Defence of the Reich facts for kids

Quick facts for kids Defence of the Reich
Part of European theatre of World War II
Scope of the Defence of the Reich campaign.
Date 4 September 1939 – 8 May 1945 Location German-occupied Europe Result Allied victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom  United States  Canada  Soviet Union  France  Free France Poland  Belgium  Netherlands  Norway Czechoslovakia	Germany  Italy  Romania  Hungary  Slovakia
Commanders and leaders
Arthur Harris Trafford Leigh-Mallory Arthur Tedder Charles Portal Carl Spaatz James H. Doolittle Ira C. Eaker Alexander Novikov	Hermann Göring Hans Jeschonnek Hans-Jürgen Stumpff Josef Kammhuber Hugo Sperrle
Strength
	Ground-based, mid-1944: Personnel: 1,110,900 2,655 heavy flak gun batteries: 10,930 88 mm Flak 18/36 and Flak 37 guns 4,157 105 mm Flak 38/39 and 128 mm Flak 40 guns 1,612 light flak gun batteries: 30,463 20 mm Flak 30/38 and 37 mm Flak 43 guns
Casualties and losses
40,000 aircraft destroyed 22,000 RAF Bomber Command aircraft 18,000 American aircraft 79,281 RAF Bomber Command personnel 79,265 American airmen	57,405 aircraft destroyed 97 submarines destroyed 7,400+ 88mm artillery pieces lost (1942–1944) at least 23,000 motor vehicles destroyed At least 700–800 tanks 500,000 civilians killed 23,000 military and police killed at least 450 locomotives (1943 only) at least 4,500 passenger wagons (1943 only) at least 6,500 goods wagons (1943 only)

The Defence of the Reich was a major air battle during World War II. It took place over German-occupied Europe and Germany. Germany's air force, the Luftwaffe, tried to protect its people, factories, and military from attacks. These attacks came from the Western Allies.

Thousands of planes fought in the sky, day and night. They tried to stop the Allies from bombing German cities and industries. This campaign was one of the longest air battles ever. It lasted from September 1939 to May 1945.

At first, the Luftwaffe was strong. They caused many losses for Allied bombers. In 1939, British bombers had to fly at night because of heavy losses during the day. By 1943, American bombers also faced big problems. They even stopped their daylight attacks over Germany for a while.

But the Allies got stronger. The British improved their bombing tactics. The Americans introduced new long-range fighter planes. These planes, like the North American P-51 Mustang, could fly with the bombers all the way to their targets. By 1944, the Allies had gained control of the skies over Germany.

Allied bombing severely damaged Germany's fuel production. This made it hard for the Luftwaffe to train pilots and keep planes flying. By the end of the war, the Allies claimed to have destroyed over 57,000 German aircraft. The Allies dropped millions of tons of bombs. This forced Germany to use many soldiers and guns for defense. This weakened their ability to fight on other fronts.

The bombing also hurt German industry. Production of tanks, aircraft, and trucks dropped. By late 1944, the German economy was collapsing. The air campaign continued until Germany surrendered in May 1945.

Germany's Early Air Defense Strategy

Germany's air force, the Luftwaffe, did not have a strong air defense system early in the war. Allied planes did not attack German areas much between 1939 and 1940. Air defense was handled by local air commands. These commands controlled anti-aircraft guns, warning services, and fighter planes.

However, their coordination was often poor. The leader, Adolf Hitler, preferred anti-aircraft guns. He thought they made people feel safer, even if they were not always effective. Germany's air defenses were not very strong. But the Allies were too weak to take advantage of this at first. Only a few fighter groups protected German airspace. Important industries were not well guarded.

In September 1939, the Luftwaffe's Chief of Staff, Hans Jeschonnek, explained the role of fighter planes. Some fighters would protect specific areas. Other fighters would be part of larger "Air Fleets." These fleets would fight offensively to keep control of the skies. This idea worked well on the front lines. But it was hard to make it work for defending Germany. Pilots and anti-aircraft units did not train well together.

Most air battles until May 1941 were against small British raids. The Luftwaffe's strategy was to focus its power on one front. But this plan started to fail when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe had spread its fighter defenses thin. They were mostly on the edges of German-controlled areas. Little was left to protect the heart of Germany.

Weaknesses in Germany's Air Defense

The Luftwaffe put more effort into defense than the British did during the Battle of Britain. But they did not do it soon enough. Germany made big mistakes in leadership, production, and training from 1940 to 1942. They did not have a clear plan for a long war.

German leaders did not make air defense a top priority. This weakened the Luftwaffe's efforts from 1943 to 1945. Their strategy of attacking first worked well from 1939 to 1941. But when the war became a long fight, Germany's forces were spread thin. They also failed to create good defensive plans. This led to their defeat.

How Organization and Planning Failed

Germany's fighter defenses were not seen as important as their attacking air force. They did not get enough investment. The defense force was too weak to grow properly after the war started. It also had no voice in the main military command.

