McMahon–Hussein Correspondence facts for kids

This important letter from October 1915 was part of the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence. It's a key document in the history of the Arab national movement.

The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence was a series of letters exchanged during World War I. In these letters, the British government promised to support Arab independence in a large area after the war. In return, the Sharif of Mecca (a leader of the Arabs) would start the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. This exchange of letters greatly influenced the Middle East during and after the war. A disagreement about Palestine continued for many years because of these letters.

The correspondence includes ten letters sent between July 1915 and March 1916. They were exchanged by Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, who was the top British official in Egypt. The British wanted Arab help to fight the Ottomans. They also wanted to prevent the Ottoman Empire's call for a "holy war" from turning the many Muslims in British India against them. The area promised for Arab independence was described as "within the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca". However, some parts of Syria were excluded. These were areas west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. Different ideas about this description caused big problems later on. One major disagreement, which still exists today, is about how much of the coastal area was meant to be excluded.

Later, in November 1917, the Balfour Declaration was published. This letter promised a national home for Jewish people in Palestine. Then, a secret agreement from 1916, called the Sykes–Picot Agreement, was leaked. This agreement showed that Britain and France planned to divide and control parts of the land promised to the Arabs. Because of these, the Sharif and other Arab leaders felt that the promises made in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence had been broken. Hussein refused to sign the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. In 1921, when Britain suggested a treaty to accept their control over these areas, Hussein said he couldn't agree to a document that gave Palestine to Zionists and Syria to foreign powers. Another British attempt to make a treaty failed in 1923–24. Within six months, the British stopped supporting Hussein. Instead, they supported their ally Ibn Saud in central Arabia, who then took over Hussein's kingdom.

The correspondence "haunted Anglo-Arab relations" for many years. Parts of the letters were published in newspapers in 1923 and in the 1937 Peel Commission Report. The full correspondence was officially published in 1939. More documents were made public in 1964.

Why the Letters Were Written

Sir Henry McMahon and Sharif Hussein

Early Talks About Independence

The first talks between the UK and the Hashemites (Hussein's family) happened in February 1914. This was five months before World War I started. The discussions were between Lord Kitchener, a British official in Egypt, and Abdullah bin al-Hussein, Hussein's second son. Hussein was worried about the new Ottoman governor in his region.

These talks led to a message from Kitchener to Hussein in November 1914. Kitchener, who was now the Secretary of War, promised that Great Britain would "guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the Sharifate" if the Arabs of Hejaz supported them. Hussein said he couldn't break with the Ottomans right away. But when the Ottomans joined Germany in World War I in November 1914, Britain's interest in an Arab revolt grew quickly. Some historians believe that Britain's failure in a battle called Gallipoli made them even more eager to make a deal with the Arabs.

What Was the Damascus Protocol?

On May 23, 1915, Faisal bin Hussein, Hussein's third son, received a document known as the Damascus Protocol. Faisal was in Damascus to talk with Arab secret groups. The document said that the Arabs would revolt with the United Kingdom. In return, the UK would recognize Arab independence in a large area. This area would stretch from the 37th parallel (a line of latitude) near the Taurus Mountains in the north, to Persia and the Persian Gulf in the east, the Mediterranean Sea in the west, and the Arabian Sea in the south.

The Letters: July 1915 to March 1916

After discussions among Hussein and his sons in June 1915, Hussein decided to write to Sir Henry McMahon. Between July 14, 1915, and March 10, 1916, ten letters were exchanged. McMahon was in touch with Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, who approved the correspondence.

Some historians point to a private letter from McMahon in December 1915 as a sign of possible British dishonesty. In it, McMahon wrote that he didn't take the idea of a "strong united independent Arab State" too seriously. He felt that the situation was "too nebulous" and that their main goal was to "tempt the Arab people into the right path" and get them to join the British side. He suggested using "persuasive terms" rather than arguing over conditions.

Here's a summary of the ten letters:

Were These Letters a Treaty?

