Hans-Adolf von Moltke facts for kids
Quick facts for kids
Hans-Adolf Helmuth Ludwig Erdmann Waldemar von Moltke
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| Born | 29 November 1884 |
| Died | 22 March 1943 (aged 58) Madrid, Spain
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| Nationality | German |
| Years active | 1913–1943 |
| Known for | German ambassador to Poland and Spain |
| Political party | Nazi Party |
Hans-Adolf von Moltke (born November 29, 1884 – died March 22, 1943) was a German diplomat and landowner from Silesia. He served as Germany's ambassador to Poland during the Weimar Republic era. Later, during World War II, he became Adolf Hitler's ambassador to Spain.
Contents
About Hans-Adolf von Moltke
Early Life and Education
Moltke was born in Oppeln (now Opole), a city in Upper Silesia. He came from a very famous noble family in Germany. His father, Fredrich von Moltke, was a minister in Prussia. Hans-Adolf was a devoted Lutheran and held traditional German nationalist and conservative views. He believed it was a great honor to serve his country.
From 1903 to 1907, Moltke studied law at Heidelberg University. In 1904, he joined an exclusive student group called the Corps Saxo-Borussia Heidelberg, which only accepted royalty and nobles.
After university, he served one year in the Prussian Army. In 1913, he joined the Foreign Service. Moltke also owned large estates in Silesia, called Wernersdorf and Klein-Bresa.
The German Foreign Office (called Auswärtiges Amt) was a very important and exclusive part of the German government. To become a diplomat, you needed a university degree, language skills, and a high income. This meant mostly wealthy, aristocratic men became diplomats. Moltke could only join in 1913 after his father helped him meet the income requirement.
Early Diplomatic Work
Moltke started his diplomatic career in Athens, Greece. The next year, he moved to Constantinople (now Istanbul), the capital of the Ottoman Empire. In 1915, he worked in Brussels, Belgium, as part of the German occupation government.
He later served as an envoy in Stuttgart. Moltke also played a role in stopping the publication of his cousin's (Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Younger) memoirs. He said that Berlin did not want them published because they revealed too much about the start of World War I. The memoirs were finally published in 1922 after many parts were changed to remove anything that might blame Germany for the war.
After Germany lost World War I and the November Revolution happened in 1918, Moltke saw these events as disasters. He continued his diplomatic career out of loyalty to Germany, not to the new Weimar Republic, which he saw as a temporary government.
From 1920 to 1924, Moltke represented the German Foreign Office in Upper Silesia. This region was holding a vote (plebiscite) to decide if it would be part of Germany or Poland. Moltke worked to keep as much of Upper Silesia as possible for Germany. He was known for his "tact, politeness, and cultivated demeanor." He also warned Berlin against using military force, saying it could lead to French involvement.
From 1924 to 1928, Moltke worked at the German Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. When he returned to Berlin, he led the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, handling relations with all Eastern European countries.
Ambassador to Poland
From 1931 until Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Moltke was the German ambassador in Warsaw. He arrived in February 1931. He wanted Germany to regain lands lost to Poland after World War I, but he believed this could happen peacefully. Moltke thought Poland was less developed and would eventually become influenced by Germany. He saw no problem with trying to improve German-Polish relations while still wanting to take back land.
Relations with Józef Beck
In November 1932, Colonel Józef Beck became the Polish Foreign Minister. Moltke found Beck difficult to work with, but he believed Beck was pro-German and anti-French.
In 1933, Moltke welcomed the new Nazi government. Like many other diplomats, he thought Adolf Hitler would make Germany a great power again. Moltke had some anti-Jewish views, but he was still willing to work with Jewish diplomats.
In March 1933, the Nazis began taking control in Danzig. Poland feared Danzig would rejoin Germany and increased its military presence there. On April 1, 1933, some Polish Jewish groups boycotted German businesses in Poland. Moltke complained that "anti-German" Polish Jews used "terror tactics" during this boycott.
On April 12, 1933, Moltke met with Beck, who seemed open to better relations and a non-aggression pact. Moltke reported to Berlin that rumors of Poland starting a "preventive war" were just a negotiating tactic. He thought war was unlikely.