The defense forces were split under different commands. They were never put under one leader. When the need for air defense was finally recognized, the rush to build up the fighter force was too fast. This hurt its quality and organization. The growth came too late. Only nine fighter wings existed in 1939. No new ones were created until 1942. The years 1940 and 1941 were wasted.

Problems with Equipment and Development

The German air force did not have a way for pilots to suggest improvements to their planes. So, the Luftwaffe could not provide the right equipment for its units. After 1940, all planning was short-sighted. Leaders resisted technical improvements. They thought upgrades would slow down plane production. This meant older plane types stayed in production too long.

The main air command refused to make more fighter planes instead of bombers until mid-1944. Even then, getting new planes was hard. For example, the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter was not introduced fast enough. This was partly because its jet engines were new and needed a lot of development. Too much time was lost between testing, planning, and training.

Pilot Training Issues

One big problem was that the Luftwaffe preferred bomber pilots. Flight schools focused more on training bomber pilots than fighter pilots. This meant there were not enough experienced fighter leaders later in the war.

Pilots did not get enough flying hours. They had too little training on combat planes, flying in groups, shooting, and fighting. They also lacked training for flying with instruments. This was not fixed until late in the war.

Staff Training Problems

Training for staff was also poor. Systematic training for group leaders did not start until after 1943. This led to a lack of experienced leaders from 1943 to 1945. This was too late to help in the defense of Germany.

Experienced leaders were replaced too quickly by younger, less experienced ones. This was because Hermann Göring, the Luftwaffe chief, was frustrated with them. This high turnover made it impossible to gain experience. Also, there were no fighter command groups at the start of the war. There were never enough good officers to staff the ones that were set up.

Strategy and Tactics Mistakes

The Luftwaffe's mistakes meant its fighter force was overloaded with missions after 1942. They were never allowed to go on the attack to regain control of the skies. Their tactics were always defensive. Resources were constantly moved from the defense of Germany to the Eastern Front. This stopped an early build-up of defensive forces.

Moving units around caused confusion and reduced their readiness. Bad weather operations also caused high losses and hurt morale. The Luftwaffe leaders did not understand how to use their forces wisely. They sent all their planes to meet every raid. This quickly wore down their defenders.

Another problem was using slow, twin-engine planes like the Messerschmitt Bf 110 and Messerschmitt Me 410 Hornisse for daylight combat. Hitler and Göring insisted on this. But these planes were too vulnerable. They had to be pulled from daylight combat by spring 1944 due to heavy losses.

The new American commander, Jimmy Doolittle, changed fighter tactics in 1944. He sent American fighters to hunt down German planes. This destroyed Germany's day fighter defenses. By June 1944, the Allies had almost complete control of the air.

German Production Failures

Germany had problems making enough aircraft since 1936. While plans for a larger air force grew, actual production got worse. By 1939, only 33% of the planned planes were built.

Erhard Milch's aircraft production plan depended on defeating the Soviet Union in 1941. After Germany failed at the Battle of Moscow, aircraft production was put aside. The army needed more resources due to heavy losses. Milch later improved production rates. In 1941, Germany made about 981 aircraft per month. In 1942, this rose to 1,296.

But the army and navy also needed resources. Milch noted that 74% of all aluminum went to the aviation industry. But a lot of it was used for ammunition. He said this could have built 1,000 bombers and 4,000 fighters. Milch ordered recycling of metals. This increased metal availability by 57%.

Allied bombing made it harder for Germany to produce planes. They had to spread out their factories. German aviation production reached about 36,000 aircraft in 1944. But by then, the Luftwaffe did not have enough fuel or trained pilots. The failure to make more planes earlier meant the Luftwaffe was effectively defeated by early 1944. Even when production increased, it was too little, too late.

Stopping British Bombers (1939–1941)

The British Royal Air Force (RAF) believed in bombing industrial cities. They thought this would hurt German morale and industry. This idea came from earlier wars. They hoped to cause so much damage that people would rise up. But the RAF did not have enough good bombers at the start of the war. Unescorted bombers were easy targets for fighters in daylight.

The air defense campaign started on September 4, 1939. The RAF attacked the German naval base at Wilhelmshaven. These raids continued into December. On December 18, 1939, in the Battle of the Heligoland Bight, the RAF lost 12 out of 22 bombers. The Germans lost only 3 fighters. The RAF realized they could not fly daylight missions. They switched to bombing at night.

British leaders argued about bombing strategy. Some thought bombing was not accurate enough for specific targets. A report showed that only 30% of RAF bombers hit their target area. When Arthur Harris took over Bomber Command in 1942, he used this to push for bombing large areas of cities.

Night Bombing Operations

Josef Kammhuber was key in developing Germany's night fighter system. Using radar, they could guide their fighters close to enemy planes. He created "Combined Night Fighting Zones." In these zones, fighters worked with radar and anti-aircraft guns. At first, it was not very successful. But it soon improved.

