Treaty of Naples (1639) facts for kids
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The Treaty of Naples was a special agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Poland. It was signed in Naples, Italy, in late 1639.
Under this treaty, the Polish king, Władysław IV, agreed to gather an army of 17,000 soldiers. This army would include 12,000 cavalry (soldiers on horseback) and 5,000 infantry (soldiers on foot). These troops were meant to travel through the Holy Roman Empire and then fight for Spain in Flanders against the French.
In return, the Spanish king, Felipe IV, promised to pay for the soldiers' training and upkeep. He also agreed to pay King Władysław IV a large sum of 500,000 Neapolitan escudos.
However, the Polish side quickly asked to change the deal. This led to a new agreement in 1641. In the new deal, Spain had to pay even more money for a smaller army. But this second treaty also never happened. The Spanish court finally canceled the whole plan in early 1642.
This treaty is special because it's the only time Spain and Poland ever signed a direct military alliance agreement.
Contents
- Early Ties Between Spain and Poland
- Poland's Royal Family and European Powers (1637–1639)
- Spain and Poland Plan Military Action (1639)
- Why Spain and Poland Wanted This Deal
- The Treaty of Naples (1639)
- Trying to Make the Treaty Happen (1640)
- A New Agreement (1641)
- The Deal Falls Apart (1641–1642)
- Why the Treaty Failed
- See also
Early Ties Between Spain and Poland
For a long time, Spain and Poland didn't have much to do with each other. They were focused on different parts of the world. Spain was busy with the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea. Poland was focused on the Baltic Sea and its large eastern plains.
But in the 1500s, both countries became powerful. Their interests started to get closer. Their first big meeting was actually a disagreement. Both Spain and Poland claimed money from Bona Sforza, a queen of Poland who had passed away.
By the late 1500s, both countries had diplomats in each other's capitals. They started thinking about working together. The first real attempts to team up happened during the early parts of the Thirty Years' War.
In the mid-1620s, King Felipe IV of Spain wanted to stop Dutch ships in northern waters. At the same time, Polish King Sigismund III of Poland, who had Swedish family, wanted to get back the throne in Sweden.
Diplomats from both kings tried to build a navy. Spain would pay for it, and Poland would provide the sailors. This navy would control the western Baltic Sea. But their goals weren't exactly the same. Also, the emperor and his friends had their own plans. In the end, a joint fleet was captured by the Swedes in 1631. Spain then stopped its active plans in the Baltic Sea.
The new Polish king, Władysław IV, became king in 1632. He continued his father's plans. In 1634, he sent a special messenger to Madrid. They talked about the Sforza money and about getting Spanish jobs and money for two of the king's brothers.
But the main point was Spanish money to help Poland fight Sweden. Sweden had been involved in the Thirty Years' War since 1630. The truce between Poland and Sweden was ending in 1635. King Władysław was thinking about starting the fight again.
Spain was slow to respond at first. They listened politely but didn't do much. This changed in the spring of 1635. Spain agreed to send two messengers to Warsaw. However, they didn't realize how urgent it was. French messengers, sent at the same time, traveled by sea. They arrived in Poland in May 1635. They quickly helped extend the truce between Poland and Sweden.
The Spanish messengers traveled by land and took many detours. They finally reached King Władysław in Vilnius in August 1636. There, they first suggested that Poland raise an army to join the Catholic League in the war.
Poland's Royal Family and European Powers (1637–1639)
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In 1637, it looked like the House of Habsburg (rulers of Austria and Spain) and the Polish House of Vasa were becoming allies. Spain gave money to two of the Polish king's brothers. They also gave Prince John Casimir a special award called the Toisón d’Or.
The Spanish messenger in Warsaw also agreed to pay for the Polish fleet lost in Wismar. He also agreed to pay interest on the Sforza money. But there were no clear plans for Prince John Casimir's job. There were only vague ideas about him leading a fleet or an army.