Germany often used the League of Nations to complain about Poland's treatment of its ethnic German minority. In 1933, Poland started using the League to complain about Germany's treatment of German Jews. Moltke was very angry about this, calling Poland "the classic land of anti-Semitic pogroms" while it pretended to defend German Jews.
Ending the Trade War
On August 30, 1933, Moltke reported that the Great Depression had hurt Poland's economy. He believed Poland's leader, Jan Piłsudski, wanted better relations with Germany because Germany had Europe's largest economy. Moltke urged an end to the tariff war (trade war) that had started in 1925. He argued that the trade war had failed to force Poland to return land. He thought better relations would weaken French influence in Europe.
Moltke's idea was accepted, and in September 1933, talks began to end the trade war. Germany was planning to leave the World Disarmament Conference to rearm, and feared a French attack. Improving relations with Poland, a French ally, would reduce this risk. The trade war ended in November 1933.
Non-Aggression Pact and Improved Relations
After the trade agreement, Moltke offered Piłsudski a non-aggression pact, which Piłsudski found very interesting. This pact, signed in January 1934, greatly improved German-Polish relations. A media agreement followed, stopping attacks in each other's newspapers. In March 1934, relations were upgraded to ambassadorial level, and Moltke became the German ambassador.
In June 1934, German propaganda minister Josef Goebbels visited Warsaw, with Moltke as his guide. In March 1936, during the crisis over Germany re-militarizing the Rhineland, Beck told Moltke that Poland would not actually help France if France went to war. Beck implied Poland would stay neutral. Moltke saw this as proof that closer economic ties would bring Poland into Germany's influence.
In 1936, Germany and Poland worked together to remove Seán Lester, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig. Lester had tried to protect the rights of Danzig's Jewish minority, which made him unpopular with the Nazis.
In June 1937, Hitler ordered Moltke to negotiate with Beck about the German minority in Poland and the Polish minority in Germany. Moltke joined the Nazi Party on October 1, 1937.
During the Sudetenland Crisis in 1938, Moltke reported that Beck saw this as a chance for Poland to claim the Teschen region. Moltke believed Poland would not defend Czechoslovakia if Germany invaded and might even invade Czechoslovakia itself. He worked hard to improve Polish-German relations during this time.
After Kristallnacht, when a Polish Jew shot a German diplomat, Moltke was asked to find negative information about the shooter's family. Unable to find any, he made up stories to portray them as criminals.
In December 1938, Moltke met with Hitler at his retreat. The main topic was not Danzig, but Hitler's demands for Poland to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact and help Germany conquer the Soviet Union. Beck refused these demands.
Danzig Crisis and the Road to War
In January 1939, Moltke offered Beck a deal: if Poland allowed Danzig to rejoin Germany, Germany would support Poland annexing all of Soviet Ukraine. Beck rejected this. Moltke also pressed Beck to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact, but Beck refused.
On February 26, 1939, Moltke reported that Beck was planning to visit London and Paris. Moltke worried this meant German-Polish relations were getting worse. He noted that Britain had usually supported Germany's claims to Polish land, making Beck's visit unusual.
On March 23, 1939, Moltke reported that Germany's annexation of the Memelland was a "very unpleasant surprise" in Warsaw. Poles feared Danzig and the Polish Corridor would be next. Poland ordered a partial military mobilization. Ribbentrop ordered Moltke to demand Danzig's return to Germany and offer parts of Soviet Ukraine as a reward. If Beck refused, Moltke was to say Poland would be considered an enemy.
On March 25, 1939, Beck formally rejected the demand for Danzig. He told Moltke that Danzig's status was not open for discussion. On March 28, Beck warned Moltke that if Danzig's government voted to rejoin Germany, Poland would see it as an act of war. Moltke protested, but Beck replied that it was Germany's own method.
On March 29, 1939, a German official told the Danzig government that Germany would wear down Poland and did not want a compromise. On April 5, Moltke was ordered not to negotiate with the Poles. Germany wanted to use the Danzig crisis as an excuse for war.