A new radar, Lichtenstein radar, was developed for planes. Despite Germany's new defenses, most British night bombing missions failed in 1940–1941. Many RAF bombers were lost. Most of these losses were due to poor navigation. German night defenses claimed 421 RAF bombers in 1941.

Kammhuber suggested attacking British bombers as they took off. But Hitler refused. He wanted the German people to see British bombers shot down over Germany. This decision helped the RAF. The chance to stop the bomber offensive was lost. Kammhuber then focused on building the Kammhuber Line, a strong defensive system.

Organizing Germany's Air Defense

The difficulty of protecting Berlin from small RAF raids led to stronger air defenses. A new command, Luftflotte Reich, was created to protect all of Germany. Hermann Göring ordered Hubert Weise to form a new air command in September 1940. This command grew to cover all air defenses in central Germany.

Weise also created the Night-Fighter Division under Josef Kammhuber. But the air defense of southern Germany was given to Hugo Sperrle. Erhard Milch urged Göring to unite all air defense forces. He said they were competing and causing problems. But Göring refused. So, Germany's home defense forces remained split until 1944.

How Night Defenses Grew

Germany believed in fighting offensively to protect their homeland. But they had many tools for defense ready in 1939. They had many good anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and sound detectors. They also had Freya radar on the coasts. Soon, the Würzburg radar was introduced. This radar could guide anti-aircraft guns to hit targets.

When British bombers started night attacks in May 1940, Germany had no good way to stop them. Pre-war tests used sound detectors and searchlights. Night fighters would wait outside the lighted areas. When a bomber was caught in the light, the fighter would attack. Anti-aircraft guns were told to fire unless fighters were in the way.

In response to British attacks, Josef Kammhuber developed a better night defense. Over three years, he built the complex Kammhuber Line. This system used Freya radar for early warnings. Würzburg radar controlled night fighters and anti-aircraft guns. Germany used Messerschmitt Bf 110 and Junkers Ju 88 planes as night fighters. Both worked very well.

Pilots did not like early airborne radar because it slowed their planes. They preferred to see the target after ground control guided them. Anti-aircraft guns and searchlights were moved to protect cities.

The system had some weaknesses. Each part of the Kammhuber Line was limited by the Würzburg radar. Only one fighter could be controlled from the ground at a time. Radar measurements could be off by a lot. This made it hard to intercept planes. Airborne radar like the Lichtenstein radar helped. But it had a narrow search angle. Despite its flaws, the Kammhuber Line became a strong defense.

Americans Join the Battle (1942)

The United States joining World War II in December 1941 was a shock for Germany. For the first year, the expected American attacks did not come. Half of the Luftwaffe was fighting on the Eastern Front. In North Africa, the Luftwaffe was losing control of the air. The RAF was also increasing its attacks.

In May 1942, the bombing of Cologne was a success for the RAF. But Germany still gave low priority to defending its own airspace. In May, Hermann Göring realized that if enemy bombers broke through, Germany would have "nothing left to oppose them." But few commanders worried because American attacks were not yet massive.

The American air forces, the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, used Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers. The B-24 was faster and carried more bombs. But it was harder to fly in formation at high altitudes. This made it more vulnerable.

American commanders did not think long-range fighters were needed in 1942. They believed bombers could always get through. So, they did not rush to develop such fighters. They used British Supermarine Spitfires, but these planes did not have enough range.

American Bombing Goals

American strategy was different from the RAF's. They did not aim to break German civilian morale. American intelligence believed attacks on economic targets, like power plants, would work better. They thought this would avoid "indiscriminate civilian bombing."

Americans believed Germany's military industry was already weak. They thought certain targets would be very sensitive to attack. So, oil, petroleum, and synthetic rubber were added to their bombing plans. They focused on these because they mistakenly thought Germany's military relied mostly on vehicles. In reality, many German infantry divisions used horses.

Later, U-boat bases were added as targets. But the biggest difference was America's focus on destroying the Luftwaffe. The British thought this would happen by crippling the German economy.

The American plan in June 1943 was to attack Germany's air industry. This was seen as necessary before any invasion of Europe. The goal was to defeat the Luftwaffe in the air, on the ground, and destroy its factories. General Ira C. Eaker proposed a combined attack called Operation Pointblank. American forces would make precision attacks by day. British bombers would do area bombing at night.

However, Arthur Harris of Bomber Command did not want to do precision bombing. His crews were not trained for it. He preferred area bombing of industrial cities. British successes in the Battle of the Ruhr and Battle of Hamburg seemed to prove him right. American bombers suffered heavy losses without escorts. Deep raids were stopped in October 1943. Daylight bombing only became possible when long-range escort fighters were available.