Some historians, like Elie Kedourie, said the October letter was not a treaty. He also argued that Hussein didn't keep his promises. But Victor Kattan called the correspondence a "secret treaty." He said the UK government treated it as a treaty during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

The Arab Revolt: 1916 to 1918

The Arabs saw McMahon's promises as a formal agreement with the United Kingdom. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour also called it a treaty during post-war talks. Because of this understanding, the Arabs, led by Hussein's son Faisal, formed a military force. They fought against the Ottoman Empire during the Arab Revolt, with help from T. E. Lawrence (known as "Lawrence of Arabia").

In June 1916, the Arab Revolt began. An Arab army attacked Ottoman forces. They helped capture Aqabah and cut the Hejaz railway, an important link from Damascus to Medina. Meanwhile, the British army, led by General Allenby, moved into Palestine and Syria. The British advance ended with the Battle of Megiddo in September 1918. The Ottoman Empire surrendered on October 31, 1918.

Historians see the Arab revolt as the first organized movement of Arab nationalism. It brought Arab groups together to fight for independence from the Ottoman Empire. After the war, the revolt had lasting effects. The Hashemite kingdom in Jordan is still influenced by the actions of Arab leaders in the revolt.

Other Agreements: 1916 to 1918

The Sykes–Picot Agreement

The Sykes–Picot Agreement was a secret deal between the UK and France. It was agreed upon in January 1916. The French government knew about Britain's letters to Hussein in December 1915, but they didn't know formal promises had been made.

This agreement was revealed in December 1917 by the Bolsheviks after the Russian Revolution. It showed that Britain and France planned to divide and control parts of the promised Arab land. Hussein was told by British officials that the British promises to the Arabs were still valid and that the Sykes–Picot Agreement was not a formal treaty. After the Sykes-Picot Agreement became public, McMahon resigned.

Many sources say the Sykes-Picot Agreement went against the Hussein–McMahon Correspondence. For example, Persia was placed in the British area. Also, British and French advisors would control the area meant for an Arab State. While the correspondence didn't mention Palestine, Haifa and Acre were to be British, and a smaller Palestine area was to be controlled internationally.

The Balfour Declaration

In 1917, the UK issued the Balfour Declaration. This promised to support a national home for Jewish people in Palestine. Historians often look at this declaration, the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, and the Sykes-Picot agreement together. This is because they might not all fit together, especially regarding Palestine. According to Albert Hourani, a historian, these agreements were meant to have "more than one interpretation."

The Hogarth Message

Hussein asked for an explanation of the Balfour Declaration. In January 1918, David George Hogarth, a British official, was sent to deliver a letter to Hussein, who was now King of Hejaz. The Hogarth message assured Hussein that "the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world." It also mentioned the "freedom of the existing population both economic and political." Hogarth reported that Hussein "would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine."

The Declaration to the Seven

Because of the McMahon–Hussein correspondence, the Balfour Declaration, and the Sykes–Picot Agreement, seven Syrian leaders in Cairo asked the UK government for clear answers. They wanted a "guarantee of the ultimate independence of Arabia." In response, on June 16, 1918, the Declaration to the Seven was issued. It stated that British policy was to let the people of the Ottoman Empire's occupied regions decide their own future government.

Allenby's Promise to Faisal

On October 19, 1918, General Allenby told the UK Government that he had promised Faisal that any military actions were temporary. He said they would not affect the final peace agreement, where Arabs would have a representative. Allenby also told Faisal that the Allies were honor-bound to reach a settlement based on the wishes of the people involved.

The Anglo-French Declaration of 1918

In this declaration on November 7, 1918, Britain and France stated their goal was to free the people oppressed by the Turks. They wanted to establish national governments chosen by the local people. This declaration was seen by historians as misleading.