Moltke, following orders, refused to discuss solutions to the Danzig crisis. He publicly demanded Danzig rejoin Germany, knowing Poland would never accept. Moltke was one of the few German diplomats who opposed invading Poland. He still believed Poland could be influenced economically.
On March 31, 1939, Britain promised to defend Poland's independence. Moltke privately supported this "guarantee," hoping it would stop Germany from invading. He thought British involvement might also pressure Poland to let Danzig rejoin Germany peacefully.
In late April 1939, Moltke was called to Berlin. Ribbentrop threatened to fire him if he continued to suggest a peaceful solution was possible. Moltke returned to Warsaw on May 5, reluctantly following orders to push the crisis to the brink. His biographer called his stance "passive" because he disagreed with the policy but felt too committed to serving Germany to disobey.
On August 1, 1939, Moltke wrote about how Germany should occupy Poland. He suggested that to break Polish national spirit, Germany would need to weaken the Roman Catholic Church, which was central to Polish life. He noted that Polish morale was high and that the Church encouraged Polish nationalism.
On August 4, 1939, Poland warned that if Danzig continued to harass Polish customs inspectors, Poland would retaliate. On August 6, Moltke told Ribbentrop that Poland would "hardly any doubt" go to war if its rights in Danzig were violated.
On August 9, 1939, Ribbentrop forbade Moltke from returning to Warsaw from his vacation in Germany. Moltke protested, saying he felt like "a captain who had deserted his company." Ribbentrop wanted his ambassadors out of London, Paris, and Warsaw to prevent any diplomatic solutions that might stop the war.
After the Invasion of Poland
Moltke returned to the Foreign Office in Berlin. He opposed creating the "Government-General" (the German-occupied part of Poland) and suggested a Polish puppet government with limited powers. He believed most Poles were loyal to their government-in-exile.
In late 1939, Moltke became the editor of The White Book, a collection of German and Polish documents meant to blame Poland for the war. Moltke carefully edited the documents, removing his own warnings that Poland would go to war over Danzig.
The Kozłowski Affair
During his time in Warsaw, Moltke had known Leon Kozłowski, a Polish politician. Kozłowski was captured by the Soviet NKVD in 1939. After being held in Moscow, he developed a strong hatred for the Soviet Union. In 1941, he deserted from a Polish army being formed in the Soviet Union and surrendered to the German army.
Moltke approached Kozłowski in Berlin, asking him to speak out against the Soviet Union. On January 11, 1942, Kozłowski held a press conference in Berlin. He described his time in Soviet captivity and criticized the Polish government-in-exile for allying with the Soviets. This was a major propaganda success for Germany. In Poland, however, Kozłowski's actions were seen as a national scandal.
Ambassador to Spain
On January 10, 1943, Moltke was appointed ambassador to Madrid, Spain. He was seen as a "reliable Nazi." Another reason for his appointment was to explain away Nazi atrocities in Poland, especially against the Catholic Church, which had given Germany a bad image in Catholic Spain.
Upon arriving in Madrid, Moltke noted the huge German embassy staff, calling it "a hydra with many heads." He reported that most Spanish officials supported the Axis powers and admired Germany's fight against communism. However, Spain relied heavily on American oil, which gave the American embassy influence. By this time, Germany no longer hoped Spain would join the war. Moltke's job was to encourage Spain to resist Allied demands.
The Blue Division and Wolfram
A main concern was keeping the Blue Division (Spanish volunteers fighting for Germany) on the Eastern Front. Spain was officially neutral but had sent these troops. By early 1943, the Axis was losing, and Spain's leader, General Franco, considered recalling the Blue Division. The US and Britain reduced oil and food shipments to Spain, pressuring Franco to recall the troops.
Moltke tried to ensure the German Foreign Office was the main contact for Spanish policy. He worked to prevent other Nazi officials from trying to force Spain into the war.