Germany's View of the New Enemy

In 1942, German leaders did not think much of the American air force. Hitler refused to believe reports about America's ability to produce thousands of good aircraft. Göring told Hitler that the B-17 bomber was not good. He joked that Americans could only build refrigerators.

This was a bad situation. German intelligence had detailed reports on American aircraft. They also knew about the American aircraft industry's capacity. General Friedrich von Boetticher, a German military attaché in Washington, sent many reports on the B-17. But Hitler and Göring dismissed the information.

Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, was worried. He wrote that Germany was "lost." He said his requests to expand the Luftwaffe had been ignored. He feared Germany would be "covered from the air with an enemy screen." But Jeschonnek could not convince his superiors. Official optimism won out.

Outdated Luftwaffe Technology

The Luftwaffe's technical advantage was fading. A report from late 1941 showed many complaints. These included poor radar, lack of all-weather heavy fighters, and the slow climb rate of the Bf 109. Erhard Milch and Ernst Udet tried to increase aircraft production. They also tried to introduce more modern fighters.

They explained in September 1941 that the next generation of aircraft had not appeared. So, older planes like the Heinkel He 111 bomber had to stay in production. Milch said they had to choose between having no planes in 1943 or many older, but still useful, types.

In 1941, the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter began to replace the Bf 109. The Fw 190 was more agile and better armed. But its performance dropped at high altitudes. The Bf 109 was better at high altitudes. It was decided to keep both in production. Later, heavily armed Fw 190 "Sturmböcke" were used as bomber destroyers. The Bf 109s would fight the escorting fighters.

German Day Control (1942–43)

The American build-up in Europe was slow. The first American air attack over Germany was not until January 27, 1943. Small groups of B-17s had flown over France since July 1942. But they achieved little, like the early RAF missions.

Germany's air defenses had 179 fighters protecting the Netherlands and Germany. Another group protected Belgium and France. Hitler and Göring still would not make more fighters at the expense of bombers. Any new planes had to come from other war zones.

The Luftwaffe leadership kept pushing for bomber production. Little attention was paid to new fighter types. In February 1943, Göring refused to believe Americans had good fighter designs. He thought the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt was worse than German fighters. But in March, he changed his mind. He complained that the Bf 109 was getting old, and there was no replacement.

Milch and Albert Speer, the new armaments minister, could not develop new planes. They were busy increasing production of existing types. The air battles of 1943 and 1944 were mostly fought by older planes. These included the Bf 109, Bf 110, Ju 88, and early Fw 190s.

American Daylight Bombing

Germany's fighter force was at its best in 1943. Without long-range escort fighters, American bombing raids into Germany were very costly. German fighters got heavier weapons to deal with American bombers. American bombers flew in "combat box" formations for mutual defense. Dozens of heavy machine guns pointed outwards from these formations.

Some German fighters were fitted with even heavier guns. These could attack from beyond the range of American guns. Bf 110s, Dornier Do 217s, and Ju 88s also joined in. They fired cannons and unguided air-to-air rockets. These weapons caused high losses for the bombers.

The Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission on August 17, 1943, damaged ball-bearing factories. But 36 out of 230 B-17s were shot down. A second attack on October 14, 1943, was called "Black Thursday." Out of 291 bombers, 77 were lost. German losses were 38 fighters.

These raids forced Germany to use many resources for defense. In 1940, Germany had 791 heavy anti-aircraft gun batteries. By 1944, this increased to 2,655 heavy batteries. It took thousands of anti-aircraft rounds to shoot down an American bomber.

Producing fighters should have been the priority. But Hitler and Göring stopped a switch to defensive fighters. American attacks on aircraft factories also hurt production. In October 1943, Germany learned that Allied fighters were reaching as far east as Hamburg. These were P-47s and P-38s with extra fuel tanks. But Göring dismissed this as a fluke. The danger was ignored.

From mid-October 1943 to mid-February 1944, the Luftwaffe had control of the air over Germany. The Americans realized they needed long-range escort fighters. The 8th Air Force stopped deep raids into Germany for the rest of the year.

British Night Bombing, 1942–43

New navigation tools like Oboe allowed for accurate bombing. The bombing of Cologne in May 1942, the Battle of the Ruhr, and the bombing of Hamburg were Allied victories. During the Battle of the Ruhr, British bombing severely disrupted German production. Steel production fell, and the armaments industry faced shortages.

Attacks on Kassel destroyed much of the city. Tank production was halted for months. Locomotive production also stopped. Bomber Command had stopped Germany's "armaments miracle." Germany had to move 7,000 heavy guns from the army to protect the Ruhr. The British lost 640 bombers.

In May 1943, the British learned about Germany's Lichtenstein B/C radar. They developed Window (chaff) to jam it. This led to the Wilde Sau (Wild Boar) tactic, using day fighters for night defense.

The Battle of Hamburg (July 1943) was beyond Oboe's range. RAF bombers used H2S radar. The use of Window confused German radar. Only 12 planes were lost on the first night. Many factories and homes were destroyed. About a million people fled the city. Window gave the British a temporary advantage.