After the War: 1919 to 1925

The Sherifian Plan

Just before the war with the Ottomans ended, the British Foreign Office discussed T.E. Lawrence's "Sherifian Plan." This plan suggested Hussein's sons become leaders in Syria and Mesopotamia. One reason for this was to fulfill a promise to the Hashemites from the McMahon correspondence.

Mandates

The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was held to decide how to divide territories after the war. Prince Faisal, representing King Hussein, asked for an Arab state under British control.

In January 1920, Prince Faisal signed an agreement with French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. This agreement recognized "the right of the Syrians to unite to govern themselves as an independent nation." On March 8, 1920, a meeting in Damascus declared an independent state of Syria. This new state included parts of Syria, Palestine, and northern Mesopotamia. Faisal was declared king. In April 1920, the San Remo conference quickly met in response. There, the Allies gave control of Palestine and Mesopotamia to Britain, and Syria and Lebanon to France.

Britain and France agreed to recognize the temporary independence of Syria and Mesopotamia. But Palestinian independence was not mentioned. France decided to rule Syria directly. They took military action in June 1920, removing King Faisal from Damascus. In Palestine, the UK appointed a High Commissioner and set up their own rule. The January 1919 Faisal–Weizmann Agreement was a short-lived agreement for Arab–Jewish cooperation in Palestine. Faisal had mistakenly thought this would be part of the Arab kingdom. Faisal treated Palestine differently in his presentation to the Peace Conference. He said Palestine, because of its special nature, should be considered by all parties.

The agreement was never put into action. At the same conference, US Secretary of State Robert Lansing asked if the Jewish national home meant an independent Jewish government. The head of the Zionist group said no. Lansing believed the system of mandates was a way for the Great Powers to hide their division of war spoils.

Hussein's Downfall

In 1919, King Hussein refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles. After February 1920, the British stopped paying him. In August 1920, the British asked Hussein to sign the Treaty of Sèvres, which recognized his kingdom, and offered him money. Hussein refused. In 1921, he said he couldn't sign a document that gave Palestine to Zionists and Syria to foreigners.

After the 1921 Cairo Conference, T. E. Lawrence was sent to get Hussein's signature on a treaty for a yearly payment. This also failed. In 1923, the British tried again to settle issues with Hussein, but it failed. Hussein kept refusing to recognize any of the mandates he felt were his. In March 1924, the UK government stopped talks. Within six months, they withdrew support for Hussein. They supported Ibn Saud, who then took over Hussein's kingdom.

Disagreements Over Land and Palestine

"Districts" according to the McMahon letter and their administrative category in the Ottoman Empire

McMahon's letter to Hussein on October 24, 1915, said Britain would recognize Arab independence with some exceptions. The original letters were in English and Arabic. There are slightly different English translations.

The letter stated: "The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed limits and boundaries.

With the above modification and without prejudice to our existing treaties concluded with Arab Chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries, and in regard to the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to interests of her ally France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurance and make the following reply to your letter:

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca."

The letters were written first in English, then translated to Arabic, or vice versa. The exact writer and translator are not clear.

The "Portions of Syria" Debate

The argument about Palestine started because Palestine is not directly named in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence. However, it was within the boundaries Hussein first suggested. McMahon accepted Hussein's boundaries "subject to modification." He suggested that "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab and should be excluded." Until 1920, British government papers suggested Palestine was meant to be part of the Arab area. Their interpretation changed in 1920, leading to public disagreement. Each side used small details of the wording to support their views.

Historian Jonathan Schneer used an example to explain the main disagreement: Imagine a line from the districts of New York, New Haven, New London, and Boston. It excludes land west of an imaginary coastal kingdom. If "districts" means "nearby areas," that's one thing. But if it means "provinces" or "states," it's completely different. There are no states of Boston, New London, or New Haven, just as there were no provinces of Hama and Homs. But there is a state of New York, just as there was a vilayet (province) of Damascus. Land west of New York State is different from land west of the district of New York City. The same applies to Damascus.