A big step was the "Family Pact" between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Polish Vasas. King Władysław IV and Emperor Ferdinand III were cousins. But with this pact, they also became brothers-in-law. King Władysław IV agreed to marry Cecilia Renata of Austria, Ferdinand III's sister. This agreement settled some family matters. It didn't directly cover military cooperation. But it seemed King Władysław was now leaning more towards Austria than France.
In early 1638, Prince John Casimir left Poland for Spain. It's not clear if Spain and Poland had agreed on his role there. Or if he just went to speed up talks. While he was in Vienna, French newspapers reported he would become the viceroy of Portugal. Spanish sources said this was just one idea they were thinking about.
However, in May, the French stopped the prince in Port-de-Bouc. He was traveling from Italy to Spain by the sea. Officially, they accused him of being a spy. But historians believe cardinal Richelieu used this chance to stop King Władysław IV from joining a military alliance with the Habsburgs. Richelieu wanted to keep Poland out of the Thirty Years' War.
By summer, it was clear the prince wouldn't be freed soon. In October 1638, Władysław met Ferdinand III to plan what to do next. Both kings decided to ask Italian states to help. These states were usually friendly with the king of France.
A Tuscan man working for the Polish king, Francisco de Bivoni, was sent to Italy. In late 1638, he talked in Republic of Venice. In early 1639, he was in Republic of Genoa. Spanish diplomats helped him in both places. He also had the power to represent the Polish king in the Duchy of Parma. He might have been there in early 1639. But all these efforts failed. Richelieu didn't change his mind. John Casimir remained held by the French for a year.
Spain and Poland Plan Military Action (1639)
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While Poland tried to free the prince peacefully, Spain saw an opportunity. They brought back the idea from 1636: getting Poland to fight against the French, possibly in Flanders.
King Felipe IV sent another messenger to Warsaw. This was Fernando de Monroy, a nephew of the Spanish ambassador in Vienna. Monroy arrived in Warsaw in the spring of 1639. He found King Władysław IV very angry with the French. The king was also frustrated that the Italian talks had failed. He was becoming more ready to fight.
We don't know all the details of Monroy's talks in Poland. But a key person he spoke with was Adam Kazanowski. Kazanowski was a close friend of the king and an important official at the court. When they talked about raising an army to help the Habsburgs, Kazanowski suggested three options:
- The Polish parliament (called the diet) approves the plan, and the king leads the army himself.
- The diet rejects the plan, and one of the king's brothers leads the army under the Polish flag.
- If John Casimir is freed, troops are raised and sent to fight for the Habsburgs.
Around the time of Monroy's visit, the Polish king decided to explore Spain's idea. He wanted to start talks about military cooperation, possibly against the French.
In mid-1639, Bivoni, who was still in Italy, was given more power to negotiate. He traveled further south. By August, he was in the Kingdom of Naples. There, he began talks with Duque de Medina de las Torres, the Spanish viceroy of Naples.
In the fall of 1639, the Spanish Council of State in Madrid discussed the issue many times. There were different opinions. But the final decision came from Olivares, the prime minister. His opinion won, and the Council agreed to go ahead. Medina de las Torres was given the power to handle the negotiations.
It's not entirely clear why Naples and Medina were chosen. Vienna would have been closer. The Spanish diplomats there knew more about Eastern European politics. Historians think that Naples was becoming a supply base for Spain. Medina was also good at handling money matters. It might also be that King Felipe IV wanted to negotiate away from the watchful eye of the Austrian Habsburgs. Also, the Polish messenger was already in Italy. Finally, southern Italy was about halfway between Madrid and Warsaw. It was an area both kings had been interested in since Sforza's death.
Why Spain and Poland Wanted This Deal
In 1637 and 1638, the Habsburgs suffered many defeats. Their forces were spread too thin and could only defend themselves. Historians also note that by the mid-1630s, Spain and Austria were running out of military resources. They had used up their main areas for recruiting soldiers. Even their backup areas could barely raise new troops. Some new soldiers had to be brought to the front lines in chains.
Smaller groups from Eastern Europe were already fighting. For example, a Scotsman who had served in the Polish army later led a unit of experienced soldiers in Flanders. Spain also tried to recruit soldiers in Denmark, Hamburg, Bavaria, and Tirol. The cavalry (horse soldiers) were especially needed.