German Night Defenses

After several Window attacks, the Luftwaffe changed its tactics. With radar jammed, German night fighters found it hard to find bombers. Ground controllers stopped using radar to guide fighters. Instead, they gave general updates on the bomber stream. Individual planes were only tracked if caught in searchlights. These changes did not work immediately. But they led to a method of loosely controlled visual interception.

Other tactics were tried. Wilde Sau used single-engine day fighters. They used all forms of light, like searchlights and fires, to see bombers. They also used Naxos, a passive radar detector. This tactic had limited success. The Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses in the winter of 1943–1944. German production barely kept up with night-fighter losses.

By the end of 1943, Nazi leaders feared morale would collapse. Joseph Goebbels, the propaganda minister, called the raids "terror bombing." He tried to rally the people. But a US study after the war found that morale did fall. About 75% of Germans believed the war was lost because the Luftwaffe could not stop the bombing.

1944: The Turning Point

The appearance of American fighters far into Germany worried the Germans. Defending Germany became the top priority. In November 1943, German commanders tried to find a solution. Three air divisions were to defend German airspace.

A commander suggested that Bf 109 groups should fight American escorts. Then, Fw 190 "Sturmgruppen" would attack the bombers. These Fw 190s were heavily armed and armored. They were meant to be escorted by Bf 109s. These Bf 109s would keep the dangerous P-51 Mustangs away. The importance of home defense was recognized. The central air command was renamed Luftflotte Reich (Air Fleet Reich). A more experienced commander, Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, took charge.

American Air Force Changes

General Henry H. Arnold ordered the American air forces to destroy the enemy air force. This meant destroying them in the air, on the ground, and in factories. General Ira C. Eaker was replaced by Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz. Jimmy Doolittle took command of the 8th Air Force. On January 21, he ordered the destruction of the German fighter force. This was needed before the Allied landing in Normandy. Doolittle believed the Luftwaffe could only be defeated by wearing them down.

America Gains Control of the Skies

Doolittle began his campaign in February 1944 with Operation Argument, known as "Big Week". The goal was to lure the Luftwaffe into a big battle. They launched massive attacks on German aircraft factories. If the Luftwaffe was defeated, the Allies would control the air. Then, the invasion of Europe could happen.

During "Big Week," the Americans and British lost many bombers. The German air defense lost 355 fighters and nearly 100 valuable pilots. While the Allies claimed victory, German fighter production only dropped briefly. But the battle of attrition got worse for the Luftwaffe. After Big Week, the Allies had permanent control of the air. By early 1944, Germany's fighter force was getting very few new pilots. This made the Luftwaffe "a brittle shield."

A key development was the North American P-51 Mustang. It could fly with bombers all the way to their targets and back. It was also fast and well-armed. The number of Mustangs grew quickly. By March 1944, Doolittle sent Mustang squadrons ahead of the bombers. They would "clear the path" by fighting German planes. As 1944 went on, German heavy fighters and armored bomber destroyers were driven from the skies by the P-51s.

The Luftwaffe was under huge pressure in March and April 1944. Adolf Galland, the General of Fighters, reported heavy losses. He said 500 aircraft and 400 pilots were lost in 10 operations. In four months, 1,000 pilots were killed. Galland noted that the enemy outnumbered his fighters 6 to 1 or 8 to 1. He also said Allied pilot training was "astonishingly high."

Galland realized the Luftwaffe was losing too many planes and pilots. He wanted to focus on quality, not just quantity. He said he would rather have one Me 262 jet in action than five Bf 109s.

The Luftwaffe lost many fighters and pilots in early 1944. Between January and May 1944, 2,262 German fighter pilots were killed. Galland noted the loss of experienced personnel. He said they needed to bring in experienced pilots from other parts of the military.

More and more American fighters were shooting down Germany's best pilots. This created a bad cycle. Training time was cut to replace losses. Shorter training meant poorer pilot quality. This led to more pilots being killed. The attacks on German oil also cut training time, making things worse.

The Luftwaffe's situation got worse throughout 1944. As German territory shrank, the number of anti-aircraft guns grew. By late 1944, anti-aircraft defenses were more effective than the Luftwaffe at shooting down Allied bombers. Losses for the German air defense reached a high on November 26. They lost 119 fighters and 60 pilots killed for only 25 American fighters and six bombers.

Night Bombing Continues

In the first half of 1944, the RAF's night bombing faced new German technology. In mid-1943, the RAF used Window (chaff) over Hamburg. This made German ground and airborne radars ineffective. The RAF also shortened its attacks and used fake routes to trick German fighters. They used jamming screens to send enemy planes to the wrong areas.

Germany responded by improving its plotting systems. They used long-range radar and observer networks. They also listened to British bomber signals. When the British turned off their IFF devices, the Germans tracked their tail warning and navigation radars. The British did not believe this was possible. But intelligence reports showed these new German radar systems were causing many bomber losses.