More than 50 years later, historian Arnold J. Toynbee shared his thoughts on the debate. He said if McMahon's "districts" meant provinces, it would mean McMahon was either very uninformed about Ottoman geography or was being tricky. Toynbee found both ideas hard to believe.

The "Without Harm to France" Debate

In the letter of October 24, the English version says: "...we accept those limits and boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France." At a meeting in December 1920, the English and Arabic texts were compared. An official present said that in the Arabic version sent to King Hussein, it seemed Britain was free to act without harming France in the entire area. This was a problem for the British, as they had used this phrase to tell the French they had protected their rights, and to tell the Arabs that they would need to deal with the French later.

James Barr wrote that McMahon wanted to protect French interests. But the translator lost this meaning in the Arabic version. In a British Cabinet analysis from May 1917, William Ormsby-Gore, a Member of Parliament, wrote that French plans in Syria seemed to go against the Allies' war goals. He questioned if British promises to King Hussein were consistent with French plans to make Syria and Upper Mesopotamia like another Tunis. He felt it was time to tell the French about their promises to Hussein.

Declassified British papers show a message from McMahon to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey, on October 18, 1915. McMahon described talks with a Syrian nationalist who said Arabs would fight if the French took Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. But he thought they would accept some changes to the northern boundaries. Based on this, McMahon suggested the wording: "In so far as Britain was free to act without detriment to the interests of her present Allies, Great Britain accepts the principle of the independence of Arabia within limits propounded by the Sherif of Mecca." Lord Grey allowed McMahon to make this promise, with the exception for the Allies.

The Arab View

The Arabs argued that Palestine could not be excluded because it was far south of the named places. They said the vilayet (province) of Damascus did not exist. The district (sanjak) of Damascus only covered the area around the city. Palestine was part of the vilayet of Syria A-Sham, which was not mentioned in the letters. Supporters of this view also noted that during the war, thousands of messages were dropped in Palestine. These messages, from the Sharif Hussein and the British, said that an Anglo-Arab agreement had been made to secure Arab independence.

The British View

The left page is from a November 1918 document, while the right page is from the Churchill White Paper of June 1922.

1918 British Government map titled "Map illustrating Territorial Negotiations between H.M.G. and King Hussein."

British memorandum on Palestine for the 1919 Peace Conference.

The British Government's interpretation changed between 1918 and 1922.

In November 1918, British historian Arnold J. Toynbee prepared a memo for the Political Intelligence Department. This memo was used for the Peace Conference. Later, Jan Smuts asked for a summary, and Toynbee produced another document. These documents were discussed by the Eastern Committee of the Cabinet in December 1918. T. E. Lawrence also attended.

The Eastern Committee met nine times to create policies for the negotiators. Henry Erle Richards summarized Toynbee's work into a "P-memo" for the Peace Conference delegates.

In public, Arthur Balfour was criticized when some politicians said secret treaties should be changed. They felt these treaties went against why Britain entered the war. In response to growing criticism about the conflicting promises, the 1922 Churchill White Paper stated that Palestine had always been excluded from the Arab area. Although this went against many earlier government documents, those documents were not known to the public. For this White Paper, a British official named John Evelyn Shuckburgh talked with McMahon. They relied on a 1920 memo by Major Hubert Young. Young noted that in the original Arabic text, the word translated as "districts" was "vilayets" (provinces). He concluded that "district of Damascus" meant the province of Damascus, which extended south but excluded most of Palestine.

While some British governments said they didn't intend to promise Palestine to Hussein, they sometimes admitted the problems in the legal wording. A committee set up by the British in 1939 to clarify the arguments said many promises had been made. They said all of them needed to be studied together. Arab representatives told the committee that whatever McMahon intended didn't matter legally. What mattered were his actual statements, which were promises from the British government. They also noted that McMahon was acting for the Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey. Lord Grey himself said in 1923 that he had serious doubts about the Churchill White Paper's interpretation of the promises he had made to Sharif Hussein.

See also

• Pan-Arabism