At the same time, Polish horse units were known for being very good in Europe. However, there were also some concerns. Some people thought Polish soldiers were brutal and hard to control. The Elector of Saxony said that Cossack soldiers working for Poland "did as much damage to friends as to enemies." Some Spaniards thought Poland was too far away for reliable cooperation. But King Felipe IV seemed to like the idea. He noted that Cossacks were "unique when it comes to making breakthroughs and crossing mountains."
Poland's reasons for the deal are less clear. After wars against Sweden, Turkey, and Russia, Poland had been peaceful since 1634. The nobility, who paid for the wars, really liked this peace. They didn't care much about their king's family goals in Sweden. They cared even less if it meant Poland joining the Thirty Years' War.
King Władysław IV wasn't eager to join the big European war either. He might have considered a small involvement if it helped him against the Swedish queen, Christina, Queen of Sweden. But generally, he didn't want to fully commit to either the Spanish-Austrian side or the French side. His plan was to keep all his options open.
His brother John Casimir's capture pushed him to start military talks with Spain. But it's not clear if he truly wanted a Polish army to fight the French. Or if he just used the talks with Spain as a way to pressure France. He might never have intended to make a final deal with Spain. Another idea is that King Władysław IV just wanted money from Spain. Since he needed the Polish parliament to raise money at home, he might have planned to get cash from Spain instead.
The Treaty of Naples (1639)
The negotiations happened in Naples. Bivoni represented King Władysław IV, and Medina de las Torres represented King Felipe IV. Other people, like the Polish diplomat in Naples, were also involved.
They started talking in August 1639. But Medina didn't get full power from the Spanish Council of State until November 1639. We don't know the exact date they reached an agreement. One historian says the talks finished by the end of the year but doesn't give a date.
The exact written form of the agreement isn't known. No original or copy has been found in Spanish or Polish records. We only know its details from later letters. However, historians clearly refer to it as the "Treaty of Naples" or "alliance treaty."
The treaty planned for an army to be raised in Poland. This force would have 12,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry. They would also have support units, but these were not for fighting. Estimates for the total army size range from 22,000 to almost 60,000 men.
The army would be led by Polish officers. It would officially serve the Polish king. The troops were to travel by land from Poland to Flanders. The treaty didn't specify how. Once in Flanders, they would join the army led by Cardenal Infante. They would then fight against the French. This would technically mean Poland was at war with France.
It was agreed that Poland would not make a separate peace deal with France. They also wouldn't return any captured land to the French without Spain's agreement. In return, the viceroy of Naples, on behalf of King Felipe IV, would pay the Polish king 500,000 Neapolitan escudos.
It was also decided that three people would manage the treaty for Spain. Medina de las Torres would handle the money, using Naples' financial system. The Spanish embassy in Vienna would negotiate the army's passage through the Holy Roman Empire. They would also manage relations with the Austrian court. Finally, an Italian diplomat working for Spain, Allegretto de Allegretti, would oversee the recruitment and organization of troops in Poland.
The army was supposed to be ready by late spring of 1640. It would cross the empire during the summer and then join Spanish command. Even though Vienna knew about the plans, they weren't asked for advice on specific issues and didn't join the negotiations.
Trying to Make the Treaty Happen (1640)
In early 1640, Medina sent 430,000 ducats to Castañeda in Vienna for the project. In March, he told Madrid that the first payment had been made. At that time, Allegretti was already in Warsaw and reported problems. King Władysław IV said there were issues that made it impossible to officially approve the treaty.
In the spring, a Polish mission in Paris managed to free Prince Jan Kazimierz after two years in custody. In return, the Polish royal family promised not to fight against the French. Some historians think the prince's release was a direct result of the Naples talks, which were no longer a secret. But this is just a guess.
Spain still expected the Treaty of Naples to be carried out. Bivoni assured them that it was happening. However, there was no real progress in recruiting soldiers.