The Luftwaffe introduced the Lichtenstein SN-2 airborne radar. This radar was harder to jam. It became widely used in late 1943 and early 1944. This new device caused problems for the RAF. The plotting system was strong and had few weaknesses. Despite spoof raids, the new system caused 8–9% losses on each raid. German night fighter losses were acceptable.

The Luftwaffe's technology had a big impact in early 1944. The RAF's new offensive, the Battle of Berlin, suffered heavy losses. It failed to win the war as the British expected. The RAF lost 1,128 bombers, while Germany lost 256 fighters.

The RAF tried to reduce losses by using de Havilland Mosquito night fighters. But the Bristol Beaufighter was chosen instead. It was not good enough until the Mosquito replaced it. Technology and tactics favored the fighter. But in July 1944, the RAF discovered that German radar could detect their Monica tail warning sets and H2S bombing radar. The British then limited the use of these radars.

The Kammhuber Line is Lost

The Allied liberation of France and the Low Countries in 1944 helped the bomber offensive. Allied armies overran most of the early warning systems of the Kammhuber Line. This made it harder for German night fighters to stop bombers.

The Luftwaffe had to fight night bombers even though they could not afford the losses. Their losses were smaller than the British. But crews also suffered from bad weather, lack of skill, and accidents from night flying. In early 1944, 15% of their crews were lost. The Mosquito night fighter caused problems for German night fighter units. The Mosquito was faster than most German night fighters.

The campaign against German oil industries in 1944 caused serious problems. After August 1944, the German night fighter force did not have enough fuel. They could not train new crews or operate effectively. After this, they stopped being a threat to British bombers.

German Production Struggles

The American air force planned its 1943 campaign against German arms factories. Attacks in summer 1943 on Regensburg, a center for Bf 109 production, cut output by 50% for months. Bombing attacks on Marienburg in October 1943 destroyed an Fw 190 plant. Field Marshal Milch, in charge of German aircraft production, said that heavy raids from June/July 1943 stopped them from producing more than 1,000 fighters a month.

The Giulini aluminum factory was also badly hit in July 1943. These attacks reduced Germany's aluminum production. Speer's ministry estimated that the aircraft industry lost enough aluminum for 7,000 aircraft. It was also estimated that 5,000 to 6,000 fighter aircraft were lost in 1943 due to factory destruction and relocation.

Germany tried to move factories out of bomber range. But strategic bombing continued in 1944. So, German industries had to move production underground or into concrete bunkers. This order was given in February 1944 after Big Week. Milch described how they moved 4 million square meters of factory space. But the decision to go underground was only made in early 1944.

By spring 1944, the German aircraft industry had spread 27 main plants into 729 separate ones. Engine plants were spread across 249 locations. This dispersal was costly and difficult. The new facilities were built quickly. They lacked skilled workers and were less efficient. Moving materials to these new locations also strained the railway system. This explains why German factories failed to meet production plans in 1944. The quality of aircraft from these new factories also suffered.

Oil Campaign, May–November 1944

Spaatz's Strategy

Allied intelligence showed that Germany was running out of fuel. So, tactical air forces attacked oil trains and storage near the front lines. American bombers improved their radar use. British bombers also used their navigation tools better. They found that synthetic oil plants were easier to attack than refineries. These plants were larger and easier to spot on radar.

A committee was set up in London to manage the oil campaign. It recommended focusing on gasoline production. This meant synthetic oil plants and crude oil refineries in Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Germany were top priorities.

Allied planners knew Germany's oil supply was its weak point. By 1938, Germany imported two-thirds of its oil. As war neared, Germany started making synthetic oil from coal. This provided all the Luftwaffe's aviation fuel. In 1940, Romania and Hungary joined the Axis, giving Germany valuable oil wells. But the Allies still controlled over 90% of the world's natural oil.

The American air force wanted to make oil a priority. By spring 1944, they had long-range fighters to protect bombers attacking oil centers like Ploieşti. But the Americans had other priorities, like supporting the invasion of Normandy.

Spaatz and Harris again argued against using their forces for tactical support. Harris wanted to continue bombing cities. Spaatz wanted to attack oil plants. Both believed their strategies would cripple Germany. Spaatz threatened to resign if one of the bomber forces was not used for oil targets. He argued that bombing rail yards was pointless because they could be easily repaired. He also wanted to force the Luftwaffe into battle. Attacking oil would do this. Eisenhower agreed, and Spaatz moved the American 15th Air Force to Romanian targets.

Air Defense

The Luftwaffe faced two big challenges. First, they had to send planes from Germany to France to deal with the Allied invasion. Second, they had to protect Germany's airspace from deeper American attacks.