On January 23, 1943, Moltke officially presented his credentials to Franco. Moltke asked Franco for a written promise not to recall the Blue Division, but Franco refused. Moltke then negotiated an agreement for Spain to trade more wolfram (a metal vital for weapons) for German arms. He also tried to get Franco to promise that any Allied landing in Spain would be a reason for Spain to enter the war, but Franco refused this too. However, on January 29, 1943, Franco secretly promised that Spain would enter the war if the Allies tried to seize the Canary Islands or Spanish Morocco.
The Sephardic Jews of Thessaloniki
Another issue was the status of the Sephardim (Jews of Spanish descent) in the Greek city of Thessaloniki. Many of these Jews had been expelled from Spain in 1492. In 1924, Spanish law allowed them to claim Spanish citizenship if they could prove their ancestors lived in Spain before 1492. When Germany occupied Greece in 1941, about 600 of the 49,000 Sephardim in Thessaloniki had Spanish citizenship.
On January 21, 1943, Moltke told Spain that it had until March 31, 1943, to evacuate all Spanish-citizen Jews from Greece. Moltke knew Spain did not want these descendants of expelled Jews to return. This diplomatic note was a step to force Spain to either accept these Jews or remain silent as they were deported to Auschwitz. Spain generally refused entry visas for these Jews, encouraging them to flee to Turkey instead. Spanish diplomats knew "resettlement in the East" meant extermination. Franco's "feeble policy" led to the death of most of Thessaloniki's Jewish community.
On February 10, 1943, Moltke signed the final agreement for Spain to continue supplying wolfram to Germany in exchange for arms. Moltke's rivals saw this as a failure because it didn't commit Spain to war. They tried to undermine the agreement by raising the price of German weapons. Spain bought far fewer weapons than planned but continued to supply wolfram. Franco felt a strong debt to Germany for its help in the Spanish Civil War. Only a threat of a total oil embargo from the US and Britain in February 1944 finally forced Franco to reduce wolfram sales.
Moltke did not stop the flow of Nazi propaganda from the embassy. The embassy spent a lot of money bribing Spanish journalists to write pro-Axis articles. This propaganda was meant to influence not only Spain but also Latin America.
Death and Legacy
On March 16, 1943, Moltke felt pain in his stomach. On March 22, 1943, he died after an appendix operation in Madrid. His sudden death led to rumors that he had been poisoned.
After the war, Moltke's son, Gebhardt von Moltke, had his father's body examined. No evidence of foul play was found. On March 26, 1943, Moltke's body was taken by train to be buried in the Moltke family crypt in Breslau (now Wrocław, Poland).
Reputation Today
Recently, Moltke gained attention when Russian president Vladimir Putin cited one of his reports from October 1, 1938. In this report, Moltke quoted Polish Foreign Minister Beck as being grateful for Germany's treatment of Polish interests during the Czech crisis. Putin used this to suggest that Poland was involved with Nazi Germany's expansion, implying that the German-Soviet pact to divide Poland in 1939 was not so bad. Putin seemed to be challenging the idea of Poland as a victim in World War II.
However, historians argue that Putin put too much importance on Moltke's report. Beck likely wanted to make Poland look good to the German ambassador, especially when discussing Poland's claims to Teschen. Historians note that Beck kept his options open during the 1938 crisis and was prepared to fight Germany under certain conditions. They criticize judging Polish foreign policy harshly based on just one report from Moltke.
Family Tree
Hans-Adolf von Moltke came from the old noble family of Moltke. He was the grandson of Adolph von Moltke (1804–1871), who was the brother of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke. His father was Friedrich von Moltke (1852–1927), a Prussian Minister of State.
Moltke married Davida Yorck von Wartenberg on June 8, 1926. They had eight children:
- Monika von Moltke (1927–1948)
- Maria von Moltke (born 1929)
- Friedrich von Moltke (1931–2018), a bank manager
- Heinrich von Moltke (born 1933), a director at the European Commission
- Wulf von Moltke (born 1935), a senior executive
- Gebhardt von Moltke (1938–2019), who became a German Ambassador in London
- Angelika Baroness von Hahn (born 1940), a neurology professor
- Renate von Dobschütz (born 1942), an art historian
Images for kids
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Hans-Adolf von Moltke in 1934.
See also
In Spanish: Hans-Adolf von Moltke para niños