In late spring, Madrid decided to send a military expert to Poland. This person would check on the situation. They chose Pedro Roco de Villagutiérrez, a cavalry captain from Flanders. He arrived in Warsaw in July 1640. Villagutiérrez was not allowed to have political talks. His job was to work with Allegretti to get the deal done.
He first worked with Kazanowski and his friend Kasper Denhoff to get the treaty officially announced. But he soon realized that the Poles were just looking for a reason to blame Spain for delays. Villagutiérrez himself was very doubtful about the whole deal. He told Madrid that raising such a large force of mercenaries (paid soldiers) was not very effective.
Also, Vienna declared that they would not let the Polish army pass through their lands. This was because of the damage and looting their territory had suffered during the war.
Because of the standstill, Bivoni and Monroy suggested paying key Polish officials to get the deal done. Besides Kazanowski, Jerzy Ossoliński, an experienced statesman, was seen as a key decision-maker. Spain first thought about paying both Kazanowski and Ossoliński. But they decided to focus on Kazanowski. The amount for him (including Bivoni's share) was 20,000 thaler. But this didn't help much.
In mid-1640, Bivoni told Medina that the deal needed to be renegotiated due to new circumstances. The viceroy of Naples strongly opposed reopening the agreement. But Madrid was in a tougher and tougher spot. Besides military defeats, there was a rebellion in Catalonia and tension in Portugal. Medina was told to talk.
Meanwhile, problems with the treaty led to two changes in personnel. Castañeda had to leave the Vienna embassy. Medina blamed him for mishandling the issue. Bivoni was also recalled. Polish officials hinted that he might have gone beyond his authority. Maciej Tytlewski replaced him. Tytlewski arrived in Naples in late 1640.
A New Agreement (1641)
New talks between Tytlewski and Medina happened in late 1640 and early 1641. They finished in February. Again, no official document has been found. It's not even certain if one was ever signed. However, Spanish historians formally call it the "second Treaty of Naples" or "Treaty of Warsaw." Polish historians refer to it more generally as "another agreement."
The February 1641 agreement made some important changes to the first Treaty of Naples.
- Smaller Army: The new army would have 13,000 combat-ready soldiers. This included 9,000 cavalry (3,000 heavy lancers like winged hussars and 6,000 light cossacks) and 4,000 infantry. With support units, the total army would still be between 20,000 and 40,000 people.
- More Money: Spain would pay the Polish king 230,000 thaler. They would also pay an extra 400,000 thaler if Poland got involved in a war against Sweden, Russia, or Turkey. This effectively doubled the cost from the 1639 agreement.
- Different Command: The army would be raised in the name of the emperor, not the Polish king. It would then be commanded by Cardenal Infante in Flanders.
- More Details: Many details were added about command, transport, and supplies. For example, Medina successfully stopped the demand that the troops be allowed to loot territories they passed through.
Historians note that King Władysław IV got a very good deal financially. A winged hussar in regular Polish service was paid about 164 złoty per year. But in the emperor's service, under Spanish command, he would cost 30 thaler a month. This was about 1,080 złoty per year! Similar big differences applied to Cossacks and infantrymen.
All this was on top of a one-time recruitment cost, also paid by Spain: 40 thaler for a hussar, 30 thaler for a Cossack, and 16 thaler for an infantryman. Plus, there was the 230,000-thaler fee for the deal itself, which went to King Władysław IV's treasury.
Despite the higher cost and extra conditions, Medina seemed happy with the deal. He reported it as a success to King Felipe IV. To avoid the problems that followed the 1639 treaty, Medina sent his own representative to Warsaw. This person would supervise the new agreement. The chosen person was Vicenzo Tuttavilla, a military man who later became a high commander in Naples.
The Deal Falls Apart (1641–1642)
When Tuttavilla arrived in Warsaw in the spring of 1641, he found himself in a diplomatic battle. French messengers were also there, trying to stop Poland from getting closer to the Habsburgs. They wanted Poland to stay neutral in the Thirty Years' War.
Tuttavilla had some success. King Władysław IV refused to officially approve a 1640 agreement with Richelieu. That agreement had promised not to use Polish troops against the French. However, there was little progress on the Naples agreement. Neither the Polish parliament approved it, nor were soldiers actually recruited.