There was some hope. The Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet rocket fighter and the Me 262 jet fighter started to appear in small numbers in mid-1944. New Fw 190 "Sturmgruppen" also entered service. These Fw 190s had two 30 mm cannons. These could destroy a B-17 with three hits. The Fw 190s were heavily armored and mostly safe from American defensive fire. But this armor made them slower and harder to fly at high altitudes. Like the twin-engine planes, they needed Bf 109 escorts.

The Oil Campaign's Impact

On May 12, 1944, the first major American raid on oil targets began. The results were terrible for Germany. Albert Speer wrote that the enemy had hit them at their weakest point. He said if they kept it up, Germany would soon have no fuel production.

After these attacks, Germany tried a new defense. When bombers approached, they would light smoke pots around the Ploesti oil fields. This hid the area from precision bombing. The Americans tried low-level attacks with P-38s, but it was not a clear success. The oil situation remained serious for Germany. Göring ordered fuel savings. Many anti-aircraft units were moved from cities to guard oil fields.

The RAF also played a big role in the oil campaign. They dropped a lot of bombs on these targets. Their main targets were synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr.

The Luftwaffe was in an impossible situation. They had to defend the oil industry, but it was costly. Their fighter losses were high, while American bomber losses were low. By September 1944, the Luftwaffe was losing more planes than they were shooting down. Allied formations were 18 times larger than German ones. By October 1944, Germany had only 347 serviceable aircraft.

The 15th Air Force continued large-scale operations. Their missions against Ploiești denied Germany millions of tons of crude oil. The main refinery in Romania was almost destroyed. The final raids on Ploesti were in August 1944. Romania then surrendered to the Soviets and declared war on Germany. Remaining German fighter units retreated. The Slovak and Hungarian air forces continued to help Germany.

British Oil Raids

The RAF attacked synthetic oil targets in the Ruhr until November 1944. Then, Allied leaders decided further attacks were wasteful. The RAF was ordered to attack transportation targets instead. Charles Portal demanded that the British share the losses by attacking two large, distant targets: Pölitz and Merseburg-Leuna.

The Allied victory in France crippled Germany's warning system. This made RAF missions possible. Speer reported to Hitler that night attacks were more effective. They used heavier bombs and were more accurate. Germany's oil production in November was only 31% of its spring average. Most of the supply came from benzol plants, which were not attacked until autumn.

After the war, Albert Speer was asked which air force had a better bombing strategy. He said American attacks, which focused on industrial targets, were "by far the most dangerous." He said these attacks caused the breakdown of German industry. Speer noted that a small number of raids on ball bearings, dams, oil, and transport nearly collapsed Germany's war machine. This did not fully happen because Harris often diverted planes to area bombing. German intelligence showed that American attacks on oil and transport had a much greater impact than British area bombing.

Luftwaffe Training Problems

Flight training; total/operational hours.

Year	Germany	United Kingdom	United States
1939–42	250/75	200/50	–
Oct 42/43	200/50	350/60	260/60
July 43/44	200/25	330/75	320/125
July 44/45	140/25	330/100	400/160

The attacks had a terrible effect on German fighter units. More and more units were pulled from the Eastern Front to defend Germany. Göring ordered more thorough and faster pilot training. He also ordered bomber pilots to become fighter pilots. But this failed. Pilot training was shortened. In 1944, the pilot program was only eight months long. Pilots got only 20 hours of flying on the Fw 190 and Bf 109. This was less than half of what they got in 1942.

German fighter pilot schools needed a lot of fuel. But they never got enough. There were many new cadets, but primary schools had to close. The influx of bomber pilots helped keep output high for a while. By autumn, the Luftwaffe was looking for anyone with basic flying experience. One pilot wrote that he felt like he was closing the lid of his own coffin every time he got into his plane.

Before 1942, German training programs were better than the Allies'. But German training time decreased during the war. Allied training improved. The decline in skill was caused by the high rate of pilot losses. This was perhaps the most important reason for the Luftwaffe's decline. New pilots with less skill were lost faster. This forced training schools to produce pilots even more quickly. Once this cycle started, it was hard to stop. By early 1943, as many pilots were lost in accidents as in combat.

Impact on Axis Oil Production

The oil campaign was very successful. In June 1944, only 56,000 tons of oil were produced. This was far below the planned total. Oil consumption was higher than production. By the end of June 1944, oil reserves were down by 70%. Intercepted messages confirmed cuts in non-operational flying.

According to Speer, by July 21, 98% of all Axis fuel plants were out of action. Monthly production fell from 180,000 tons in March 1944 to 20,000 tons in November. Oil reserves dropped significantly. The campaign caused huge fuel shortages. This made the Luftwaffe powerless in the last 10 months of the war. It also stopped the German Army from launching counter-offensives.

Germany's Communications Collapse, Autumn 1944

Decline of Night Defenses

In 1943–1944, Germany's night fighter units were very effective. Even in July 1944, they were still successful. But in August, fuel shortages cut down their operations. After that, night fighters no longer had a serious impact. The Allied advance across Western Europe also destroyed Germany's early warning systems.

