the political agreements among the Sunni fighter organizations also broke down, turning the city into a battlefield for terrible conflicts. Wahdat was a major part of this conflict for nearly three years. This caused intense internal debates within the party. The question of who to ally with further increased internal tensions. Muhammad Akbari became the leader of a group within the party that supported Massoud. He challenged Abdul Ali Mazari's decision not to join Burhanuddin Rabbani's and Massoud's government and his alliance with Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e Islami, who had become the main opposition.

The differences between Abdul Ali Mazari and Akbari led to the first major split within the party. After the split, both leaders kept separate political and military groups under the name of Wahdat, with Abdul Ali Mazari leading the main part of the party. The growing rivalries between the two leaders became very clear during the preparations for the party's leadership election in September 1994. The election was held during a time of strong competition between the two leaders for control of the party. The party was going through its hardest internal power struggle since it was formed. New political divisions were appearing as the party leaders tried to define their political goals in Kabul. Both sides were determined to win to control leadership positions and change the party's political direction. The location for the upcoming elections also caused disagreement. Akbari wanted the elections to be held in Bamyan, where he felt stronger. In contrast, Mazari and his supporters pushed for elections in Kabul, where he had gained more support among Hazaras living in the city. Given the political differences and personal rivalries, the first election for the party's secretary general was fiercely contested. It was also very sensitive because of the civil war in Kabul, where both leaders were suggesting different political directions for the party. Akbari hoped he could change the party's role in the war and in the conflict in Kabul to favor Rabbani's government if he was elected secretary general. So, the election of the secretary general became extremely important for both sides in the civil war to keep or change the party's political alliances in their favor.

The elections were held in a climate of distrust and violence. Abdul Ali Mazari was re-elected as leader, getting 43 votes out of 82 central council members present. Akbari, with 33 votes, was elected as his first deputy. Agreements were also reached on 20 other key positions. Akbari's group won the positions of heads of cultural and military committees, which they had strongly pushed for. He and his supporters believed that by controlling these committees, they could influence the party's war and propaganda to favor the Rabbani government, their outside ally. Karim Khalili, who would later become the party leader, was elected as chief of its political affairs committee. The voting patterns during the elections show important things about the party's internal politics. Members of Nasr and Pasdaran, the two largest and most powerful groups, controlled the process and the two emerging factions. While Nasr stayed united, most other smaller organizations were divided. All former Nasr members in the council voted for Mazari, showing how Nasr remained a strong political block within Wahdat. In contrast, while most former Pasdaran members supported Akbari, some voted for Mazari. For example, Ali Jan Zahidi, Ghulam Hussain Shafaq, Hayatullah Balaghi, and Abdul Ahmed Fayaz, who were important local leaders of Pasdaran, supported Mazari. Similarly, most former members of Harakat and Nahzat followed Pasdaran, while most of Sazman-e Daawat and Mostazafin supported Mazari. Other organizations like Shuray-e Ittefaq and Jabh-e Motahid were deeply divided.

Also, distrust and suspicions continued to weaken the new appointments. The role of outside players, especially Rabbani's government, was very important. It is believed that the Rabbani government had been working through their contacts with Akbari to weaken Mazari and turn Hezb-e Wahdat into an ally. Mazari strongly suspected Akbari of trying to undermine him. A few weeks after the party elections, in response to an alleged plan by Akbari and parts of Harakat Islami to overthrow him, Mazari ordered his troops to attack and remove all his opponents from the western part of the capital. As a result, Akbari, his supporters, and his allies in Harakat were forced to flee to areas controlled by Massoud in the north of the capital. While the exact details of the alleged plot are still unknown, Mazari later claimed that Qasim Fahim, who was then Rabbani's head of intelligence, was working with Akbari to militarily force him out of leadership. According to the claims, Massoud was funding and arming as many as 20,000 troops to allow Akbari to take over Wahdat's leadership in Kabul and establish its control in Hazarajat as well.

The split created a deep and lasting political division among the Hazaras of Afghanistan. While Mazari and his successor Khalili had the support of most Hazaras, Akbari mostly worked against them. After Mazari died at the hands of the Taliban in March 1995, Karim Khalili was elected as the new party leader. He reorganized the party, regained control over the Hazarajat region, and joined Massoud and Junbesh against the newly emerging Taliban threat. This new alliance was called the Supreme Council for Defence of the Motherland, later known as the ‘northern alliance’. In contrast, Akbari joined the Taliban when they took control of Bamyan in September 1998.

Later Years

The party faced three major setbacks in its history. The first was its defeat in Kabul and the death of Mazari by the Taliban in March 1995. Second, in August 1998, the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif was taken by the Taliban. This city was the second most important center for the northern alliance after Kabul fell, and it also had many Wahdat troops and Hazara civilians. Hezb-e Wahdat had played a key role in stopping a Taliban attack on the city in 1997. This time, they faced the full force of the Taliban's anger. Thousands of Hazaras were killed or imprisoned. Third, within a few weeks, the Taliban captured Bamyan, the party's new headquarters, in another quick move. This marked the end of Hezb-e Wahdat's political life as a strong, united organization. The fall of these two cities was more than just military defeats. Almost all the areas it controlled were captured by the Taliban. Its political and military leaders fled to neighboring countries. Khalili went to Iran. Among the senior leaders, only Muhaqiq returned quickly to Afghanistan after a short time in Iran. He organized a resistance front in the Balkhab district. Wahdat never fully recovered after Mazar-e Sharif and Bamyan fell to the Taliban, because of the high losses among its members and leaders.