In June 1641, Tytlewski gave Medina a letter from the Polish king. It listed many demands as conditions for carrying out the treaty. These included:
- Payment of interest on the Sforza money.
- Arrangements for the Ducato di Bari and Principato di Rossano regions.
- Money for the Wismar fleet.
- Naming John Casimir as viceroy of Portugal.
Moreover, King Władysław IV asked for the 400,000-thaler fee to be paid unconditionally. This fee was originally only to be paid if Poland went to war against Sweden, Russia, or Turkey.
Despite this setback, Medina still thought the deal could be saved. He was mainly worried about the money.
Kazanowski, who had already received a lot of money from Spain, insisted there was a good chance of success. In early autumn of 1641, he claimed to have the support of 48 senators. He said he only needed a few more to win them over. However, he was becoming less and less believable. Some Spaniards thought they had put their trust in the wrong person and that Ossoliński should have been their man.
In late 1641, Emperor Ferdinand III declared that no Polish army would be allowed to pass through his lands. Madrid sent Marqués de Castelo Rodrigo to Vienna to negotiate. But the messenger was only told to abandon the whole deal. He was told there were cheaper ways to recruit soldiers in Denmark or Silesia.
Medina's own position, as the main negotiator, was also becoming weak. His political friend, Cardinal Infante, had passed away. Medina was left relying only on his family connection to Olivares. With his reputation on the line, he kept saying that everything was negotiable. He even suggested that the Poles could perhaps be used against rebels in Catalonia.
Tuttavilla kept discussing transit terms. In January 1642, he agreed on more details to make the passage of Poles acceptable to the emperor. However, at this point, Madrid declared the entire deal unworkable. Medina was informed. The Poles were told that the emperor's opposition canceled the project. The money meant for Warsaw was instead sent to Flanders.
Why the Treaty Failed
After the talks failed, Spanish officials still believed the deal could have worked. They thought errors by their own diplomats prevented it. Medina was very critical of Castañeda. He claimed the Vienna ambassador mishandled his mission. He said that letting Allegretti negotiate made the Poles believe the treaty could be changed. Marqués de la Fuente suggested Spain relied on the wrong person in Warsaw. Later, after a conflict in 1644 between the Poles and Medina in Naples, some in Madrid started to doubt Medina's own negotiating skills.
Spanish writers often say that the Poles just wanted to get as much money as possible from the Spanish king. They believe the project failed because King Felipe IV had financial problems. He couldn't pay for his big plans. Another reason for failure was the emperor's position. He was always doubtful about Polish troops crossing his land. At key moments, he refused permission, which effectively ended the project. Finally, it's noted that Poland's relations with Turkey were getting worse. So, Warsaw turned its attention towards the southeast.
Polish historians have doubts about King Władysław IV's true intentions. They suspect he might have started talks with Spain just to pressure the French. Some think his gamble worked and led to Prince John Casimir's release. After that, the king lost interest in military deals with Spain.
Others suggest that neither Spain nor Poland fully understood the political situations of their partners. The Spanish court thought the Polish king had as much power as the Spanish king. They didn't realize that dealing with Władysław IV was not the same as dealing with the entire Kingdom of Poland. On the other hand, Polish diplomats were misled into believing King Felipe IV had endless money. They didn't know about his constant financial problems.
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What would have happened if the Polish army from the Naples treaty had joined the Thirty Years' War is just a guess. A Polish light cavalry group called lisowczycy, sometimes confused with Cossacks, fought briefly in 1620. They had some success but gained a reputation as an army that "God would not want and the devil would be afraid of." This made it hard to use them again.
However, some of them did fight for the emperor against the French in Flanders in the mid-1630s. There, they confirmed their reputation as wild and brutal looters. Some mercenary units that had served Poland also operated in Flanders. But their military strength was only moderate, and their numbers dropped due to soldiers leaving. It's unknown what would have happened if the Spanish tercios (considered the best infantry at the time) had combined with the famous Polish winged hussars.
See also
- Thirty Years' War
- Medina de las Torres
- Adam Kazanowski