The RAF used "intruder operations." Mosquito night fighters would attack German fighters as they took off or landed. This forced Germans to limit airfield lighting. Due to fuel shortages, night crew training was not thorough. Manpower demands also led to a decline in quality of ground staff. Some fighter forces were moved to the Eastern Front.

In late 1944, the German defensive line only stretched from Denmark to Switzerland. This allowed British bombers to fly toward Germany without interception. German strength was reduced. More planes were used for reconnaissance over the North Sea. Despite problems, the Luftwaffe night fighter force was numerically stronger than ever. But its effectiveness was declining due to poor training, fuel shortages, and lack of manpower.

British Bomber Command's Transportation Plan

In the last year of the war, bombing became even more powerful. With German defenses largely defeated, the economy was open to massive attacks. Most of the bombs dropped by Allied fleets were in the last year of the war. Germany still had 50,000 anti-aircraft guns around industrial targets. They also had a small fighter force.

The American air force could use 7,000 bombers and fighters. The RAF had 1,500 heavy bombers, each carrying up to 20,000 pounds of bombs. By autumn 1944, Allied fighter-bombers could attack targets that were previously untouched. This firepower targeted the Ruhr industrial heartland and Germany's communication networks.

Rail lines were mostly destroyed. Coal and material traffic halved by December 1944. With the loss of Romanian oil fields, German oil supplies critically dropped. In winter 1944–1945, Germany was cut into isolated economic regions. Aircraft production moved underground into caves, salt mines, and underground factories. These were manned by slave laborers. Conditions underground were poor. Bad ventilation and high humidity damaged machinery.

Attacks on rail and communications began in autumn 1944. The Luftwaffe could not stop the destruction of Kassel's electricity supply. The Dortmund–Ems canal was drained. The large railway yard at Hamm was badly damaged. By early October 1944, only one in fifty trains reached the Ruhr. Lack of iron ore caused steel production to drop by 66%. Over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped on these targets. This caused a near total collapse between November 1944 and January 1945.

Statistics show the German transport system was slowly strangled. Daily freight car tonnage dropped from 183,000 in June 1944 to 83,000 in December 1944. Water transport of coal from the Ruhr declined sharply. Coal stocks piled up at mines because they could not be transported to factories. Production fell by 22% between May 1944 and January 1945. About 50–60% of this reduction was due to attacks on transport.

Germany's Defeat (1945)

Daylight Defense in 1945

By 1945, the Allies were at Germany's borders. German territory was now the front line. The difference between tactical and strategic attacks blurred. Allied air forces and the Luftwaffe supported ground troops. They also fought to attack or defend industrial targets.

Hitler tried to improve Germany's position by launching the Battle of the Bulge. The German air defense sent some fighter units to support this attack. The cost was high. About 400 pilots were killed or missing in late December 1944. On January 1, 1945, the Luftwaffe launched Operation Bodenplatte. This was an attempt to regain air superiority. It failed, sacrificing the remaining German fighters.

The Luftwaffe's leaders had hoped that jet fighters like the Me 163 and Me 262 would be prioritized earlier. But jet engine development had problems. The operations of these new planes did little to stop Allied air superiority. German losses remained high because of the difference in pilot training. For example, on April 7, 1945, only 15 out of 183 German fighters returned from a mission. The Germans reported losing 133 fighters, claiming 50 American bombers. But only eight American bombers were actually shot down.

The Western Allied invasion of Germany had begun. Airfields in western Germany were quickly captured. The Luftwaffe defended its airspace but suffered heavy losses. They flew defensive and offensive missions over Allied bridgeheads on the Rhine River. A few successes were scored. But the losses inflicted on Allied bombers were not decisive. The Allied Air Forces had control of the air. They attacked the Luftwaffe on the ground and in the air. From April 13 to 15, 400 German fighters were lost to Allied ground attack planes.

End of the Area Offensives

The intense bombing campaign against German cities continued. One of the most controversial raids was the Bombing of Dresden in February 1945. The reason for this raid was to help the Soviet army on the Eastern Front. Dresden was a transport hub. It was believed to be moving German reinforcements eastward. It was also thought to have important industries. But its value as a military target is still debated.

Other attacks took place in March–April 1945. The Luftwaffe tried desperate measures. This included the Sonderkommando Elbe aerial ramming unit. The Heinkel He 162 jet fighter also debuted. But these efforts did not stop the Allies. On April 19, Allied leaders ordered strategic air forces to support ground troops. This took effect on May 5. On April 26–27, the American air force flew its last operations. The British Bomber Command was busy helping Allied prisoners of war.

On May 8, Nazi Germany surrendered. This ended the fighting in Europe.

See also

• Emergency Fighter Program
• Sonderkommando Elbe
• Strategic bombing during World War II