So, Hezb-e Wahdat took part in the political process after the Taliban with much less political and military power than before. Wahdat still claimed to represent the Hazaras, and the Hazarajat region came under its control when the Taliban government was overthrown. In the Interim Administration (2001–2002), Wahdat had a small role. Muhammad Mohaqiq represented the party as one of the deputy chairmen and Minister of Planning. Members of Harakat and Akbari's Wahdat mostly represented the Shiites in both the Interim Administration and the Transitional Administration (2002-2003). Also, in the new political situation, the party needed to change to fit the new realities in the country. The new political system, supported by the international community, required military-political groups to become civilian political parties. This meant breaking up their military groups, disarming under the UN-led program, and working within the new legal and political rules. As mentioned earlier, Hezb-e Wahdat's military structure had already fallen apart under the Taliban. So, by late 2001, the organization was not as strong as other anti-Taliban groups in terms of military structure and equipment. Its leaders lacked the political and military resources to reorganize their fighters on a large scale. In June 2005, the only major military group controlled by the party, the Ninth Corps, was disbanded. This ended financial support from the center to Wahdat's military side. Lacking resources and with a weak organization, the party's military activities almost stopped. Only in northern Afghanistan did some parts of it survive. Wahdat's weakness compared to other, better-resourced military-political organizations became even clearer. On the positive side, its leaders can be praised for effectively giving up their military wing.

The second and most urgent demand for change came from within the Hazara political community itself. Reforming and bringing the party back to life as the largest and most influential Hazara organization was a top priority for most Hazara educated people and religious leaders. Many educated Hazaras from different backgrounds rushed to Kabul in 2002 and offered to help the party. Ideas for reform and restructuring the party were given to Karim Khalili and Muhammad Mohaqiq, who were seen as the key leaders. While both Mohaqiq and Khalili often agreed that the party leadership needed to change and expand, most reformers (including religious leaders) were frustrated by the senior leaders' lack of real effort. With its military structures gone and the need to become a full political party, Hezb-e Wahdat faced a very difficult challenge that required big changes. The change from a military to a political organization has been similarly hard for other Afghan groups created during the war years. But Hezb-e Wahdat faced a unique problem because a much larger educated class had emerged among the Hazaras. Wahdat's political leaders were mostly religious scholars educated in religious schools in Afghanistan or in Iran and Iraq. As they rose to political leadership, they strongly competed with university-educated challengers. They remained doubtful and afraid of modern educated politicians. They suddenly found themselves forced to deal with Western ideas like democracy and human rights. As in 1992, opening the party's doors to more educated Hazara leaders was necessary to meet reform expectations. However, the return to the country of many young Hazaras educated in Iran and Pakistan was much larger than the small number of leftists and government officials welcomed into Wahdat in 1992. After 2001, the party kept its old structure where seven of the eleven committees within the Jaghori of the party were led by religious scholars. Only technical and less important positions, like health and archaeological committees, were headed by non-religious figures. Also, these non-religious figures mostly acted on behalf of their senior religious leaders. But opening the party to the growing secular educated class meant that the religious leaders' control over Hazara society's political leadership was at risk of being weakened.

While a few of Wahdat's founders continued to hold leadership and political power, most others were not as fortunate. The failure to bring back the party's structures left many of them politically sidelined. Second-rank officials of Hezb-e Wahdat, like most members of the central council, have mostly been unable to find government jobs. Many of them chose to live in their home areas in Hazarajat, far from the leaders in Kabul.

Party Divisions

The situation of Hezb-e Wahdat in early 2009 and its political divisions can best be explained by the leadership style of its leaders. Right after the Taliban fell, Khalili was widely recognized as the party leader. In April 2002, he flew to Kabul from Bamyan, moving the party headquarters to Kabul. He was warmly welcomed by Mohaqiq, who was deputy chair and Planning Minister of the Interim Administration, and other senior figures of the organization. In the Transitional Administration, Khalili replaced Mohaqiq as a vice-president, becoming the highest Hazara official in the government. Until before the presidential election of 2005, Muhaqiq was at least officially heading the political affairs committee of Hezb-e Wahdat in Kabul. Their relationship, however, soon started to fall apart. Apparently, Muhaqiq had taken a more challenging approach within the government on issues of development and reconstruction plans in Hazara areas. It is said that his powers as the Minister of Planning were being moved to the more powerful Finance Ministry, led by the Western-educated expert Ashraf Ghani. Mohaqiq left the cabinet in a disagreement in 2004. Khalili and Mohaqeq have since been in a personal rivalry and competition for power within the government, as well as for leadership among the Hazaras. Their rivalry became clear when Mohaqiq decided to run as a candidate for presidential elections in 2005, and Khalili ran as the second vice-president with Hamid Karzai. Later, Mohaqiq joined the main opposition alliance, the Understanding Front, led by Yunus Qanuni. By opposing the government, he championed the rights of Hazaras and continued to challenge Karim Khalili. The focus on individual leaders was not limited to Mohaqiq and Khalili and led to the party splitting into the following four separate organizations:

• Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan (Karim Khalili)
• Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan (Muhammad Mohaqiq)
• Hezb-e Wahdat Milli Islami Afghanistan (Muhammad Akbari)
• Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Millat-e Afghanistan (Qurban Ali Erfani)

Glossary of Dari Words

Most of these words come from the Arabic language.

See also

• List of Islamic political parties
• People's Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan
• National Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan