Operation Sportpalast facts for kids
Quick facts for kids Operation Sportpalast |
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| Part of World War II | |||||||
 Fairey Albacore aircraft taking off from HMS Victorious to attack Tirpitz on the morning of 9 March 1942 |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Germany |
 United Kingdom |
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Otto Ciliax |
 John Tovey |
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| Strength | |||||||
| 1 battleship 3 destroyers 8 submarines |
2 battleships 1 battlecruiser 1 aircraft carrier 1 cruiser 12 destroyers |
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1 aircraft | 2 aircraft 1 merchant ship 1 armed whaler |
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Operation Sportpalast was a naval mission by Germany during World War II. It happened between March 6 and 13, 1942, in the Norwegian Sea. The goal was to attack two Allied convoys carrying supplies.
The main German ship was the battleship Tirpitz. Three destroyers and eight submarines joined her. However, the German ships could not find the convoys. They only sank one merchant ship sailing alone. The Allies also tried to find the German force, but they were not successful either.
This operation was the first big German attack on convoys going to and from the Soviet Union. Germany had moved powerful warships to Norway in early 1942. Tirpitz and her escort ships sailed on March 6. The Allies knew about this because they decoded German radio messages. The British Home Fleet tried to find and destroy the German ships.
The Allies used this secret information to change the convoys' routes. This helped them avoid Tirpitz. On the morning of March 9, the British found Tirpitz. By then, she was already heading back to Norway. Torpedo bombers from the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious attacked Tirpitz, but they failed. Two British planes were shot down. The German ships returned to their base on March 13.
The British were disappointed they could not damage or sink Tirpitz. They thought their aircraft and attack plans were not good enough. They believed Tirpitz was a big danger to the convoys. So, they started sending very strong escorts with them. The German Navy learned a lesson too. Tirpitz came very close to being destroyed. They decided to be much more careful. Tirpitz was only sent out against one more convoy, PQ 17, in June 1942. But she was called back before she could attack. She was attacked many times while anchored in Norway and finally sank in November 1944.
Contents
Why This Operation Happened
Before World War II started, the German Navy, called the Kriegsmarine, planned to attack Allied merchant ships. Their leader, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, thought battleships and cruisers were key to this plan. So, the Scharnhorst and Bismarck-class battleships were built for long-range attacks.
Tirpitz was the second Bismarck-class ship. She was launched in April 1939 and ready for action in February 1941.
The German Navy tried two battleship raids in the Atlantic in 1941. The battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst sailed from Germany, attacked Allied ships, and returned to occupied France. Another raid involved the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Bismarck sank the British battlecruiser HMS Hood. But then Bismarck was badly damaged by Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers from the British aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. She sank on May 27 after being attacked by several British battleships. Admiral Sir John Tovey led the British fleet from HMS King George V. After Bismarck was lost, Tirpitz was Germany's only large battleship left. Her crew was still training at this time.
After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Allies started sending convoys. These ships carried supplies through the Norwegian Sea and Arctic Ocean to ports in northern Russia. The Arctic convoys in 1941 and early 1942 faced few attacks. Only one Allied merchant ship and the destroyer HMS Matabele were sunk by German submarines before March 1942. The harsh weather, with extreme cold, rough seas, and strong winds, made naval and air operations very difficult.
In December 1941, Germany moved many naval and air forces to northern Norway. They had occupied Norway since 1940. These forces were meant to attack the Arctic convoys. They also defended the area from an invasion. The German leader, Adolf Hitler, wrongly believed the Allies planned to invade Norway. On January 12, 1942, Hitler ordered Tirpitz to move from Germany to Trondheim in Norway. The battleship and two escorting destroyers left Germany on January 14 and arrived in Trondheim on January 16. She was to be the main ship of a strong battle group. Captain Karl Topp commanded Tirpitz.
The Allies learned about Tirpitz's arrival in Trondheim on January 17. They got this information from Ultra intelligence, which came from decoding German radio signals. British photo reconnaissance planes found the battleship there on January 23. They flew regular missions over Trondheim to watch her. Tirpitz was a big threat to Allied convoys. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said on January 25 that "the destruction or even crippling of this ship is the greatest event at sea at the present time." The Royal Air Force (RAF) sent 16 heavy bombers to attack Tirpitz on the night of January 29/30. But they caused no damage.
Getting Ready for Battle
Allied Convoys and Fleet
Because of the German battle group in Trondheim, the Home Fleet had to provide strong protection for the next Arctic convoys. This was the first time such strong protection was given. The British also increased air patrols over Trondheim and the Norwegian Sea. They wanted to watch German ship movements.
Two Arctic convoys sailed on March 1, 1942. PQ 12 left Iceland for the Soviet Union. QP 8 left Murmansk in northern Russia to return ships to the Atlantic. PQ 12 had 17 merchant ships. It was escorted by a heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, and several armed Norwegian whalers. QP 8 had 15 merchant ships. It had a weaker escort of 2 corvettes and 2 minesweepers. Admiral Tovey wanted the convoys to sail at the same time. This would make it easier for the Home Fleet to protect them. They were most at risk between Jan Mayen and Bear Island.
On March 3, a force led by Vice-Admiral Alban Curteis left Iceland to protect the convoys. It included the battleship HMS Duke of York, battlecruiser HMS Renown, and six destroyers. Tovey was on board King George V at Scapa Flow. He wanted to stay there to talk with his intelligence sources. He also wanted to intercept Tirpitz if she tried to go into the Atlantic. The Admiralty disagreed. They ordered Tovey to sail on March 3. They wanted the full Home Fleet to attack Tirpitz if she sailed. Tovey sailed shortly after with King George V, Victorious, Berwick, and six destroyers. The two parts of the Home Fleet met east of Jan Mayen on March 6.
Tovey's orders were to protect the convoys first, even over destroying Tirpitz. He was not happy with this. He thought sinking the battleship was "incomparably greater importance to the conduct of the war". Tovey's forces were much stronger than the German forces.
Victorious's air wing had two squadrons of Fairey Albacore torpedo bombers. These were 817 and 832 squadrons. The Albacores were older biplanes. They were slow and hard to turn. They could carry one torpedo. The crews were experienced but had little training in attacking warships. The carrier also had Fairey Fulmar fighters from 809 Naval Air Squadron. These fighters were not as good as German fighters. Tovey thought his fleet did not have enough air support.
German Plans
A German Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor maritime patrol aircraft saw ships from PQ 12 near Jan Mayen on March 5. The German Naval Group North commander, General Admiral Rolf Carls, asked to attack the convoy. Raeder agreed after talking with Hitler. Raeder told Ciliax to avoid Allied naval forces if possible. He should only attack convoys if they were protected by an equal or weaker force. This raid is often called Operation Sportpalast. Ciliax and his staff called it Operation Nordmeer.
Ciliax knew two Allied convoys were at sea. He thought the Home Fleet would protect them, but he did not know its strength. His plan was to find one or both convoys between Jan Mayen and Bear Island. If they found a convoy, Tirpitz would destroy its escorts. Then she and the destroyers would attack the cargo ships. Ciliax could not sail with all his ships due to fuel shortages. He left Trondheim at noon on March 6 with Tirpitz and the destroyers Friedrich Ihn, Hermann Schoemann, and Z25.
Eight German submarines in Norway were to support Tirpitz. Four experienced submarines were placed to attack the Home Fleet if it showed up. The other four submarines operated near Murmansk. They would attack any ships from PQ 12 that escaped Tirpitz.
The Battle Unfolds
March 6–7
The German ships were not seen leaving by Norwegian resistance agents. Bad weather stopped British photo reconnaissance flights over Trondheim on March 6. Extra air patrols over the Norwegian Sea were also not flown due to a lack of aircraft. The submarine HMS Seawolf first spotted a large warship at 6:01 pm on March 6. This was north of Trondheim Fjord. Seawolfs commander, Lieutenant Dick Raikes, thought it was Tirpitz. He tried to attack but was too slow. Seawolfs crew sent a radio report. It said the ship was either a cruiser or a battleship. The German battle group sailed north-east along the Norwegian coast at 23 knots (43 km/h). They turned north at midnight.
On March 6, PQ 12 sailed through loose pack ice. This made it take a south-easterly course. The destroyer HMS Oribi was seriously damaged. QP 8 was also behind schedule. It had been scattered by gales on March 4 and 6. The Soviet cargo ship Izhora and the American ship Larranga fell behind the convoy.
Tovey got Raikes's report after midnight on March 6/7. He believed Tirpitz was at sea. He thought she was protecting northern Norway. But he could not rule out an attack on the convoys. Tovey wanted Curteis's force to protect the convoys. He wanted his own ships to intercept Tirpitz. The Admiralty refused. They told the Home Fleet to stay together. This was so Victorious's fighters could protect it from air attacks. Tovey ordered the fleet to sail north. They would launch search aircraft at 10 am. But icy conditions made flying impossible. This was a missed chance for the British. They likely would have found Tirpitz then.
The Germans did not know where PQ 12 was. Their aircraft and submarines had not seen the convoy again. Ciliax still did not know the Home Fleet was nearby. Tirpitz launched two Arado Ar 196 floatplanes on the morning of March 7. But they did not find PQ 12. Ciliax also sent the three destroyers to search on their own. The weather stayed bad, with frequent squalls and blizzards. The two convoys passed each other in the afternoon. Z25 came within 10 miles (16 km) of QP 8 but did not see it. In the afternoon of March 7, the Admiralty warned PQ 12 about German ships. The convoy changed course north, then east to avoid sea ice.
At about 4:30 pm, Friedrich Ihn spotted the Izhora. Tirpitz changed course to join the destroyer. Friedrich Ihn attacked and hit Izhora with a torpedo. But the cargo ship's radio operator sent a report before it sank. The Home Fleet received this, giving Tovey an idea of the German location. The British also intercepted a German submarine radio message at 4:40 pm. They wrongly thought it was from Tirpitz. Radio direction finding showed it was near PQ 12. Tovey ordered six destroyers to search the route the German ships might use to return to Norway. The main battle fleet went north-east to protect the convoy. Tovey received Ultra intelligence that afternoon. It confirmed the Germans were hunting convoys, not preventing a landing. Another German submarine signal at 7:40 pm made Tovey wrongly believe Tirpitz was sailing south fast.
Ciliax kept searching for the convoys. His destroyers ran low on fuel. Friedrich Ihn went to Narvik to refuel. Two attempts to refuel other destroyers from Tirpitz failed due to bad weather. They were sent to Tromsø instead. Tirpitz had mechanical problems on March 7. These could not be fixed at sea. Her speed was limited to 29.5 knots (54.6 km/h).
March 8
The six British destroyers went south-east, then north at 2 am on March 8. They did not see any German ships. At this time, Tirpitz was searching alone. She was about 250 miles (400 km) north-east of the Home Fleet. The British destroyers were low on fuel. They headed for Iceland to refuel. This left the Home Fleet with only one destroyer. Two had gone to Iceland the night before. Tovey thought the German battleship had escaped his destroyers. He turned south-west to meet other destroyers. These were needed to protect the capital ships from submarines. He got more Ultra intelligence about German aircraft and British radio activity. But a mistake meant it did not say the messages were for Ciliax. If Tovey had known, he likely would have turned the Home Fleet around.
On the morning of March 8, Tirpitz went north towards Bear Island. She tried to get ahead of PQ 12. The battleship then turned south-west. Ciliax thought this course would intercept the convoy. Her crew went to action stations. But Ciliax was wrong. PQ 12 had changed its course at dawn. It had been warned by Ultra intelligence. It passed north of Tirpitz. The battleship and a patrolling Condor did not see any Allied ships. Naval Group North sent Ciliax a signal at 6:20 pm. It suggested PQ 12 might have stopped its voyage. It gave him permission to end the operation. Ciliax decided to do so. At 8:25 pm, he turned south for Norway.
Tovey received more Ultra intelligence in the afternoon of March 8. It confirmed Ciliax was near Bear Island. Tovey reversed the Home Fleet's course at 6:20 pm. They headed for Bear Island. It took only two or three hours to decode German radio signals. This let the ships at sea react quickly.
After changing course, Tovey broke radio silence. He told the Admiralty he was heading north with the main fleet. He said he lacked protection against submarines. He also asked the Admiralty to control the Home Fleet's separate cruiser and destroyer forces. They knew their locations better. Two cruisers were in the Norwegian Sea, near Jan Mayen. Another pair of cruisers and three destroyers had searched on March 8. They sailed from Iceland to patrol the same area. Groups of destroyers were ready in Iceland and Scotland. Tovey hoped the Germans would intercept his signal and recall Tirpitz. This would keep PQ 12 safe. It might also bring the battleship within range of Victorious's aircraft.
Morning of March 9: The Attack
At 1:37 am on March 9, the Admiralty told Tovey to "steer 120 degrees maximum speed." This was because of an intercepted German radio message. It said Ciliax was heading to the Lofoten islands to meet destroyers at 7 am. The Home Fleet changed course for the Lofoten islands at 2:42 am. They went at 26 knots (48 km/h). The British ships were about 200 miles (320 km) west of the German battleship. Tovey got more Ultra intelligence. It confirmed the Germans were returning to Trondheim. It gave Tirpitz's expected position at 1 pm. German signals intelligence on Tirpitz intercepted Home Fleet radio signals. They warned Ciliax that a British force with an aircraft carrier was nearby.
By this time, the Home Fleet's battleships could not catch the German force before it reached the Norwegian coast. But Victoriouss torpedo bombers might damage Tirpitz. This could slow her down enough for the Home Fleet to destroy her. At 3:16 am, Tovey asked Victoriouss commander, Captain Henry Bovell, for attack plans. Bovell planned to launch six Albacores at 6:30 am to search. Then, 12 torpedo-armed Albacores would follow an hour later.
The six search aircraft launched at 6:40 am. Three were from each Albacore squadron. The Home Fleet was 115 miles (185 km) north-west of Tirpitz. Tirpitz had met Friedrich Ihn. The weather was good. An Albacore pilot spotted the German force at 8:03 am. As soon as the report came, the 12 strike aircraft were ordered to take off. Tovey sent a message to their crews. He said they had "a wonderful chance." The search aircraft stayed in contact with Tirpitz. After being spotted, Ciliax thought a torpedo attack was coming. He ordered the battleship to full speed. He told the crew to go to their action stations. He also had her floatplanes launched. Only one floatplane could launch. Once it was in the air, Ciliax changed the battleship's course to Vestfjorden. She would shelter at Narvik. The battleship was only 50 miles (80 km) from the Norwegian coast. Tirpitz's anti-aircraft guns fired at the search aircraft but missed. The floatplane damaged one and wounded a crewman. The other search aircraft kept tracking the German ships. Ciliax asked the Luftwaffe (German air force) in Norway for fighter aircraft. But it took hours for any to arrive.
The British strike force had four groups of three Albacores. Lieutenant Commander Bill Lucas led them from 832 Squadron. Lucas had just joined the squadron. He had no training in attacking warships. He saw the German ships at 8:40 am. He ordered his planes to approach at 3,500 feet (1,100 m). Scattered clouds might hide them. A strong easterly wind and the German ships' speed meant the Albacores' closing speed was only 30 knots (56 km/h). British torpedo bomber plans said strike forces should overtake targets. Then half the planes would attack from the left, half from the right. Torpedoes would be released at 800 to 1,000 yards (730 to 910 m). This would be hard for large warships to avoid. But because of the slow closing speed, Lucas ordered each group to attack alone.
Lucas's group attacked first. The planes approached Tirpitz from her port side. They released their torpedoes at 9:18 am. They were very low and probably more than 1,000 yards (910 m) from the battleship. Tirpitz turned sharply left and avoided these torpedoes. A group from 817 Squadron then attacked from the port side. Their torpedoes also missed.
Tirpitzs turning forced the other two groups to attack from astern. This meant flying into heavy gunfire. They released their torpedoes from very far away. Tirpitzs anti-aircraft gunners shot down two Albacores. All six airmen died. No hits were made, though one torpedo came within 10 yards (9.1 m) of the battleship. After this attack, the British aircraft returned to Victorious. They landed around 11:00 am.
The German sailors were relieved. Tirpitz was not damaged. Only three men were wounded by gunfire from the British aircraft. Ciliax gave Captain Topp the Iron Cross for his skill in avoiding the torpedoes. Victoriouss senior officers criticized the surviving British airmen. Bovell said Lucas started the attack too early. He also said other pilots released torpedoes too far away. Tovey did not try a second torpedo attack. Victoriouss aircraft could not operate in the defended area around Narvik successfully.
March 9–13: After the Attack
The failed torpedo attack meant the Home Fleet could not fight Tirpitz before she reached safety. The German battleship anchored near Narvik at 8 pm on March 9. In the late afternoon of March 9, the Home Fleet turned west. They wanted to avoid possible German air attacks. German reconnaissance aircraft started following the fleet. But Victorious's Fulmar fighters were not launched. It was thought they could not intercept them. At 3:45 pm, three German Junkers Ju 88 aircraft attacked the Home Fleet with bombs but missed. Four destroyers joined the Home Fleet around 7 pm. Tovey thought about raiding German positions in Norway. But he decided against it. He set course for Scapa Flow. The Home Fleet, with eight more destroyers, arrived at Scapa Flow on the night of March 10.
On March 9, HMS Shera, one of two armed Norwegian whalers, capsized. She was searching for PQ 12. Only three crew members were rescued. The other whaler went straight to Murmansk.
Tirpitz's crew finished engine repairs 48 hours after arriving at Narvik. She left the port with five destroyers just before midnight on March 12. British destroyers, led by Captain Alan Scott-Moncrieff, tried to intercept the German force. They used Ultra intelligence and reports from agents in Norway. They searched between Trondheim and Bodø that night. They did not find the Germans. They had to turn away from the coast at 3:30 am to avoid German air attacks at dawn. Four British submarines along the route also could not attack the German ships. Tirpitz anchored near Trondheim at 9 pm on March 13. The British got reports of her arrival from Norwegian agents. Photo reconnaissance confirmed this on March 18.
Both convoys reached their destinations without more losses. QP 8 arrived at Reykjavik in Iceland on March 11. Most ships of PQ 12 reached Murmansk on March 12. But some ships that got separated arrived on other dates. One Norwegian whaler with PQ 12 shot down a German aircraft. It was trying to bomb a merchant ship on March 13. This was the only attack on the convoy during its trip. Two of the four German submarines near Murmansk saw ships from PQ 12. But neither could attack.
What Happened Next
Lessons Learned
The British were disappointed they failed to sink or damage Tirpitz. Tovey criticized the orders he got from the Admiralty. He thought prioritizing convoy defense over attacking the battleship hurt his operations. He also felt the fleet should not have gone into waters with many submarines. They did not have enough destroyers to protect their main ships. He was also frustrated by the Admiralty trying to control his command closely. The Admiralty agreed with Tovey's first two criticisms. They agreed that sinking Tirpitz would be the Home Fleet's main goal for future convoys. They also agreed the fleet should not go past 14 degrees east without enough destroyers. His other criticism was thought unfair. The Admiralty had better access to Ultra intelligence at sea.
On March 13, Churchill asked the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, for a report. He wanted to know why 12 planes missed Tirpitz. He compared it to the successful Japanese attack on Prince of Wales and Repulse. The reason was that the Japanese had many effective aircraft with well-trained crews. The Fleet Air Arm did not. Pound tried to explain this to Churchill. But the Prime Minister was not fully convinced. This made him doubt the value of the Fleet Air Arm. Still, the failed attack on March 9 led to a decision. They would speed up improvements to the Royal Navy's air force.
Operation Sportpalast also showed the danger German warships in Norway posed to Arctic convoys. It was decided the Home Fleet would cover all future convoys. This stopped ships from being moved to other war areas. Pound was so worried about Tirpitz attacking convoys. He asked Churchill not to send any convoys during the summer. This was when there was almost continuous daylight in the Arctic. The Prime Minister did not agree. Tovey, however, thought the Germans would be careful with Tirpitz. He expected they would not send her to attack convoys in the Barents Sea.
The Germans learned a hard lesson from Operation Sportpalast. Both Ciliax and Raeder believed only good luck saved Tirpitz from damage or destruction. So, Raeder and Hitler decided to send the battleship against convoys only if victory was certain. Hitler also said she could only attack convoys if no aircraft carriers were present. After this, Tirpitz was mostly kept in reserve. She would attack Allied forces if they tried to land in Norway. Other warships, submarines, and aircraft were used against the convoys. So, the Allies had no chances to attack Tirpitz at sea after Operation Sportpalast. RAF heavy bombers attacked the battleship at Trondheim again on March 31 and April 28-29, 1942. But they caused no damage.
Later Operations
In June 1942, Raeder decided to send Tirpitz and three heavy cruisers against the next Arctic convoy. This was called Operation Rösselsprung. This force sailed on July 2 after Convoy PQ 17 was seen heading for the Soviet Union. They stopped at Altafjord in northern Norway on July 4. They waited for Hitler's permission to attack. After learning Tirpitz had sailed, Pound ordered the convoy to scatter. He also told its escort to leave on the evening of July 4. Tovey strongly disagreed with this decision. This led to heavy losses from German submarines and aircraft in the following days. The battleship left Altafjord on July 5 to attack the convoy. But Raeder recalled her that night. He learned Victorious was at sea.
Allied forces attacked Tirpitz at her anchorages in Norway in 1943 and 1944. The battleship was badly damaged on September 22, 1943, by the Operation Source raid. This raid used midget submarines. She was never fully ready for combat again. The Fleet Air Arm caused more damage during the Operation Tungsten raid on April 3, 1944. But several later carrier attacks failed due to bad weather and problems with British naval aircraft. RAF heavy bombers crippled Tirpitz on September 15, 1944, during Operation Paravane. They sank her with many lives lost on November 12 that year.
